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The Japan-U.S. Income Tax Treaty: Signaling
New Norms, Inspiring Reforms, or Just Tweaking
Anachronisms in International Tax Policy?
PAMELA

A.

FULLER*

I. Introduction
What form will international tax cooperation take over the twenty-first century? What
direction will it take in East Asia and along the Pacific Rim-two of the world's hottest
economic zones, where many developing countries are just now beginning to remove tax
barriers to trade? What happens in Asia will undoubtedly affect the development of international tax policy (and trade policy) around the world. Of course, precise predictions are
elusive, but the long-awaited Japan-United States Tax Treaty (Treaty),' which became fully
effective on January 1, 2005,2 after a decade in the making, sheds new light on these critical
questions, especially since Japan has indicated that it will use its new agreement with the
United States as its model in negotiating tax treaties with other countries.'
The new Treaty, with its accompanying protocol, replaces an archaic, thirty-three-year-old
tax treaty between Japan and the United States that had been in force without amendment
since 1972.' Not only does the new Treaty between Japan and the United States represent
"a critically important modernization of the economic relationship between the world's

*Pamela A. Fuller, J.D., LL.M. (Tax Law), is a New York-based attorney, specializing in U.S. federal and
international taxation, cross-border investments, and tax controversies. She formally served as Attorney Advisor to the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court in Washington, D.C.
1. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan, Nov. 6, 2003, S. TREATY Doc. No. 108-14 [hereinafter Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty
or the new Treaty].
effective date ofJanuary 1, 2005. See discussion
became effective prior to the default
2. Some of the articles
infra text accompanying note 7.
3. See, Gary M. Thomas, Opportunitiesand Challenges in New InternationalTax Era in Japan, 34 TAx NOTES
INT'L 1161 (2004) (reporting that a high ranking Japanese tax official clearly indicated, without actually using
the term model tax treaty, that Japan views its new tax treaty with the United States as its new model for future
tax treaty negotiations).
4. The former tax treaty between Japan and the United States was signed in 1971. Income Tax Convention,
U.S.-Japan, Mar. 8, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 967 [hereinafter 1971 Treaty].
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two largest economies,"' many of its provisions suggest a profound and pivotal change in
Japan's international trade and tax policy, which may serve as a catalyst for tax policy reform
in other Asian countries looking to remove unnecessary barriers to cross-border trade and
investment. Moreover, the new Treaty reflects an evolving international consensus on how
best to handle-at least within the confines of the existing normative framework-some
key issues, including the allocation of authority to tax cross-border investment income;
the treatment of income derived through fiscally transparent entities; and the policing of
conduit schemes, non-arm's length transfer pricing, and treaty shopping.
A.

NEGOTIATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE

Formal negotiations to revise the thirty-three-year-old tax treaty between Japan and the
United States began in October 2001, when the U.S. Treasury acknowledged in a press
release that the 1971 treaty needed to be revised "to take into account significant developments in the tax treaty policies and domestic tax systems of both countries since 1972."6
On November 6, 2003, the two countries signed the proposed Convention and Protocol
in Washington. The Convention and Protocol were accompanied by an exchange of diplomatic notes, also dated November 6, 2003. On March 30, 2004, instruments of ratification
were exchanged, thereby bringing the proposed Convention into force. Although most of
the new Treaty's provisions did not become effective until January 1, 2005, its March 2004
ratification allowed certain key provisions, such as the newly reduced withholding tax rates
on dividends, interest, and royalties, to become effective on July 1, 2004-six months prior
to the general effective date. 7 Thus, 2005 became the first full calendar year in which qualifying taxpayers could take advantage of all the provisions in the new Treaty.
B.

PURPOSE OF

Tx TREATIES

Bilateral tax treaties are a primary means by which unnecessary tax barriers to crossborder trade and investment flows are eliminated between resident individuals and entities
of the two signatory countries (Contracting States). A tax treaty is intended to provide
greater certainty to taxpayers by knitting together the tax rules of the two Contracting
States so "that there is little potential for dispute regarding the amount of tax that should
be paid to each country. The goal is to ensure that taxpayers do not end up caught in the
middle between two governments, each of which claims taxing jurisdiction over the same
income."' Thus, traditionally, tax treaties have been intended to prevent double taxation.
But in recent years, modern treaties have included an increasing number of provisions
aimed at preventing both the improper claim of treaty benefits by third parties engaged in
so-called treaty shopping, as well as the complete evasion of income tax in both Contracting States through complex conduit structures lacking any legitimate economic or business
purpose other than to obtain treaty benefits. International tax planners have increasingly
used fiscally transparent entities and hybrid structures in financing transactions to exploit
5. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of theTreasury, Testimony of Barbara M. Angus, Int'l Tax Counsel, U.S. Dep't.
of the Treasury before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations on Pending Income Tax Agreements ( Feb. 25,
2004), availableathttp://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/jsl 191.htm. [hereinafter 2003 Tax Treaty Hearing].
6. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury, U.S., Japan to Negotiate Revision to Income Tax Treaty
(August 10, 2001), availableat http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po548.htm.
7. Had the new Treaty been ratified after March 31, 2004, the new lower withholding rates would not have
taken effect until January 1, 2005, when the balance of the new Treaty's articles became legally effective.
8. 2003 Tax Treaty Hearing, supra note 5.
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loopholes created by the myriad of conflicts between various national laws governing:
(1) the classification of entities and financial instruments, (2) the identification of entities'
tax residence,9 and (3) the determination of which persons are subject to tax on a transaction. Arbitrage structures, designed to avoid taxation altogether, have become more
common since the United States made entity classification (even in the international context) largely elective through the so-called Check-the-Box Regulations.1° The 1971 treaty
between the United States and Japan did not include modern anti-treaty-shopping provisions. For example, the 1971 treaty included neither a sophisticated definition of "Resident" nor a Limitation-on-Benefits article (LOB) article to counter various treaty-shopping
and hybrid-entity techniques. An elaborate Residence article and a modern LOB article are
now standard features of tax treaties negotiated by the United States." The new tax treaty
between Japan and the United States represents the first time Japan has agreed to include a
comprehensive LOB article in one of its tax treaties, and its inclusion signals a major policy
change for Japan, which is already being reflected in its other newly negotiated treaties.
U.S. Treasury officials have lauded the new Treaty "one of the most important tax treaties
in the world,"' 2 in large part, because it was agreed to by the world's two most powerful economies. This fact alone merits analysis of the new Treaty since it is bound to be influential outside
the explicit bilateral relationship. But while the new Treaty may be important for removing

trade barriers in the short term, its long term effect on international tax policy is not as clear.
One would expect that an international agreement of this import and magnitude would include
provisions that do more than simply refine old concepts to fit new circumstances. One would

9. Except as otherwise provided in the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, only persons who are "residents" of
one or both Contracting States are eligible for treaty benefits, including the reduced tax rates. See Japan-U.S.
Tax Treaty, art. 1supra note 1.Article 4 contains an elaborate definition of the term "resident of a Contracting State," which generally means "any person, who under the laws of that Contracting State is liable to tax by
reason of his domicile, residence, citizenship, place of head or main office, place of incorporation, or any other
criterion of a similar nature ..... Id. art. 4(1) (emphasis added). However the term "resident of a Contracting
State" does not include any person that is liable to tax in that country only on income from sources in that
country or on profits attributable to a permanent establishment in that country. Id. This definition puts a great
deal of pressure on the meaning of the term "liable to tax," which is not expressly defined in the treaty's text.
Article 3(2), however, provides that any undefined term used in the treaty shall, unless the context otherwise
requires or the competent authorities agree otherwise, have the meaning that it has under the domestic tax law
of the Contracting State at the time it applies the Convention. See id. art 3(2). See also Press Releases Dept. of
Treasury Technical Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
16
on Income and on Capital Gains Signed Nov. 6, 2003, p. (2004), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/report/tejapan04.pdf (discussing how to determine which persons are liable to tax in a fiscally transparent entity) [hereinafter Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty]. The U.S. Treasury Department
issues a different Technical Explanation for each tax treaty that the United States enters into. The Technical
Explanation is viewed by officials, practitioners, and scholars as an official guide to that particular convention,
reflecting the policies behind particular treaty provisions, as well as understandings reached by the Contracting
States with respect to the application and interpretation of their treaty. See id. at 1.
10. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -5 (as amended in 2006).

11. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 4 (Residence), art. 23 (Limitation on Benefits), July 24, 2001, U.S.-U.K,
(Protocol signed July 22, 2002), availableat http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/uktreaty.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-U.K Convention]; see also Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, art. 4 (Residence), art 22, Oct. 2, 1996, U.S.-Switz.,
(Protocol signed Oct. 2, 1996), (Limitation on Benefits), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/
library/teswiss.pdf.
12. Tax Analysts, Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty of CrucialImportance, U.S. Treasury's Angus Says, 2003 WORLDWIDE
Tx DAILY, Dec. 12, 2003, at 239-5.
WINTER 2006
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expect to find some change in approach given how much the world has changed in the thirtythree years since the former treaty between Japan and the United States was signed.
This article reviews the foundational norms upon which most bilateral tax treaties are
based. It then examines selected articles of the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty with three questions in mind: (1) Does the new Treaty signal new norms? (2) Might the new Treaty inspire
reforms? (3) Does the new Treaty merely tweak anachronistic principles or, put another way,
does it evince the continued future dominance of the Nation State in a globalizing world?
These questions are not merely academic. Presently, an ongoing debate is raging over
whether the informal bilateral tax treaty network, of which the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is a
part, and which has been spawned and promoted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) through adoption of its Model Income Tax Treaty,
is an adequate or outdated institutional structure for allocating international tax authority
in a world that is being increasingly transformed by economic integration, electronic commerce, and the greater mobility of taxpayers. Much of this article is devoted to delineating
the deficiencies in the OECD bilateral tax treaty network, and evaluating several alternatives to bilateralism that have been offered in the literature, including the formation of:
(1) an explicit multilateral tax treaty, (2) a supranational body similar to the World Trade
Organization, and (3) regional tax agreements under the umbrellas of existing regional
free-trade agreements. My claim is that, despite its flaws and weaknesses, the OECD bilateral tax treaty network, which operates within the informal, multilateral, consensus seeking framework provided by the OECD and its Model Treaty, is still the best institutional
approach for allocating international tax authority, given the broad spectrum of domestic
tax rules, economies, and diverse political regimes. Fortunately, the conclusion of the new
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty greatly strengthens this informal network, making it much more
likely that the competing architectures for international tax policy will be dissuaded. My
claims and conclusions are admittedly controversial and not all scholars will agree.
Part II of this article reviews the foundational principles underlying normative international
tax systems in order to set the stage for the policy arguments made in this article. Part ILI provides a structural overview of the domestic tax rules of both Japan and the United States, and
briefly explains their trading relationship. Parts TV through XI set forth an analytical description of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, noting the tax policy objectives each provision appears to
serve, as well as any new approaches that are being taken in the Treaty. Part XII analyzes the
various alternatives to bilateral tax treaties mentioned above, after discussing the flaws in the
existing system. Part XIII is divided into four sections. First, it describes how the bilateral
tax treaty network is exhibiting certain synergistic attributes, known in economics as network
effects, which serve to increase the value and utility of the network to participating Contracting
States, especially as it expands. In particular, so-called transgovernmental networks, comprised
of Contracting States' national tax administrators, OECD representatives, and academics,
appear to be serving a key cooperative function by establishing standards that bolster compliance with explicit treaty rules and principles. Part XI then defends the bilateral tax treaty network from the sharp criticisms it has received, and argues that the OECD bilateral tax treaty
network may prove to be the optimal tax institution for the Information Age. Section C returns
to focus on the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, and considers the extent to which it is signaling
new norms and inspiring reforms-particularly in Asia, where many developing countries are
only now beginning to negotiate modern tax treaties. In this context, the continued viability
of the alleged anachronistic principles-income source and taxpayer residency, as a means to
delineate Nation State tax sovereignty-is finally evaluated. Part XIV concludes.
VOL. 40, NO. 4
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II. Foundational Principles of Normative International
Tax Systems
Before analyzing provisions of the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, it is appropriate to briefly
review the foundational principles that inform most countries' international tax regimesparticularly those principles that are routinely given as policy justifications for the domestic
tax rules of the United States and Japan concerning foreign-source income. 3 In general,
every country exercises some degree of sovereignty over all the income producing activities of its residents-whether that income is derived domestically or abroad. In fact, the
right of a country to tax the global income of its residents has long been recognized in
international law. 14 Conceptually, it is possible to divide the various national systems for
taxing residents into (1) worldwide systems (also known as residence-based systems) that
tax their resident individuals and entities on their global income, regardless of whether that

income was derived within the home country's borders or abroad, and (2) territorial systems
(also known as source-based systems) that tax only the income that was derived within the
nation's borders, irrespective of whether the person deriving the income is a resident or a
foreigner. Thus, a country employing a pure territorial system exempts all foreign-source
income from its tax base. If all countries in the world employed the territorial system and

also had the exact same rules for characterizing income and determining each income category's source, the potential for double juridical taxation would be eliminated, although, in
the absence of some supranational institutional tax authority imposing restrictions, there
would undoubtedly be fierce competition between countries for attracting capital by offering the lowest effective tax rates.

A.

SYSTEMS THAT TAx WORLDWIDE INCOME-

RESIDENCE

BASED TAXATION

Economists have long believed that worldwide economic welfare is reduced when capital
resources cross national borders in response to tax policies and incentives, rather than in
response to pure economic fundamentals." A system that taxes residents (or citizens) on
their worldwide income is arguably more economically efficient, from a global standpoint,
than a territorial system since the decision of where to invest-at home or abroad-is not
distorted by tax considerations. 16 Under this system, a resident would choose to invest in the

location that provides the best economic opportunity based on pure business considerations,
13. Both the United States and Japan allow domestic taxpayers to elect to either deduct their foreign taxes
or to credit them against their domestic income tax, so long as the foreign tax credit does not offset domesticsource income. See discussion infra at Part I. D (1)-(2).
14. See Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairnessand the Taxation of InternationalIncome, 29 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus.
145, 148 (1988).
15. See PEGGY B. RicHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN ECONOMIC ANALYsIs (1963);
PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME (1969). Musgrave's theoretical
and empirical work on the efficiency aspects of outbound foreign investments is thought to be the seminal analyses on the subject, although recently her conclusions have been questioned. See generally, Michael J. Graetz,
Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale University, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture delivered at New York
University School of Law: Taxing InternationalIncome: InadequatePrinciples,OutdatedConcepts, and Unsatisfactory
Policies, (Oct. 26, 2000), in 54 TAX. L. REV. 261, 271 (2001) [hereinafter Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome]. See
also U.S. Treasury Dep't, The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations:
A Policy Study, 23-54 (2000), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/subpartf.pdf [hereinafter Treas. Subpart F Tax Policy Study].
16. See generally, Treas. Subpart F Tax Policy Study, supra note 15.
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knowing that the domestic tax burden will be the same regardless of whether he locates his
investment at home or abroad. Because this kind of system promotes the efficient allocation
of capital, it is said to serve the efficiency norm of capital export neutrality (CEN). When
the worldwide system also allows domestic taxpayers to credit the foreign taxes they paid
on their foreign-source income, the worldwide system (so adjusted by eliminating the penalty for choosing to invest abroad) also serves the norm of equity-specifically horizontal
equity-in that it ensures that all domestic taxpayers are treated equally relative to themselves, irrespective of whether they chose to invest abroad or not. The foreign tax liability,
via the credit, displaces a part of the domestic tax liability on the foreign-source income so
that the marginal domestic tax rates on foreign-source and domestic-source income are the
same, and equality between domestic taxpayers is achieved. Moreover, worldwide systems
can be easily tailored to also serve the norm of vertical equity-the idea that those with a
greater ability to pay for government service should be taxed at higher rates. Progressivity
in tax rates is more easily effectuated through a residence-based system, than through a
source-based system, because the former can more easily access and substantiate the information about each taxpayer's total income and expenses upon which progressive tax brackets are based.
B.

SYSTEMS THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN-SOURCE
INCOME-SOURCE-BASED TXATION

A territorial system, unlike a worldwide system, exempts foreign-source income from its
tax base, but subjects all domestic source income to tax regardless of whether the person
deriving such income is a resident or a foreign person. Thus, the major prerequisite to
income taxation is the income's source. Territorial systems are said to serve the efficiency
norm of capital import neutrality (CIN) or competitive neutrality because all investors in a
given country are competing on a level playing field; all business activity derived within the

same jurisdiction is subject to the same marginal tax rate regardless of whether the investor
is a resident or a foreigner, so that those investors who invest both within and without the
jurisdiction are not disadvantaged as they are in pure residence-based systems (i.e., those
that offer no relief for foreign taxes paid)." Because all investors receive the same aftertax returns on investments sourced to the country employing a territorial system, they all
encounter the same prices within that country on future versus present consumption."
The problem of double juridical taxation is avoided in a territorial tax system since all
foreign-source income is exempt from tax. However, CEN is not served by a pure territorial system because investors are likely to be lured to the jurisdictions that offer the lowest
tax rates on investments. Huge amounts of capital will cross borders in direct response to
divergent tax policies. Thus, while a territorial system avoids double taxation and efficiently
allocates savings within a given jurisdiction, these advantages come at the price of losing
CEN.' 9 The efficiency norm of CEN has been thought of as superior to the efficiency
17. Overview of Present-Law Rules and Economic Issues in International Taxation: Hearing before the
Joint Comm'n on Taxation, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter JCT Economic Issues Report]; Graetz, Taxing
InternationalIncome, supra note 15 at 262, 271.
18. Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome, supra note 15, at 271.
19. Factors Affecting the International Competitiveness of the United States: Hearing before the Joint
Comm'n on Taxation, 102d Cong. 5 (1991) [hereinafterJCT Competitiveness Report 19911; Graetz, Taxing
InternationalIncome, supra note 15, at 272 and n.36.
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norm of CIN by both government analysts and tax scholars, many of whom maintain that
distortions in the locations of investments are "more costly than distortions in the allocation of savings.""

C.

HYBRID SYSTEMS

The world's tax regimes are neither fully harmonized nor standardized. Rather, the world
is full of diverse tax systems with overlapping tax bases; a wide spectrum of tax rates; and
clashing rules for classifying entities, determining residence, and characterizing income. In
today's world, it is impossible to achieve the policy goals of CEN and CIN simultaneously.2
A pure worldwide tax system, which serves the efficiency goal of CEN, fails to deal with
the problem of double juridical taxation and thus cannot fully serve CIN. A pure territorial
system, on the other hand, which theoretically serves the policy objective of CIN, cannot
efficiently allocate capital across borders unless all prospective competitor countries have
virtually the same system and the same tax rate, or are subject to the same international tax
authority that eliminates the relative tax incentives. Thus, no country has adopted a pure
worldwide tax system or a pure territorial system. If a country were to adopt a pure worldwide system, it would face the risk that the foreign-source income of its residents or citizens
would be subject to double juridical taxation, putting its domestic taxpayers at an economic
disadvantage relative to its foreign investors who reside in exemption countries and who
are not therefore subject to double taxation. If a country were to adopt a pure territorial
system, it would face the risk that its tax base would be depleted by the rush of its domestic
taxpayers to invest in a lower tax country. Accordingly, all countries' tax regimes reflect
a compromise between the tax policy goals of CEN and CIN and incorporate at least a
few elements of both systems-the worldwide system and the territorial system-although
most countries' tax regimes strongly reflect one choice over the other. None, however, are
pure; all tax systems are hybrids to some extent.
In the absence of international treaties and other cooperative agreements, a country has
basically four alternative ways to handle, via its domestic law, the foreign tax that their
domestic taxpayers encounter: (1) it may provide no allowance, applying its own tax to
the domestic person's domestic-source and foreign-source income; (2) it may allow the
foreign tax to be deducted from the taxpayer's worldwide gross income, effectively treating the foreign tax as a cost of doing business or making the foreign investment; (3) it may
allow the foreign tax that was paid or accrued to be either fully or partially credited against
the tax imposed on the taxpayer's worldwide income; or (4) it may, as just discussed,
completely exempt foreign-source income from the tax base. In addition, with respect
to the first three alternatives, a country may choose to defer taxing the foreign-source
income until it is repatriated in the form of actual or deemed dividends.23 Each of these
20. Graetz, TaxingInternationalIncome, supra note 15, at 272. ("Many economists regard the choice between
CEN and CIN as essentially empirical, turning on the relative elasticities of savings and investment.") (citing
Thomas Horst,A Note on the Optimal Taxation of InternationalInvestment Income 94 QJ. ECON. 793, 793-98
(1980)).
21. Id. at 270-72.
22. Id.
23. Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperationin InternationalTaxation, 26 BROOK.J. INT'L
L. 1335, 1337 (2001) (hereinafter Musgrave, Sovereignty].
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alternative methods has dramatically different effects on
the flow of capital, and each
4
carries with it different incentives for taxpayer behavior.1
The empirical and theoretical literature debating the consequences of these alternatives is extensive and beyond the scope of this article. But it is important to note that
economists have long concluded that the application of the first alternative above would
impose a serious tax barrier to capital outflow; the application of the second alternative
would protect the residence country's tax base by ensuring that its share of tax revenues
imposed on foreign investments (net of the foreign tax) will not drop below the gross
rate of return on domestic investments; and the application of the third alternative would
allow for the efficient international allocation of capital, although its return on foreign
investments (net of foreign tax) could easily drop below the national return on domestic
investments (gross of the domestic tax). 5 In other words, when foreign taxes paid by a
domestic taxpayer exceed the amount of domestic tax due, the third alternative requires
that the excess foreign tax credits be refunded to the taxpayer if the policy goal of CEN is
to be fully served. Otherwise, the domestic taxpayer would suffer an additional burden of
making the foreign investment as compared to the purely domestic investment. Thus, a
full foreign tax credit, without any limitation, can result in a revenue loss for the residence
6
2

country.

As the foregoing summary strongly implies, critical and far reaching consequences
hinge on how a residence country chooses to structure its own tax base relative to foreign
taxes. Unfortunately, the dialogue among government analysts and tax scholars has long
been dominated by a debate over whether the CEN or CIN best serves their ultimate
goal of worldwide economic efficiency, and precisely how a compromise between CEN
and CIN should be struck. Critics of this rather limited normative framework charge that
many important considerations other than worldwide efficiency are too frequently ignored
in the international tax policy discourse.27 Given the dramatic and integrative changes in
global economics, it is time for resident countries to expand their list of criteria in designing their international tax rules and cooperative agreements. Other worthy criteria that
could and should be considered include: (1) whether the policy adequately relates to the
way modern foreign investment is now often conducted-that is, through multinational
affiliated corporations and often through electronic commerce; (2) whether the policy
serves the national welfare; (3) whether the policy treats taxpayers fairly; (4) how the policy
will affect the country's own national income, exchange rates, and balance of payments;
and (5) whether the policy will increase or decrease compliance burdens and transaction
2
costs in its implementation. 1

24. The debate is again being considered by U.S. congressional committees. See Heidi Glenn, U.S. TarwritWORLDWIDE TAx DAILY 122-4, June 22, 2006 (witnesses testifying
before a U.S. House Ways and Means subcommittee hearing on international tax reform advocated that U.S.
switch to territorial system and reduce its corporate rates).
25. See, e.g., Musgrave, Sovereignty, supra note 23 at 1337-38.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome, supra note 15, at 284 ("[E]conomists today seldom ask how
these rules affect the economic welfare of U.S. citizens or residents. [citation omitted] Instead, they generally
accept worldwide economic efficiency as the operative norm, and generally conclude that the United States
should follow a policy of capital export neutrality.").
28. See Musgrave, Sovereignty, supra note 23, at 1337-38.
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D. THE 1920s' COMPROMISE

At this point, the newly initiated might ask how the newJapan-U.S. Income Tax Treatyessentially a binding contract between two nations-reflects the economic principles that
inform normative international tax policy systems. Of course, the framework for the new
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is not really new. Like virtually all of the world's about 1,800 bilateral
income tax treaties, it is based on the OECD Model Tax Treaty,2 9 which has its genesis in
the activities of the League of Nations. In 1921, in the wake of World War I, a number
of international organizations including the International Chamber of Commerce sought
the help of the League in facilitating a postwar system of international trade, since the old
system had disintegrated during the war. Starting on a slate that had been wiped clean by
the conflict, the League was able to produce a number of working drafts of model income
tax treaties aimed at eliminating double juridical taxation. Although some fairly comprehensive 1928 drafts are recognizable as the progenitors of the present OECD Model, the
League's working drafts did not attain their final shape until the 1940s. During these years,
the League was debating between two draft models-the Mexico Model (1943), which was
thought to favor developing countries through a source-based tax system, and the so-called
London Model, which was thought to favor developing countries by imposing a residencebased tax system. The work of the League was later taken up by the predecessor of the
OECD, which produced a 1963 draft model treaty that basically reflected a compromise
between the Mexico and London models by allocating the taxation of business income to
the country of its source and the taxation of portfolio income to the country of the capital
supplier's residence.30 This finding of middle ground became known as the 1920s' compromise. The Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, which became fully effective in 2005-more than forty
years after the Mexico and London Models were melded, and more than seventy-five years
after the League of Nations drafted its influential model-still reflects this fundamental
compromise of splitting the jurisdiction to tax international income between the Residence
State and the Source State.
The 1920s' Compromise is based on an economic entitlements theory, which also makes
pragmatic sense under common law principles. "There are two universally recognized and
widely practiced national entitlements to tax income in an open economy setting."'" One
entitlement is based on the income's source, and the other is based on the residence of the
income recipient. Thus, a country is thought to be naturally and fundamentally entitled to
tax all the income that arises within its borders. The rationale for this entitlement is that
the source country should be able to benefit from the gains reaped within its borders by the
domestic and foreign-owned factors of production since it is providing the profit-enabling
29. See ORGANIZATION OFECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD MODEL CONVENTION WITH
RESPECT To TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (2005) [hereinafter OECD Model Tax Treaty, OECD Model
Treaty, or OECD Model].
30. But many scholars believe that the London Model was favored and isreflected in both the present
OECD Model Income Treaty, as well as modern treaties which, as a general rule, often limit the Source State's
authority totax in favor of the Residence State's authority. Richard J. Vann, A Model Tax Treaty for the AsianPacific Region? (pt. 1), 45 BULL. FORINT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 99, 102 (1991) [hereinafter Vann, Treaty for
theAsian-Pacificl.Cf PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAx CONVENTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TAx LAW 67 (2d. ed. 1994)

("Neither of these Model Conventions [Mexico Model or London Model], however, was fully and unanimously
accepted. Moreover, in respect of several essential questions, they presented considerable dissimilarities and
certain gaps.") [hereinafter BAKER, DOUBLE TAx CONVENTIONS].

31. Musgrave, Sovereignty, supra note 23, at 1336.
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environment, whether that environment consists of an educated or low-cost labor force, natural resources, liberal regulations, or natural resources. 2 From a common law perspective,
this limited in rem tax makes sense since the sovereign has jurisdiction over the taxpayer's
property, but not his person. Accordingly, the source-based tax is most conveniently implemented through a tax imposed, under origination principles, as a payroll, value-added, or
gross withholding tax.
The residence country's legal entitlement to tax, on the other hand, is based on its in
personam jurisdiction. Thus the residence country is entitled to fully tax its legal residents
who are presumed to be enjoying the special rights, privileges, and protections afforded
to them by the sovereign-whether they be property rights, public services, or military
protection. And, as previously discussed, this theory of entitlement is usually expressed by
taxing the residents' worldwide income, including foreign-source income, on a net basis.
The residence country's entitlement may also be justified by a benefits or quid pro quo theory. Under this theory, the residence country is viewed as the residual or dominant taxing
authority,3 which view became embedded in the OECD Model Treaty. This is one major
reason why the OECD Model has long been generally regarded as being oriented toward
34
the interests of countries that are industrialized or on the fast track to becoming so.
E.

ANACHRONISTIC PRINCIPLES?

The world is now a very different place than it was in the early part of the twentieth century when drafters of the OECD Model Treaty first embraced the framework of assigning
income on the basis of its source and the taxpayer's residence. Nonetheless, most countries,
especially the industrialized ones, appear wed to this construct-it is at the foundation
for all bilateral tax treaties based on the OECD Model." A commitment to this course of
international tax cooperation, however, is sure to lead to more complexity and confusion
because as economies have become increasingly integrated, and transactions increasingly
borderless, the concepts of source and residence have become increasingly anachronistic
and arbitrary.
Treaties based on the OECD Model, as well as most national tax systems, all require that
a distinction be made between domestic-source and foreign-source income. But since the
1920s, the concept of source has become nebulous and no longer relates to the realities of
how business is conducted in the twenty-first century. Most cross-border transactions in the
1920s involved tangible goods, and enterprises, even if they were related to each other, operated rather autonomously. Thus, it was much easier to rationally relate a particular item of
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Vann, Treaty for the Asian-Pacific?, supra note 30, at 102.
35. Id. Nonindustrialized countries, wanting their own model tax treaty, signed treaties based on the United
Nations Model Tax Treaty, which more strongly reflects the Mexico Model (i.e., source based taxation) than
the London Model (i.e., residence based taxation). However, because when the U.N. Model was first being
drafted in the late 1970s, it relied on the 1977 OECD Model as its starting point, the framework and much
of the textual language of the two models is similar. Accordingly, the influence of the OECD Model Treaty
is not limited to industrialized countries since developing countries and non-OECD member countries are
becoming more involved in a growing bilateral network that is also effectively based on the OECD Model
Tax Treaty. Id.; see UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAx CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
COtUNRIES (2001) [hereinafter U.N. Model Tax Treaty, or U.N. Model]. For an unofficial commentary on the
U.N. Model, see U.N. Draft Model Tax Convention (Kluwer, Deventer, 1979).
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income to a particular country in which it ostensibly arose. But things have changed. In the
last few decades alone, the world has witnessed the invention of the personal computer
and software, the tremendous rise of e-commerce, teleconferencing, and telecommuting,
and the explosive growth of transactions involving intangible assets and complex financial
derivatives. The idea that income is being derived from one particular country is no longer
a valid assumption (if it ever was) since more transactions are taking place in cyberspace
and the factors of production are often scattered around the world, split into tiny bundles
of various ownership rights. Yet, under the present system, income cannot be sourced to
cyberspace; it has to be sourced to a country. Thus, in order to implement the distinction between domestic-source and foreign-source income, all kinds of artificial constructs
have had be inserted into the sourcing rules. Taxpayers can now more easily manipulate an
item of income's source, and given the divergent tax systems and rate structures offered by
various countries, taxpayers have the incentive to change the character and source of their
income.16 The result is that economic inefficiencies are now built into the system.
The concept of residence also has become increasingly anachronistic and arbitrary. The jet
age has permitted individuals to become increasingly mobile and therefore able to live and
work in several different jurisdictions within the same year and have more than one home. But
the problem of identifying a human's tax residence pales in comparison to the conundrum of
identifying a transnational conglomerate's tax residence. Transnational corporations are routinely composed of consortiums of companies that are related either through equity ownership
or contractual agreements. These transnational corporate groups have member companies all
over the globe that are performing different functions. A corporation may be formally incorporated under the laws of one country, have its management and control center in another
country, and perform its business operations through subsidiaries, partnerships, or branches
in many other countries. Because different countries impose different tax rates on their resident corporations, and bilateral treaties limit only the maximum rate a Contracting State can
impose on a foreign-owned business operating within its borders, companies remain motivated
to manipulate their tax residence for tax treaty purposes." Indeed, the ease with which tax
residence might be manipulated is the primary reason why the United States requires an LOB
clause in all of its tax treaties." Many provisions of modem treaties are aimed at this abuse,
which fact proves how artificial the concept of residence has become.
Technically, treaties based on the OECD Model Treaty do not view the whole corporate
conglomerate as a one huge combined entity for residence purposes, but instead treat each
member of the group as a separate person with its own tax residence. As will be shown, this separate entity approach is also used by the OECD and the newJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty in policing
perceived transfer pricing abuses. In general, treaties based on the OECD Model require that

36. For example, because royalties and business profits have different rules for determining source and
different maximum tax rates under most treaties, inefficiency is essentially built into the system by creating
incentives for taxpayers to structure their transactions for optimal tax results, rather than in response to pure
economic fundamentals. See discussion infra Part V.
37. The U.S. Entity Classification rules greatly increase taxpayers' ability to manipulate a company's residence for tax purposes, by allowing certain eligible entities, both foreign and domestic, to elect their U.S. tax
classification as an opaque corporation, a tax transparent trust or parmership, or a disregarded entity. SeeTreas.
Reg., §§ 301.7701-1 to -5 (as amended in 2006). For further discussion of the problems created by the ambiguous concept of residency as applied to companies, and how the newJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty attempts to resolve
them, see infra Part VII.
38. Seediscussion of LOB clause in the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty infra Part VIII.
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arm's length prices be charged between entities that are related. This requirement is aimed
at preventing commonly controlled groups of companies from effectively lowering their
overall tax burden by shifting their income to subsidiaries located in low-tax jurisdictions
and their deductions in high-tax jurisdictions through artificial means such as the setting of
intercompany sales prices that bear little relation to economic reality. But as applied on a
separate entity basis to intra-firm transactions within a huge affiliated corporate group, the
arm's length formula becomes an administrative nightmare that is laden with all kinds of
artificial constructs in order to find a comparable transaction so as to determine what might
be an arm's length price. 9
Ironically, while many domestic tax systems, such as those of the United States and Japan,
have been focused on implementing rules aimed at increasing worldwide efficiency or CEN,
bilateral tax treaties have in some ways made achieving that tax policy objective more difficult.
Of course, the whole purpose of a tax treaty is to eliminate the potential for the double taxation
of income and to prevent fiscal evasion. But the concepts of source and residence-so fundamental to today's treaties-have created incentives to misuse them. Moreover, the schedular
nature of bilateral tax treaties contains built-in inefficiencies. Taxpayers are motivated to structure transactions so that their income will fall within a particular tax favored category. This
problem is exacerbated by the assumption in treaties that the tax rates will be reciprocal. Treaties do not require a uniform tax rate be imposed, but only that the rates with respect to particular types of income not exceed a maximum. If the two Contracting States employ different
systems of taxing the same kind of income and provide different effective rates-on dividends
for example-inefficiencies will result in spite of the treaty rate limitations. These problems
°
are further illustrated below in the discussion of specific provisions of the New Treaty
I. Tax Systems of the U.S. and
Japan-A Structural Overview

l

The Japanese and U.S. international tax systems are broadly similar in that both strongly
resemble a worldwide tax system and employ a limited foreign tax credit to eliminate double juridical taxation. But beyond these general similarities, there are numerous differences
in the ways Japan and the United States implement the tax policy goal of CEN. Moreover,
they have conflicting definitions of residency, different tax rate structures, and assign different weight to the status of tax treaties relative to their own domestic legislation.
A.

STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW OF U.S. INCOME

Tx

RULES

1. Tax Treatment of U.S. Persons

The United States taxes the income of all U.S. persons-including its residents, citizens,
and domestic entities-on a global basis, meaning the base is determined without regard to

39. See discussion of transfer pricing provisions in the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty infra Part VI.
40. See discussion infra Parts IVVII.
41. The descriptions in this section are intended to serve as general overviews of the U.S. and Japanese tax
systems without regard to their bilateral treaty provisions. For purposes of exposition, many of the rules and
virtually all of the complex details of these two national tax regimes have been omitted. Pertinent details and
exceptions to the rules mentioned will be discussed as they are raised in the discussion of selected articles of the
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, which follows in Parts IV through IX.
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geographic source or character.4 All income that is recognized 41 is considered gross income 44
and is potentially subject to tax. Determining gross income is the starting point for determining the U.S. income tax, although srme categories such as gifts, bequests, and cancellation of indebtedness, are specifically excluded from the definition. 4 After various deductions
are taken, a tentative tax is computed using progressive rates. Allowable tax credits, such as
46
the foreign tax credit, are then subtracted to determine a U.S. taxpayer's tax liability.
a. Individuals
For purposes of the U.S. federal income tax, an individual is a U.S. person if he or she
qualifies as either a citizen or a U.S. resident.47 The individual income tax base includes all
of a U.S. person's gross income from whatever source derived, 48 is computed on a net basis
under a self-assessment system, and is taxed at progressive rates. 49 In 2005, the individual
rates on ordinary income ranged from 10 to 35 percent. Since 2003, long-term capital gains
50
and qualified dividends have been taxed at a maximum rate of 15 percent.
b. Business Entities
The United States is an example of a jurisdiction that uses a purely formal test for determining whether a business entity is domestic and thus a "U.S. person" for federal tax purposes.5
Any business entity is considered domestic if it is organized in the United States, or organized

42. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (RIA 2006) (defining "United States person"); see,e.g., I.R.C. § I (tax imposed on
individuals); I.R.C. § II (tax imposed on corporations); I.R.C § 701 (tax imposed on partners of a partnership);
I.R.C. § 1366(a) (determination of S-Corp shareholder's tax liability).
43. Income recognition is a term of art under U.S. tax law. See I.R.C. § 1001.
44. See I.R.C. § 61 (defining gross income).
45. See I.R.C. §§ 101, 112, 115, 117-23,125-27, 129-39 (Specific exclusions from gross income).
46. Income of U.S. corporations is taxed at graduated rates ranging from 15% to 35% with no preferential
rate for capital gains. I.R.C. § 1 l(a)-(c). However, U.S. corporations may deduct qualified dividends received
from their U.S. subsidiaries. See I.R.C. §§ 243,244,245,246, 246A, 247. The amount of the dividends-received
deduction is dependent on the percentage of equity ownership. For example, 80% of a dividend received from
a 20-percent-owned corporation is deductible if certain requirements are met. See I.R.C. § 243. In general,
inter-company dividends are eliminated if the corporations are eligible to file a consolidated return, meaning
they meet the definition of an affiliated group. See id.
47. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (RIA 2006). The residency of an individual is important under U.S. law because a
resident individual, like a U.S. citizen, is taxed on his or her global income, while a nonresident alien is taxed
only on certain U.S.-source income and income that is effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business.
Any alien that spends sufficient time in the United States during a single year, or over a three-year period, is
generally treated as a resident for federal tax purposes. There are a few other ways an alien can qualify as a U.S.
resident. For example, an alien who holds a green card is considered a U.S. resident for federal tax purposes
and taxed on his or her worldwide income.
48. I.R.C. § 6 1(a).
49. The effective rates on ordinary income earned by U.S. individuals for the taxable years 2006 through
2010 are 35%, 33%, 28%, and 25%, respectively. See I.R.C. § 1. In 2003, the maximum capital gains rate for
individuals was lowered to 15%, although this rate is set to expire at the end of 2008, at which time it could
go back to a maximum of 20%. SeeJobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No.108-27, 117 Stat. 752, (2003) (JGTRRA). In addition, the 2003 JGTRRA lowered the tax rate on qualified
dividends received by individuals to a maximum capital gains rate of 15%, which will also expire at the end of
2008 unless Congress extends it. Seediscussion infra Part III.A. 1.
50. This preferential 15% rate, however, is set to expire at the end of 2008, at which time it could go back
to a maximum of 20%. SeeJGTRRA, supra note 49. Seediscussion infra Part III.A.1.
51. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)(B)-(E) (defining a "U.S. person" as including, inter alia, a domestic partnership,
domestic corporation, domestic estate, and a domestic trust, respectively).
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under the laws of the United States or any of the federal states. 2 Thus, a business entity
formed in the United States will be considered a domestic entity even if all its shareholders
are foreign persons and its center of management is located outside the United States. 3
The determination of whether a business entity is domestic is made independently from the
determination of its classification for tax purposes as a corporation, a partnership, or other
non-corporate entity. Under U.S. tax law, if a business entity is incorporated in the United
States and also chartered in a foreign country (i.e., a dual chartered company), it will still be
treated as a U.S. entity, and thus subject to tax as a U.S. person, in the absence of contrary
4

treaty provisions.1

In 1997, the United States made entity classification, even in the international context,
largely elective through the promulgation of the so-called Check-the-Box Regulations."
These regulations provide that certain eligible entities that are not per se corporations may
elect to be treated as either corporations, partnerships, or disregarded entities for U.S. tax
purposes.16 The U.S. and international tax consequences of being classified as a corporation as opposed to a partnership, especially in the international context, are huge. All U.S.
corporations are taxed on their worldwide income under a two-tier corporate tax regime,
regardless of whether they have one shareholder or thousands." In contrast to corporations, the U.S. tax law treats partnerships, and limited liability companies that elect to be
taxed as partnerships, as generally transparent for tax purposes, meaning no tax is imposed
at the entity level."3 Instead, the undistributed income from these non-corporate entities is
treated as passing through on an annual basis in the form of distributive shares, which are
then combined with the other income of each partner or member and taxed separately at
the rate applicable to each of the different partners or members. 9 As will be shown, the
ability of certain eligible entities-domestic and foreign-to elect their U.S. tax status as
either tax transparent partnerships or separate corporate taxpayers has proven advantageous in international tax planning due to their resulting utility as vehicles of tax arbitrage.
In recent years, various domestic laws and treaty provisions have attempted to restrict these
tax advantages. 6°
U.S. corporations are treated as separate entities with separate legal personalities. In
keeping with this principle, the income of a domestic corporation is generally subject to tax
both at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level when the income is distributed
in the form of dividends or liquidating distributions.61 Critics of this two-tier tax system
have long argued that it is burdensome and inefficient. In May 2003, the United States
largely abandoned its classic two-tier tax system by adopting, at least temporarily, a type of

52. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-5 (as amended in 2006).
53. Id. § 301.7701-5.
54. Id.
55. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -5 (as amended in 2006).
56. Id. Publicly traded entities are always taxed as corporations regardless of their form of organization.
LLCs with only one member are disregarded for U.S. tax purposes (tax nothings) unless they elect to be taxed
as a U.S. corporation. Id.
57. See I.R.C. § 301 (RIA 2006).
58. I.R.C. § 701 (partner, not partnership subject to tax); see I.R.C. §§ 1363(a) & 1366(a) (flow-through tax
regime applicable to electing S-corporations and shareholders).
59. I.R.C. § 702(b).
60. See discussion of fiscally transparent entities and tax arbitrage infra Part V
61. I.R.C. §§ 311, 301, 336, 331. But see I.R.C. § 243 (Corporate Dividends Received Deduction).
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partial corporate integration in the form of dividend tax relief. Certain dividends received
by U.S. individuals (historically taxed to shareholders at rates as high as 38.6 percent) will
be taxed at preferential capital gains rates-the highest rate being 15 percent.62 Much like
dividend imputation systems, which used to be common in Europe, dividend tax relief is
only available to U.S. investors. Moreover, in order to qualify for the 15 percent U.S. tax
rate, the dividend must be paid to an individual shareholder, either by a domestic corporation, or a qualified foreign corporation, defined as meeting one of the following requirements: (1) its shares or American depository receipts are traded on a U.S. stock exchange,
(2) it resides in a foreign country with which the United States has a tax treaty that contains
adequate exchange-of-information provisions, or (3) it is established in a U.S. possession. The
15 percent rate is also extended to actual dividends or deemed dividends received by U.S.
shareholders of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) as defined under section 957.63
Traditionally, income earned indirectly by U.S. shareholders through a foreign corporation is not subject to U.S. tax until it is repatriated to its U.S. shareholders. Deferral of
U.S. taxation is considered appropriate on most types of active business income earned
by foreign corporations with U.S. shareholders. However, the ability of U.S. taxpayers to
accumulate earnings in a foreign corporation, free from U.S. tax, is restricted by several sets
of complex rules, known as anti-deferral regimes. The policy underlying these anti-deferral
regimes is aimed at taxing a U.S. shareholder's share of the foreign corporation's income
that is either (1) passive and situated in low-tax jurisdictions," or (2) business income that
is being routed through conduit foreign corporations so as to artificially isolate the business gains in low-tax jurisdictions outside the country where the manufacturing or service
activities are taking place .6 The tax is either a current tax on annual deemed distributions,
or a tax on actual distributions, which is proportional to the value of the tax deferral that
was enjoyed on the foreign accumulated earnings.
The United States removes the potential for double juridical taxation by allowing U.S.
66
taxpayers to annually elect to either deduct their foreign taxes from their global income,
67
or to credit the foreign taxes paid or accrued against their U.S. tax liability. Generally, it
is more advantageous to elect the foreign tax credit over the deduction since it provides a
62. See § l(h)(1 1) (RIA 2006) ( dividends taxed as net capital gains). The preferential 15% rate on dividends
is not available to nonresident aliens. SeeJGTRRA, supra note 49. In addition, the 2003 JGTRRA lowered the
tax rate on qualified dividends received by individuals to a maximum capital gains rate of 15% which, like the
15% rate on dividends, will automatically expire at the end of 2008 unless Congress extends it.
63. I.R.C. § 957(a). The preferential 15% rate is not extended, however, to passive foreign investment companies (PFICs) or personal holding companies (PHCs) since a preferential dividend repatriation rate would
defeat the whole purpose of those anti-deferral regimes. The investors in those corporations are already effectively enjoying an interest-free loan from the government in the form of tax-deferred earnings so long as
none of the anti-deferral mechanisms are triggered. See I.R.C. § 1297 (defining "passive foreign investment
company"), I.R.C. § 542 (defining "Personal Holding Company").
64. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1291-97 (treatment of certain passive foreign investment companies and qualified
electing funds); I.R.C. §§ 541-47 (personal holding companies); I.R.C. §§ 531-37 (accumulated earnings tax).
65. See I.R.C. §§ 951-62, 964-65) (Controlled Foreign Corporations). These Code sections, along with
their accompanying regulations, are commonly referred to as the "subpart F provisions." Under the samecountry exception to certain types of subpart F income, tax deferral is allowed for certain classes of income that
are earned in the same jurisdiction where the income-producing activities are taking place. Thus, to the extent
the exception applies, the policy objective of CEN is trumped by the policy objective of CIN, which the samecountry exception serves. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(3), (d)(l)-(2), (e)(l)(b).
66. I.R.C. § 164(a) (RIA 2006).
67. I.R.C. § 901.
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dollar-for-dollar offset from U.S income tax. However, the foreign tax credit is subject to
a general limitation, the purpose of which is to prevent the cross-crediting of foreign taxes
68
against U.S. tax on U.S.-source income.
A U.S. corporation owning at least 10 percent of a foreign corporation, and which is paid
a dividend or is required to include a portion of its subsidiary's earnings in income under
an anti-deferral regime, is also allowed a foreign tax credit. 69 The U.S. parent corporation
is deemed to have paid a portion of its subsidiary's foreign taxes. The foreign taxes deemed
paid by the U.S. parent are included in the computation of its total foreign taxes paid, and
its general foreign tax credit limitation for the year in which the actual dividend or deemed
dividend is received.
2. Tax Treatment of Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corporations
There are two alternative U.S. tax regimes that can potentially apply to nonresident
aliens (NRAs) and foreign corporations. An NRA or foreign corporation that is engaged in
a U.S. business is viewed as directly participating in the economic life of the country and
is thus treated like a U.S. taxpayer; the income that is "effectively connected" to the U.S.
business is taxed to the NRA or foreign corporation on net basis at regular corporate rates.70
Even if the NRA or foreign corporation is not engaged in a U.S. trade or business, or has no
effectively connected income, certain U.S.-source investment income, comprised primarily
of dividends, interest, and royalties, is subject to a 30 percent gross-basis withholding tax.71
The 30 percent rate is often reduced by a treaty.72
A foreign corporation is also subject to a 30 percent branch profits tax on its "dividend
equivalent amount," which is essentially the earnings that are taken out in any year from its
U.S. business.7 3 Arguably, the intent of this provision is to place the foreign corporation in
the same position as a U.S. corporation by subjecting it to a second-level shareholder tax.
A foreign corporation may also be subject to a 30 percent branch-level interest tax,74 under
which interest that is paid by a U.S. branch of the foreign corporation is treated as if the
interest were paid by a U.S. corporation. That is, the interest will be treated as U.S.-source
income and subject to the 30 percent gross-basis withholding tax unless limited by treaty.
3. Status of Treaties under U.S. Law
Article IV, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that: "Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land." The
U.S. Supreme Court has construed this provision to mean that statutory law and treaties
are given equal status under the U.S. Constitution.7 5 Accordingly, if domestic legislation
conflicts with a treaty provision, the legal authority that became effective later in time
68. I.R.C. § 904 and regulations issued thereunder.
69. I.R.C. § 902 and regulations issued thereunder.
70. I.R.C. §§ 872(a)(2), 8 82(a). "Effectively connected income" is a term of art that requires that the foreignsource income be attributable to either a U.S. office or other fixed place of business of the NRA or foreign
corporation. I.R.C. § 864.
71. IR.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 8 81(a) (RIA 2006).
72. See discussion of reduced withholding rates in the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty infra Part IV.A.
73. I.R.C. § 884. See discussion of treatment of branch profits taxes under the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty infra
Part. I.C.
74. I.R.C. § 884(0.
75. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
VOL. 40, NO. 4

THE JAPAN-U.S. INCOME TAX TREATY

789

prevails. 76 Thus, in principle, U.S. law literally provides that treaty obligations can be overridden by later-enacted U.S. legislation. However, U.S. courts have held that before a treaty
can be deemed overridden, specific legislative intent to override existing inconsistent treaty
7

provisions must be shown.1

Historically, the U.S. Congress has tended to allow income tax treaties to take precedence over income tax statutes.78 But as tax planners began to utilize tax treaties for what
Congress perceived were abusive purposes, U.S. lawmakers became less deferential to treaties. In 1988, section 894(a) of the Internal Revenue Code was amended to provide that
"[t]he provisions of this title shall be applied to any taxpayer with [only] due regard to any
treaty obligation of the United States which applies to such taxpayer." 79 Amended section
7852(d)(1), sheds light on what "due regard" means: "For purposes of determining the relationship between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting revenue,
neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by reason of its being a treaty
or law.""0 The report of the Senate Finance Committee discussing these code amendments
shows that Congress did not intend to "blunt in any way the superiority of the latest expression of the sovereign will in cases involving actual conflicts, whether that expression appears
in a treaty or statute.""' Thus, the judicially created later-in-time doctrine still applies to
genuine conflicts between U.S. tax statutes and U.S. tax treaties. However, the legislative
history also points out that later-enacted statutes can often be harmonized with a treaty
(and vice-versa) by looking to see whether the legislators' intent underlying the ostensibly
conflicting provision was to merely harmonize domestic law with the fundamental purpose
of all bilateral tax treaties-that is, to prevent both double taxation and fiscal evasion."
B.

STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW OF JAPAN'S INCOME

Tx

RULES

1. Tax Treatment ofjapanese Residents

Under Japanese law, domestic individuals and domestic corporations are subject to
national income taxes on both their Japanese source and foreign-source income. However,
there is no single income tax code; rather, two separate taxing statutes are applicable to
individual income and corporate income, respectively.
a. Resident Individuals
In contrast to the U.S. system, an individual's Japanese citizenship is not a basis for taxation; instead, residence is dispositive. An individual is considered a legal resident if he has

76. The "later-in-time" rule dates back to an old common law rule, originally formulated for conflicts
between statutes. See David Sachs, Is the 19tb Century Doctrine of Treaty Override Good Law for Modern Day Tax
Treaties?,47 TAx LAW. 867 (1994).
77. Cook v. U.S., 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933). But see S. REP. No. 100-445, at 325 (1988) (Cook does not
mandate that "Congress must specifically advert to the treaties to have later statutes given effect," but if the
supposed conflict is actually mentioned in the statute or its legislative history, then such mention is "dispositive" in favor of the later-enacted statute, an intentional treaty override.) See also
BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TXATiON, para. 65.1.6 (3d ed. 2001).
78. BITTKER & LORKEN, supra
note 77.
79. I.R.C. § 894(a) (RIA 2006) (as amended in 1988) (emphasis added).
80. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (RIA 2006) (as amended in 1988).
81. See S. Rep. No. 100-445, at 322.
82. See id. at 378-79.
WINTER 2006

790

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

resided in Japan continuously for one year or more. Individuals who have lived in Japan for
less than one year and who are not domiciled83 in Japan are considered nonresidents and
are subject to tax only on certain categories of their Japan-source income, if any. Not all
resident individuals are taxed on a worldwide basis under Japanese law-there is a special
category of residents. A non-Japanese national who has been residing in Japan for no more
than five of the past ten years will qualify as a non-permanent resident. A non-permanent
resident is taxed only on Japanese-source income, plus any non-Japan-source income that
is paid in or remitted into Japan.14 However, if an individual has either resided in Japan for
more than five out of the last ten years or intends to return to Japan permanently, both his
Japan-source and foreign-source income is subject to tax. Thus, in the absence of a treaty
tie-breaking provision, a U.S. citizen living continuously in Japan for more than five out of
the last ten years would be subject to both countries' worldwide tax regimes. The JapanU.S. Tax Treaty resolves the problem of dual residence for individuals through an elaborate
series of so-called tie-breaker rules in its Residence article (Article 4).85
Although in principle Japan has adopted a self-assessment system for individual tax purposes, approximately 80 percent of the individual income taxes are collected through an
elaborate withholding system. Japan's individual income tax also differs from the U.S.
tax system in that it is schedular-meaning that income is first characterized and sepa86
rated into ten different categories and computed according to distinct rules. Although
the policy objective for this system has been said to be vertical equity, or the ability to
pay, it also gives taxpayers the incentive to manipulate the character of the income for tax
purposes.8 7
Beginning in the year 2000, Japan's individual income tax rates were dramatically flattened and now range from 10 percent to 37 percent. Moreover, all resident individuals are subject to a local income tax. To the extent that an individual's income does not
exceed 250,000 yen, individuals are entitled to a special 20 percent reduction of tax which
makes the effective individual rates much lower than the marginal rates. As under the U.S.
system, individuals are afforded some dividend tax relief. Individuals with income levels
below 10 million yen may credit 10 percent of the dividends they receive. For individuals
whose income exceeds that level, the credit drops to 5 percent. Individual taxpayers who
sell shares of listed corporations enjoy a capital gains tax preference; the preferential rate
ranges between 10 and 20 percent.

83. Under Japanese law, one's domicile is that place where one's life is centered and the place to which one
intends to return permanently.
84. This rule became effective on Mar. 31, 2006. See Ernst & Young's Foreign Desk, Proposed 2006Japanese
Tax Reform, J. INT'L Tx'N (WG&L March 2006), available at http://checkpoint.riag.com/Checkpoint?usid=
ef733423f2&lkn=mainFS&uqp=766293&bhcp=l.
85. Under the tie-breaker rules, an individual is deemed to be a resident of the country in which he or she
has a permanent home. If the individual has a permanent home in both countries, the individual's residence is
deemed to be the country with which he or she has the closest personal and economic relations (center of vital
interests). If the center of vital interests cannot be determined, then the individual's residence is where he or
she has a "habitual abode," and if that cannot be determined, then he or she is a resident for purposes of the
Treaty in the country where he or she is a national. If the individual is a national of both countries or neither
country then, the competent authorities ofJapan and the United States will settle the issue of residency under
the Mutual Agreement Procedure (art. 25). Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, art. 4(2).
86. Minoru Nakazato, Mark Ramseyer & Yasutaka Nishikori, Japan, in COMPARATIVE INCOME TXATION-A
STRUCTURAL ANALYsIs 73, 78-79 (2d ed. 2004).
87. See id.
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b. Business Entities
A corporation is considered a resident of Japan if either its headquarters or principal office is located in Japan. These concepts are derived from Japan's Civil Code8 and
Commercial Code 9 respectively. Technically, all companies that are incorporated under
Japanese law are required to have either a registered headquarters or a registered principal
office in JapanY° But a company may be registered in Japan even though it is not incorporated there. This rule leaves room for so-called dual-resident companies. Thus, a company
that is incorporated in the United States and that has its head office located in Japan could
be subject to both countries' worldwide tax regimes in the absence of a treaty tie-breaking
provision. The potential for double juridical taxation presented by dual-resident companies
is resolved in Article 4 of the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, which provides that "the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall determine by mutual agreement [which]
Contracting State... that person shall be deemed to be a resident [of] for the purposes of
the Convention."91

The kabushiki kaisha (KK) (i.e. joint stock company) 9 is the most popular form for doing
business in Japan, and its fundamental features are broadly similar to the U.S. publicly
traded corporation under Delaware law.93 In June 2005, Japan's Diet passed the 2005 Companies Law,' which broadly amends and integrates old business codes into one streamlined
statute. With 979 articles, the new legislation constitutes the most sweeping revision of
Japan's Commercial Code since World War II. The Companies Law abolished the old
yugen kaisha (YK) form 95 for closely held companies and replaced it with two new business
entities-the godo kaisha (GK) [i.e., limited liability company] and the yugen sekinin jigyo
kumiai (LLP) (i.e., limited liability partnership), both of which are patterned on American
models. The GK, however, is subject to tax at the entity level, which means that its profits
could be subject to a combined national and local income tax rate of up to 42 percent. In
addition, GK members could be subject to a combined national and local tax rate of up
to 50 percent on distributions from GK net profits. 9 6 The LLP is not subject to tax at the
88. See Minpo Law No. 89 (Civil Code), April 27, 1896, as amended.
89. See Shoho Law No. 48, (Commercial Code), Mar. 9, 1899, as amended.
90. Japan does not employ the so-called "managed and controlled" test for determining residency.
91. See Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note I, art. 4(4); see also discussion of Mutual Agreement Procedure
infra Part X.
92. Until the new 2005 Companies Law became effective inMay 2006, joint stock companies were governed
by Part I of the Commercial Code, Law No. 48 of 1899, as amended; see Law No. 48 of Mar. 9, 1899.
93. There are differences however. Until statutory amendments to the Commercial Code in 1999, KK
shareholders could only recover their investment by selling their shares; redemptions were not sanctioned.
Stock redemptions were made legal in 1999, a key development since stock redemptions are a critical element
in many tax-free corporate reorganizations.
94. Kaisha Ho [Companies Law], Law No. 86 of 2005 [hereinafter 2005 Companies Law]. The 2005 Companies Law, along with an accompanying Coordination Law whose purpose it is to implement the 2005 Companies Law, went into effect in May 2006. See Seibi Ho [Law Regarding the Coordination, Etc., of Associated
Laws in Connection with the Enforcement of the [New] Companies Law], Law No. 87 of 2005 [hereinafter
Coordination Law]. References to the 2005 Companies Law are hereinafter intended to include a reference to
its companion Coordination Law.
95. See discussion of U.S. tax consequences of repeal of the Yugen Kaisha form infra Part VI, note 207.
96. For U.S. tax purposes, it is likely that the GK will be treated as a default corporation under the U.S.
Entity Classification Regulations since none of its members have unlimited liability. SeeTreas. Reg. § 301.77012(b)(8)(vi)(2006). Thus, in the absence of further guidance by the U.S. Treasury Department, a GK's U.S. tax
classification may be elected by a U.S. taxpayer.
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entity level and is the first business entity Japan has sanctioned that combines all three of
the following attributes: "(1) limited liability for all the partners; (2) the ability to make special allocations of gains and losses that are disproportionate to the partners' relative equity
interests in the partnership; and (3) pass-through taxation."97
As under the U.S. system, Japanese corporations are treated as separate taxable entities with a few features that partially integrate the corporate level and shareholder level
taxes. First, domestic corporations are afforded a dividends-received deduction depending
on their level of ownership in the given subsidiary. For parent corporations owning at least
25 percent of the subsidiary's equity, the dividend is completely excluded from income. For
parent corporations owning a lesser percentage, only half of the dividend is excluded from
income. 9 On ordinary income, the marginal national tax rate for Japanese corporations is
30 percent. 99 But, Japanese corporations are also subject to a local income tax and an enterprise tax, bringing their top effective income tax rate to 42 percent. In 2006, Japan has the
distinction of having the highest effective corporate income tax rate in the world."'0
Japanese shareholders are generally not taxed on the earnings of their foreign corporations until those earning are repatriated to Japan. A major exception to this general rule is an
anti-deferral regime that is quite similar to subpart F under U.S. tax law.'0' Japan's foreign
tax credit is similar to that of the United States and is available to both resident individuals
and domestic corporations.' 2 Foreign tax credits are limited in generally the same manner
as those available to offset U.S. income. Japanese corporations that own at least 2 5 percent
of a foreign corporation for at least six months may also qualify for an indirect foreign tax
credit with respect to foreign taxes attributable to their foreign subsidiaries.
2. Tax Treatment of Nonresidents

Under Japan's tax law, nonresident individuals and foreign corporations are generally
taxed only on income that is sourced in Japan. But if the nonresident maintains a place of
business inJapan," 3 then the business income it generates is taxed as though the nonresident

97. See discussion infra Part VI, note 189; see also Pamela A. Fuller, InternationalLegal Developments in
Review: 2005, Regional & Comparative Law--Asia and Pacific Law-apan, 40 INTr'L LAW. 515, 521-23 (2006)
[hereinafter Fuller, Japan-2005 Int'l Legal Developments, Asia and Pacific Law-Japan]. In March 2005,
Japan's Diet passed a provision, as part ofJapan's new Tax Reform Act, which could be a trap for unwary foreign
partners in Japanese partnerships, including LLPs. Foreign partners that do not have a permanent establishment in Japan will be liable for a 20% withholding tax on the partnership's actual distributions and deemed
distributions. Japan Income Tax Act of 2006, art 212(3). The new provision, which is reminiscent of anti-deferral regimes, is effective for calendar-year partnerships beginning in 2006. Id. at supplement, art. 3.
98. In 2002, Japan enacted a corporate consolidated tax system which is largely patterned on the U.S.
consolidated system. See Hojin-zei ho (Corporate Tax Law], Law No. 34 of 1965, art. 4-2 (2002); cf I.R.C.
§§ 1502-04. As with the U.S. system, consolidated tax relief is only extended to domestic corporations.
99. For nonprofit companies and corporations with stated capital of 8 million yen or less, Japan's national
corporate income tax rate is 22%.
100. Japanese corporations also do not enjoy a capital gains preference when they sell shares in their subsidiaries; such gains are generally taxed at their ordinary income rate.
101. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 951-64 (RIA 2006). Like the U.S. CFC rules, the Japanese CFC regime is also
aimed at taxing Japanese shareholders on the passive, low-taxed earnings of their CFCs. A foreign corporation qualifies as a CFC under Japanese law if more than 50% of its shares are owned, directly or indirectly, by
Japanese residents.
102. Japanese shareholders may elect to deduct their foreign taxes in lieu of the credit.
103. The statutory concept of place of business is similar to, but broader than, the treaty concept of permanent establishment.
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proprietor was a Japanese resident. Depending on the type of business and the type of
income it generates, other non-business income of the foreign proprietor may be required
to be aggregated with the business income and subjected to tax on a net basis. Japanese law
thus reflects a strong force-of-attraction principle.
In the absence of a place of business in Japan, nonresident individuals and foreign corporations will be taxed only on their Japan-source dividends, interest, and royalties, which
are generally subject to a 20 percent gross-basis withholding tax. A lower withholding rate
of 15 percent applies to interest from Japanese bonds, domestic corporate debentures, and
domestic bank deposits. Japan does not have a branch profits tax.
3. Status of Tax Treaties underJapaneseLaw
Japanese law does not allow domestic legislation to override existing treaty provisions.
Article 98 of the Japan Constitution provides that treaty obligations should be faithfully
observed,1°4 which has been interpreted as establishing the superiority of international treaty obligations over domestic law, even if the domestic statutes are enacted later in time. The
only way domestic legislation may trump a treaty provision is if the treaty itself contains a
savings clause that preserves the application of domestic law in situations described in the
treaty itself.
IV. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty-Operative Articles
The scope of the recently effectuated Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is sweeping, and an exhaustive analysis of its many provisions exceeds the scope of this discussion. Rather, the following discourse focuses on some of the more noteworthy articles contained in the new Treaty,
explains how these rules differ from those found in the old 1971 treaty, and attempts to
evaluate how well these provisions deal with problems that are innate to the current system
for taxing international income, as well as the extent to which the provisions may be serving
international tax policy objectives.
A.

WITHHOLDING TAXES ON INVESTMENT INCOME

Bilateral tax treaties mitigate double juridical taxation by resolving the potentially conflicting claims of two countries to tax the same item of income. In the case of investment
income--especially royalties, interest, and dividends-the standard international tax practice is for the country in which the income arose (i.e., the Source State) to yield most of
its tax claim to the country of the income recipient's residence (i.e., the Residence State).
Thus, pursuant to a bilateral tax treaty, the Residence State preserves its right to tax the
foreign-source investment income of its residents, and the Source State agrees to limit its
withholding tax to a relatively low rate or eliminate it entirely.'0°
Among the most notable revisions reflected in the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty are the
reciprocal reductions in gross-basis withholding taxes ' 06 imposed by the Source State.

104. KElO, art. 98, para. 2 (1946).
105. This norm is consistent with the 1920s' Compromise previously discussed. See infra Part. II.D.
106. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 87 1(a) (RIA 2006) (imposing a 30% withholding tax on income of nonresident alien
individuals not connected with a U.S. business); I.R.C. § 881(a) (imposing a 30% withholding tax on income
of foreign corporations not connected with a U.S. business); I.R.C. § 1441 (withholding of tax on nonresident
aliens); I.R.C. § 1442 (withholding of tax on foreign corporations).
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The 1971 treaty had set maximum withholding tax rates on cross-border investment income
that were significantly higher than the rates reflected in most U.S. tax treaties with industrialized countries. The new Treaty reduces these reciprocal withholding rates, in some instances
bringing the rates into line with other tax treaties the United States has recently negotiated, but
in some instances, reducing the rates below those reflected in the Model Treaty issued by the
OECD, °7 and even those set forth in the U.S. Model Tax Treaty.' The target withholding
rates proposed in the OECD Model Tax Treaty are zero percent on royalties, 10 percent on
interest, and 5 percent on dividends) °9 The U.S. Government's objectives for withholding rates,
as reflected in the U.S. Model Tax Treaty, are zero percent on royalties and most categories of
interest, and 5 percent on dividends received by corporate shareholders holding directly at least
10 percent of the voting stock of the payor." As further explained below, the new Japan-U.S.
Tax Treaty provides for a zero percent withholding rate on all qualified royalties, a zero percent rate on direct dividends paid by 50-percent-owned subsidiaries, and a zero percent rate on
broad categories of interest, although a 10 percent tax rate generally applies to interest.
The elimination of withholding tax on these broad categories of investment income was a
key objective of the U.S. Treasury Department when it negotiated the new Tax Treaty with
Japan. The final agreement represents a remarkable and "unprecedented departure from historic Japanese tax treaty policy."' " For the United States, the zero percent withholding rate
on all royalties and intercompany dividends also sets a new standard. Only recently has the
United States been able to negotiate a zero percent withholding rate on some intercompany
dividends, and even in the three other treaties that reflect that rate-the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Mexico-the category of exempt dividends is defined much more narrowly
than under the newJapan-U.S. Treaty. In fact, the Japan-U.S.Treaty is the first U.S. income
tax treaty in which the imposition of domestic withholding taxes are limited to such a great
degree. The magnitude of this policy change is amplified by the fact that the reduced rates
were agreed to by two of the world's largest economic giants. It is difficult to predict exactly
how this aspect of the Treaty will impact the development of cooperative tax agreements
between other sovereign states, but it undoubtedly will have a significant impact. It is very
likely that the almost complete elimination of withholding taxes on investment income will
serve to motivate other Asian countries to attempt to negotiate the same deal with the United
States in order to attract more portfolio investment and to stay economically competitive.
Moreover, it may spur small developing countries to enter into cooperative international tax
agreements, even if they are not based on the bilateral OECD Model.
1. Royalty Income-Article 12
In the last two decades, economies have become increasingly borderless due in part to
advances in certain technologies (like fiber optics and digital electronics), which have been
nothing short of revolutionary. Today, industrial processes, know-how, and other intangibles

107. See OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29.

108. See United States Department of the Treasury,

UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAx CONVENTION OF
15, 2006 (Nov. 15, 2006) availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs.trty/usmtech..pdf. [hereinafter U.S.
Model Treaty or U.S. Model Tax Treaty]. The U.S. Model Treaty is an archetype the United States has long
held out as its ideal tax treaty. The U.S. Treasury Department routinely uses the U.S. Model Treaty as its starting point in all its tax treaty negotiations.
109. See OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, arts. 12(1) (royalties), 11(2) (interest), 10(2) (dividends).
110. See U.S. Model Tax Treaty, supra note 108, arts. 12(1) (royalties), 11(1) (interest), 10 (dividends).
11. See 2003 Tax Treaty Hearing, supra note 5.
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are often developed in one country, and then utilized all over the world. Recognizing the
high volume of transfers of intangibles between the United States. and Japan, U.S. treaty
negotiators wanted to overhaul the existing rules for the treatment of royalties." '2 The
1971 Treaty allowed the Source State to impose a 10 percent withholding tax on crossborder royalties. Ten percent may seem low, but the withholding taxlwas computed on a
gross basis, which frequently led to excessive taxation because the developer of the licensed
intangible often incurred substantial research, development, and marketing costs, none of
which it was allowed to deduct. Moreover, because the withholding tax on royalties could
be imposed even though the taxpayer had no actual presence in the Source State, the with-

holding tax put considerable pressure on the need to distinguish between royalty income
and other types of income not subject to gross withholding tax, including income derived
from personal services. In today's world, it has become much more difficult to distinguish
between different types of income; the old lines of demarcation have become increasingly
nebulous and, in many cases, obsolete.
Article 12 of the new Treaty completely eliminates Source-State taxation of royalty income
"beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State.""' 3 In other words, the new
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty allocates the right to tax royalties solely to the Residence State, which
will tax them on a net basis in the same manner as other business profits. Treating royalties
in the same manner as business profits removes a source of dispute in tougher cases where
it becomes difficult to distinguish royalty income from other types of income. The zero
percent withholding rate on royalty income is consistent with the U.S. Model Treaty.
Although beneficial ownership is a critical prerequisite to claiming treaty-reduced withholding rates on royalties, interest, and dividends, the text of the Japan-U.S. Treaty, like
other treaties, does not attempt to define what a beneficial owner is. Rather, the U.S. Treasury's Technical Explanation clarifies that one must look to the internal law of the Source
State to determine the beneficial owner, which is generally the "person to which royalty
income is attributable for tax purposes under the laws of the State of source."" 4 Identifying
the beneficial owner-an undefined treaty term-remains one of the most difficult problems in tax treaty interpretation.
Article 12 of the new .Treaty defines "royalties" broadly to include:
...payments

of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any
copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films and films or
tapes for radio or television broadcasting, any patent, trademark, design or model, plan, or
secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific
experience." 5

112. See id.
113. See Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,at art. 12. Only beneficial owners who are residents of the
other Contracting State may claim the treaty reduced rates on royalties, interest, and dividends. See id. arts.
10(2)-(3), 11(2), and 12(1).
114. Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, 1 266. But, this definition of beneficial
owner, which relies on the Source State's domestic tax law, as directed by Article 3(2) of the Treaty applicable
to undefined treaty terms, appears to be in direct conflict with the methodology being adopted in many treaties,
including the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, for determining which persons are "liable to tax" on items derived
through fiscally transparent entities. That methodology looks to the internal tax law of the Residence State
in almost all cases, and ignores the Source State's determination of who is the beneficial owner of the income,
presumably liable to tax. See discussion infra at Part. IV
115. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 12(2).
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Unlike the old 1971 Treaty, the new Treaty excludes from the definition of royalties any
gains "derived from the alienation of any right or property that would give rise to royalties,
[regardless of whether such gains are] contingent on the productivity, use, or further alienation" of the property.'1 6 Instead, those gains are dealt with under Article 13 (Gains), although
they are generally treated the same as royalties in that they are exempt from Source-State
taxation. Royalties, for Article 12 purposes, also do not include income from the lease of
personal property.
Historically, there has been a problem in differentiating royalty income from business
profits and income from personal services. These characterization issues frequently arise
with respect to computer software, which is universally protected by copyright laws. Under
the Treaty, consideration received for the use of, or the right to use, computer software may
ultimately be treated as either royalty income or business profits, depending on the circumstances of the transaction. The primary factor in making the determination is the nature of
the rights transferred. To be characterized as a royalty under the Treaty, the consideration
paid must be for the use of, or right to use, the software. "The fact that the transaction is
7
characterized as a license for copyright purposes is not dispositive."" According to the U.S.
Treasury's Technical Explanation, a typical retail sale of shrink wrap software will normally
not be viewed as giving rise to royalty income for Article 12 purposes, even though for
copyright purposes, it is clearly characterized as a license. The means by which the computer
software is transferred is also irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the payment
is a royalty for treaty purposes. Thus, if software is electronically transferred, but the rights
obtained by the transferee are substantially equivalent to rights in a program copy, then
the payment will be considered business profits, and taxed accordingly on a net basis in the
Source State if the income is attributable to a permanent establishment."'
In general, the zero percent withholding rate for royalty income is not available if the
royalties are attributable to a permanent establishment or other fixed place of business of
the recipient in the Source State. In that case, the income would be taxable under Article 7
as business profits." 19
The new Treaty injects transfer pricing principles into the Royalty article. Paragraph 4
of Article 12 provides that in cases where there is a non-arm's length relationship between
the payor and the beneficial owner of the royalty, then the zero percent withholding rate
is available "only to the extent the royalties would have been paid absent such special
relationship(s)."'"2 Any excess amount of royalty income may be taxable in the Source State
at a rate not to exceed 5 percent.' 2 '
At the request of Japan, the new Treaty contains an additional limit on the availability of
treaty benefits when they are claimed in connection with certain conduit schemes involving royalties, interest, and dividends. In the Royalties article, this limitation appears in
116. Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, 9 266 [emphasis added].
117. Id. 1272.
118. See id. $T 272-74.
119. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 12(3). In general, the profits of an enterprise of one Contracting State may not be taxed by the other Contracting State unless the enterprise carries on business in that
other Contracting State that rises to the level of a "permanent establishment" or "PE" as its known for short, a
term of art that Article 5 of the Treaty attempts to define. See discussion of Business Profits infra Part IV.B.
120. Technical Explanation QfJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, T 279 (explaining limitation of Article
12(4)). See discussion of transfer pricing provisions supra Part V.
121. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 12(4) (last sentence).
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Paragraph 5, which states that a resident of a Contracting State shall not be considered to
be the beneficial owner of the royalty if the royalty would not have been paid but for the
resident's agreement to repay the royalty to a third party that is not a resident of either Contracting State. Because Japan's domestic law does not provide sufficient protection against
these conduit schemes, the limiting caveat was included in the new Treaty. But, its inclusion
may signal a new trend in tax treaty negotiation; such language is beginning to appear in
other recently negotiated U.S. treaties. For example, there is a similar provision in the 2001
tax treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom,' although the breadth of
the latter provision is broader than that found in the U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty. The United
States already has elaborate rules aimed at conduit financing,'23 which are more stringent
than the provision included in the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty. The U.S. rules policing
conduit financing structures shall continue to apply.
2. InterestIncome-Article 11

Like the old 1971 treaty, the newJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty allows the Source State to impose
a withholding tax on interest payments. This represents a departure from the rule reflected
in tax treaties the United States has recently negotiated with other industrialized nations, in
which the Residence State was granted the exclusive right to tax qualified cross-border interest income. The maximum allowable withholding rate under the new Treaty is generally
10 percent if paid to a resident of the other Contracting State that beneficially owns the
interest, which is the same maximum rate that applied under the 1971 Treaty.
But unlike the 1971 Treaty, Article 11 of the new Treaty eliminates Source-State withholding tax on broad categories of interest.2 4 The most significant of these is the elimination of Source-State withholding tax for interest earned by financial institutions. "Due to
the highly-leveraged nature of financial institutions, imposition of a withholding tax on
interest received by such enterprises could result in taxation that actually exceeds the net
income from the transaction."' 25 Interest falling within this exempt category includes interest beneficially owned by a resident bank, an insurance company, a registered securities
dealer, or a qualified deposit-taking entity as defined.' 26 Moreover, interest paid to a resident creditor on debt arising as part of a credit sale of equipment or merchandise is exempt
from a withholding tax under the new Treaty. This latter exemption appears to apply not
only to the resident seller that originally extended the credit, but also to any beneficial
owner of the account receivable that is a resident of the other Contracting State.' 27
Source-State withholding tax is also eliminated on interest received by either of the two
governments directly, and on interest received by residents with respect to debt claims that
were guaranteed, insured, or directly financed by either of the two governments. 2 '

122. See U.S.-U.K. Convention, supra note 11.
123. See I.R.C. § 7701(l) (RIA 2006), which authorizes regulations "recharacterizing any multiple-party
financing transaction as... appropriate to prevent avoidance of any tax imposed by this ide." Regulations
under I.R.C. § 7701(l) were issued in 1995, and allow the U.S. Internal Revenue Service to "disregard... the
participation of one or more intermediary entities in a financing arrangement" for purposes of I.R.C. §§ 871,
881, 1441-42 (i.e., the withholding tax). Treas. Reg. § 1.881-3(a)(1) (1995).
124. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11(3).
125. 2003 Tax Treaty Hearing, supra note 5.
126. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra, note 1, art. 11(3)(c).
127. Id.art. l1(3)(e).
128. Id. art. 11(3)(b).
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Moreover, interest earned by pension funds is also exempt from Source-State withholding
tax.129 Treaty negotiators felt that imposing a withholding tax on interest received by pension funds would be burdensome because there is no mechanism for providing individual
pension beneficiaries with foreign-tax-credit relief for any withholding taxes that would
otherwise be imposed on investment income years before the retiree actually receives distributions from his pension fund.
The above exemptions from Source-State withholding tax on interest are broader than
any similar exemptions Japan has so far negotiated in its other tax treaties. The willingness ofJapan to agree to these rates is likely a direct reflection of former Prime Minister
Koizumi's announced goal of doubling foreign investment by the year 2008.130
Article 11 defines interest fairly broadly to include "income from debt-claims of every
"
kind ... whether or not carrying a right to participate in the debtor's profits." ' This definition is broader than the definitions of interest under the either the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code or the OECD Model Treaty. And, although the new Treaty is careful to state that
income under Article 10 (i.e., dividends) "shall not be regarded as interest for purposes of
this Convention,"'' the broad definition of interest in the new Treaty, which relies on the
Source State's tax treatment of the income and which does not exclude any penalty charges
for late payment, represents a departure from the norm.
As with royalty income, if the beneficial owner of the interest carries on business through
a permanent establishment in the Contracting State where the interest arises and the interest is attributable to that PE, then the interest is characterized as business profits for purposes of the Treaty and governed by Articles 5 and 7.33
The U.S. Internal Revenue Code exempts a number of categories of interest from its
withholding tax. These exemptions include certain bank deposit interest' 34 and portfolio
interest. 3 The new Treaty sets the maximum withholding rates allowable and should not
be construed to restrict any tax exemption provided under the internal laws of either Contax if
tracting State. Thus, a Japanese lender would still be exempt from U.S. withholding
36
the interest it receives qualifies as exempt portfolio interest under U.S. tax law.
As with the Royalties article, transfer pricing principles are also reflected in the Interest
article.' Article 11 provides that in cases involving a "special relationship between the
payor and the beneficial owner," where the amount of interest paid exceeds the amount that
would otherwise have been agreed upon in the absence of the special relationship, then the
reduced treaty rate applies "only to the last-mentioned amount"-that is, the "arm's length
interest payment," as it is called in the U.S. Treasury's Technical Explanation.'38 The Treaty
does not define what a special relationship is, but the Technical Explanation states that the

129. Id. art. 11(3)(d).
130. See Press Release, U.S. State Dep't., U.S.-Japan Investment Initiative (May 23, 2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20940.htm.
131. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11(5).
132. Id.
133. See discussion of treatment of business profits infra Part IV.B.
134. See I.R.C. §§ 871(i)(2)(A), (3), 881(d) (RIA 2006).
135. Portfolio interest is defined to include original issue discount (OID), explicit and unstated. See I.R.C.
§§ 871(h)(2), 881(c).
136. See I.R.C. § 871(h)(2) (defining "portfolio interest" for purposes of the exemption).
137. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11(8).
138. See Technical Explanation of 2003 Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, 248.
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determination of whether such a relationship exists turns on the definition of control as it
is interpreted within the context of Section 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. This
broad construction is consistent with the OECD Commentaries to the Interest article in
the OECD Model Treaty.'39
Benefits under Article 11 are not available with respect to back-to-back loan schemes,
where the recipient of the interest payment would not have established the debt-claim but
for the establishment of another debt-claim with a person that is not entitled to the same
or more favorable treaty benefits. Similar anti-abuse rules appear in both the Royalties and
Dividends articles to deny treaty benefits in the context of conduit structures involving
those types of income, respectively. The anti-conduit language may represent a new trend
in the negotiation of U.S. tax treaties with countries that do not have sufficient protections
against conduit schemes.
3. Dividend Income-Article 10
The new Treaty significantly reduces the Source States' maximum withholding taxes
with respect to all types of cross-border dividends. Under the 1971 Treaty, the Source
State could impose a maximum 10 percent withholding tax on dividends paid to companies
resident in the other Contracting State that beneficially owned at least 10 percent of the
stock of the payor company. Portfolio dividends (i.e., those paid to resident individuals or
companies owning less than 10 percent of the payor) could be taxed at a maximum withholding rate of 15 percent. The new Treaty reduces these rates, imposing three different
14
rate structures, depending on the payee's level of stock ownership in the payor. 0
Under the Treaty, the Source State can impose a gross withholding tax of 10 percent on
portfolio dividends received by a resident of the other Contracting State when the resident
qualifies as the beneficial owner on the date when entitlement to the dividend is determined. If the beneficial owner of the dividend is a company that owns, directly or indirectly
(i.e., through tiers of entities resident in either Contracting State), at least 10 percent of the
voting stock of the payor company, then the Source State can impose a gross withholding
tax of no more than 5 percent. Notwithstanding these provisions, the Treaty provides for a
zero percent withholding rate for dividends paid if the beneficial owner of the dividend is a
company that has owned, directly or indirectly, greater than 50 percent of the voting stock
of the company paying the dividend during the 12-month period ending on the date on
which entitlement to the dividend is determined, and one of three alternative tests is satisfied.
Under the additional requirement, the payee company must either: (1) meet the "publicly
traded" test set forth in the Limitation-on-Benefits (LOB) article;' 4' (2) meet both the ownership/base-erosion and active-trade-or-business tests described in the LOB article;' 42 or (3) be
43
granted express eligibility by the competent authorities pursuant to the LOB article.
Certain tax-exempt pension funds are also eligible for the zero percent withholding rate
on cross-border dividends, provided the dividends are not derived from the carrying on of a
business, directly or indirectly, by the pension fund.'44 Special rules apply to dividends paid
139. See OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, Commentary on art. 11 (as updated in 2005); see also
discussion of transfer pricing infra Part V.
140. See Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 10(2)(a)-(b) and (3).
141. See
id. art. 22(1)(c).
142. See id. art. 22(1)(0, (2).
143. See id. art. 22(4).
144. See id. art. 10(3)(b).
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or a U.S. Real Estate Investment Trust
by a U.S. Regulated Investment Company (RIC)
1 4
(REIT), as well as their Japanese counterparts. 1
The complete elimination of Source-State withholding taxes on dividends from controlled subsidiaries is not the current U.S. Model Treaty position. U.S. Treasury officials
have publicly stated that it is not appropriate to agree to such an exemption in every treaty:
"Consideration of such a provision in a treaty is appropriate only if the treaty contains
anti-treaty-shopping rules that meet the highest standards and the information exchange
provision of the treaty is sufficient to allow [confirmation] that the requirements for entitlement to this benefit are satisfied."' 46 Moreover, despite its inclusion in several recently
negotiated U.S. tax treaties, the withholding tax exemption on direct dividends is also not
reflected in the next version of the U.S. Model Tax Treaty, released in late 2006.47 Nonetheless, in attempting to discern the direction of international treaty policy, it is worth
noting that numerous bilateral tax treaties to which the United States is not a partner do
eliminate withholding taxes on intercompany dividends, and that the European Union in
its Parent-Subsidiary Directive achieves the same exemption result. Moreover, an increasing number of countries are agreeing to include sophisticated LOB articles and verifiable information exchange procedures in their tax treaties-two U.S. criteria for agreeing
to the zero percent withholding rates on intercompany dividends. Thus, over time, it
should become easier to verify, through compliance with the LOB and the Exchangeof-Information articles, that the requisite ownership thresholds for qualifying for the withholding tax exemption have been reached and maintained. Accordingly, as the Japan-U.S.
Tax Treaty joins a growing list of bilateral tax treaties that completely eliminate the Source
State's jurisdiction to tax intercompany dividends, it is not irrational to postulate that such
a limitation on withholding tax will likely evolve into standard treaty practice or, at the very
least, become a widespread objective of tax treaty negotiation. It is safe to conclude the
Japan-U.S. Treaty sets a new standard in this regard, if not a new precedent.14
B.

BUSINESS PROFITS-ARTCLES

5

AND

7

The 1920s' Compromise, which first took shape in the OECD's 1963 draft Model Treaty,
held that the taxation of business income should be allocated to the country of its source and
the taxation of portfolio income should be allocated to the country of the capital supplier's
residence. The Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty's treatment of business profits still reflects this compromise. Paragraph 1 of Article 7 states that the profits of an enterprise are taxable only in
the Contracting State where the enterprise is situated "unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein,"
in which case the other Contracting State may tax the business profits "but only so much of
them as [are] attributable to the permanent establishment."' 49 The concept of permanent
145. See id. art. 10(4).
146. See 2003 Tax Treaty Hearing, supra note 5.
147. See U.S. Model Tax Treaty, supra note 108; Kevin Bell, New U.S. Model Treaty Won't Provide For Zero
Dividend Withholding, Official Says, WORLDWIDE Tx DAILY, Apr. 13, 2005, availablein LEXIS, Intlaw library,
TNI file, 2005 WTD 70-4 (quoting Patricia A. Brown, U.S. Treasury Deputy International Tax Counsel).
148. U.S. treaty negotiators have staunchly maintained that each tax treaty stands on its own and that treaty
benefits are negotiated with other countries on a case-by-case basis. See id. However, this unofficial bargaining
position seems to contradict the fact that the U.S. requires that a Limitation-on-Benefits clause and a Savings
clause be included in all of its new treaties and protocols.
149. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
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establishment is a key but elaborate term,5 0 the basic function of which, under the new
Treaty, is to allocate business profits to a jurisdiction only if and to the extent the enterprise
is participating in the economic life of the jurisdiction.'' Article 5 of the Treaty defines
permanent establishment as a "fixed place of business"-including a place of management,
a branch, an office, a factory, mine, or place of extraction of natural resources-"through
which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on."' 52 Thus, two questions
are involved: first, is there a PE as defined under Article 5; and, secondly, what profits are
attributable to that PE? Article 7 addresses the second question.
The rule in Article 7 that only profits that are attributable to the PE are taxable by the
other Contracting State is roughly analogous to the effectively connected income concept,
used in U.S. tax law for determining whether a foreign person operating a U.S. trade or business will be taxed on the net income of that business at graduated rates."' The term profits
is not explicitly defined in the Treaty, but the Technical Explanation makes it clear that the
term includes income from personal services and income attributable to notional principle
contracts and other financial instruments. Profits of a PE also may include income derived
by a partner residing in one Contracting State, but which is attributable to the personal
services performed by his partnership in the other Contracting State where there is a PE. In
other words, all personal services performed by the partnership are viewed in the aggregate
and those services attributable to the PE are taxable, including those services of a54partner
who may be located outside the jurisdiction where the PE's office or site is located.'
Paragraph 2 of the Diplomatic Notes confirms that the arm's length principle set forth
in Article 9 (Associated Enterprises) may apply in determining the profits attributable to a
PE.1"' In general, Article 7 is to be applied using a functional analysis, taking into account

150. For the nuances, seeOECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, Commentaries to arts. 5, 7.
151. But some treaties apply a limited force-of-attraction principle whereby a Contracting State may tax
allprofits of the enterprise derived within its territory even if those profits are not directly attributable to the
enterprise's PE. This so-called "residual force of attraction principle," which is found in U.S. tax law at I.R.C.
§ 864(c)(3), is not the rule adopted in Article 7 of the new Japan-U.S. Treaty. See Technical Explanation of
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, 1 135.
152. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 5(1), (2). Thus, the rationale for the PE concept is consistent
with the ostensible in rem entitlement of a source country to benefit from the gains reaped within its borders
since it is providing the profit-enabling environment. See discussion infra Part fI.D & E.
153. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(1) (RIA 2006) (defining "effectively connected income").
154. See Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, 1 126-27. The Technical Explanation gives the
following example:
[A] legal partnership has five partners (who agree to split profits equally), four of whom are resident
and perform personal services only in Japan at Office A, and one of whom performs personal services
at Office B, a permanent establishment in the United States. In this case, the four partners of the
partnership resident in Japan may be taxed in the United States in respect of their share of the income
attributable to the permanent establishment, Office B. The services giving rise to income which may
be attributed to the permanent establishment would include not only the services performed by the one
resident partner, but also, for example, if one of the four other partners came to the United States and
worked on an Office B matter there, the income in respect of those services. Income from the services
performed by the visiting partner would be subject to tax in the United States regardless of whether the
visiting partner actually visited or used Office B while performing services in the United States.
Id. 9T127.
155. See Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Accompanying the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Jap., Nov. 6, 2003, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 108-14, [hereinafter Diplomatic Notes].
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the different economics that arise from operating through a single legal entity as opposed
to separate legal entities. For example, banks that trade in global securities often use internal swap transactions to shift risk from one branch to a central location where the traders
have the expertise to manage that particular risk. The Treaty allows a bank to employ such
swap transaction as a means of allocating income between the branches if they use of the
transfer pricing method that constitutes the best method within the meaning of the U.S.
transfer pricing regulations-specifically section 1.482-1(c). But the income can only be so
attributed internally if the "sales and risk management functions that generate the income
are performed in" that same location.'
Determining whether there is a PE is necessary for purposes of applying many articles of
the new Treaty. For example, the Treaty's limitations on withholding rates for cross-border
dividends, interest, and royalties (Articles 10, 11, and 12, respectively) are not available if such
income is attributable to a permanent establishment that the recipient has in the Source State.
The permanent establishment concept is also relevant in determining which Contracting
State may tax certain Gains under Article 13 and certain Other Income under Article 2 1.
C.

BRANCH PROFITS TAXES

Since 1986, the United States has imposed special taxes on unincorporated U.S. branches
of foreign corporations doing business in the United States, in addition to the regular corporate income tax. The so-called "branch profits tax" is intended to replicate the tax that
would be imposed under U.S. tax law if the U.S. branch were a separately incorporated
domestic subsidiary. The U.S. branch profits tax rate is generally 30 percent.' The United
States also imposes a second-level tax on interest paid to foreign recipients by a foreign
corporation with substantial amounts of earnings that are "effectively connected" to a U.S.
trade or business." 8 These branch taxes are often reduced or eliminated by treaty. Under
the 1971 Treaty, Japanese corporations with unincorporated branches in the United States
were considered exempt from all U.S. branch taxes. But under the new Treaty, the United
States is allowed to impose the branch profits tax, but only at a reduced 5 percent rate. The
branch profits tax may only be applied if the Japanese corporation has a PE in the U.S., or
is subject to tax on either income from real property or on gains realized from the disposing
of interests in real property. The Treaty provides that the branch taxes may not be imposed
in cases where a zero percent rate would have applied to any dividends under Article 10 had
the U.S. branch business actually been conducted through a U.S. subsidiary of the Japanese
parent. The exception is consistent with the policy objective underlying the Branch Profits
Tax-to burden the foreign corporation's U.S. business profits with roughly the same twotier U.S. corporate income tax regime regardless of whether its U.S. business is conducted
through a U.S. subsidiary or an unincorporated branch.
D.

INCOME FROM EMPLOYMENT AND STOCK OPTIONS

Article 14 of the new Treaty apportions taxing jurisdiction over the remuneration derived
by a resident employee between Japan and the United States." 9 The general rule under
156. Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, 1 133.

157. I.R.C. § 884(a).
158. I.R.C. § 884(0.
159. See Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 14.
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Article 14 is that the State where the employee services were actually performed has primary
jurisdiction to tax the employee's income. For example, if a U.S. citizen earns wages while
working as a resident in Japan, Japan may tax the wages, and the United States will grant a
foreign tax credit. Employee stock options are a form of employee compensation and are
generally governed by Article 14. The Protocol to the new Treaty sets forth special rules
regarding employee stock option plans (ESOPs) to deal with situations where the employee
changes his work location after the date of the option grant, but before the option is exercised. The annex to the Treaty's Protocol describes four alternative scenarios; the outcome
of each scenario is dependant on whether the stock option is treated as qualified under the
tax laws of either or both Contracting States. Although the new Treaty rules governing
stock options are not simple to apply, they attempt to ensure that income arising from
a stock option is taxed only once and is fairly apportioned between the two Contracting
States, either through the operation of the Treaty and its Protocol, or through the Mutual
Agreement Procedure under Article 25.
E.

GAINS FROM THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY-ARTICLE

13

The new Treaty generally provides for exclusive Residence-State taxation of gains from
the alienation of property, with a few exceptions. Pursuant to a major exception, gains
from the sale of real property, and gains from the sale of shares or other interests in certain real property holding companies, may be taxed in the country where the real estate is
located, even if the owner is not a resident in the country where the real property (or the
holding company housing the real property) is located.' 6° This rule is consistent with the
U.S. Tax Code provision dealing with foreign sellers of real property holding companies
161
as defined.
Pursuant to a second major exception to the general rule giving the Residence State the
primary right to tax gains from the alienation of property, the new Treaty preserves the nonexclusive right of the Source State to tax gains realized on the disposition of shares in certain
restructured financial institutions that arise in the Source State. This narrow exception was
included at the request of Japan to deal with the problems it has experienced in its banking
sector. Under this rule, the Source State may tax gains on stock of resident restructured
financial institutions if: (1) the financial institution had earlier received substantial financial
assistance from the government to resolve its imminent insolvency; (2) a resident taxpayer
had purchased its shares from the government; and (3) the stock is sold within five years of
such assistance. A grandfather rule provides that this provision does not apply to any stock
held by an investor who made an investment in such a financial institution prior to the
162
Treaty's entry into force, including any after-acquired stock in the financial institution.
E OTHER INCOME-ARTICLE

21

Under the 1971 treaty, income from financial services was usually subject to a gross basis
withholding tax imposed by the Source State. The new Treaty changes the tax treatment
of income from financial services with the addition of new Article 21 applicable to "other

160. See id. art. 13(2).
161. See I.R.C. § 897(a)(1), (c)(1) and (2) (RIA 2006).
162. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 13(3).
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income. 1 61 This article, which applies to income not otherwise dealt with in Articles 6
through 20, assigns exclusive taxing jurisdiction to the residence of the beneficial owner
of the income, so that income falling within this catch-all category is taxed on a net basis
similar to the treatment of business profits. Examples of types of income covered by new
Article 21 include income from covenants not to compete, punitive damage awards, income
from gambling, and income from certain financial instruments to the extent such income
is derived by persons not engaged in the trade or business of dealing in such instruments.
Article 21 also applies to items of income that do not fit within the other treaty articles
because of their source or some other characteristic. The Protocol confirms that securities
lending fees, guarantee fees, and commitment fees generally will not be subject to SourceState withholding tax, but instead will be taxable in the Residence State in the same manner
as other business profits, unless such fees are attributable to a PE in the Source State.
V. Transfer Pricing
Due to the difference in tax systems and tax rates of different countries, a multinational
corporation may have a strong incentive to shift income, deductions, tax credits, and other
tax attributes around within its commonly controlled group of companies in order to reduce
the group's overall tax burden. Locating sales gains, for example, in a low-tax jurisdiction
might be accomplished by setting artificially high prices between a related seller and buyer
if the selling corporation is in a low-tax jurisdiction and the related buyer is located in a
jurisdiction that will charge a higher rate on resale.
The new Treaty gives greater ammunition to tax authorities attempting to police this
type of non-arm's length transfer pricing. The Diplomatic Notes, which the U.S. Secretary
of State and the Japan Minister of Foreign Affairs exchanged when the Treaty was signed,'"
expressly incorporate the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a source of authority in
applying the new Treaty. Thus, "[t]he domestic transfer pricing rules, including the transfer pricing methods, of each Contracting State may be applied.., under the Convention
1 '65
only to the extent that they are consistent with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,'
which reflect the OECD Member States' consensus on application of the arm's length
principle. Moreover, the Technical Explanation clarifies that the reference in "the Notes
to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is to that document as it continues to evolve"
over time. 166 Thus, the Contracting States' obligations under the Treaty may change as the
6
OECD Guidelines are updated. 1
Article 9 (Associated Enterprises) of the new Treaty allows Japan and the United States

to adjust the taxable income (or loss) of associated enterprises if the conditions of the
enterprises' transactions differ from what they would have been if the enterprises were

163. See id. art. 21.
164. Diplomatic notes typically confirm and clarify the understanding reached by the parties to the treaty.
By their terms, the diplomatic notes to the newJapan-U.S. Treaty are "regarded as constituting an agreement
between the two Governments [and] enter into force at the same time as the Convention." Diplomatic Notes,
supra note 155, $ 8.
165. Diplomatic Notes, spra note 155, 3.
166. See Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9.
167. Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, $ 165. Because the OECD is a consensus
based organization, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines cannot be changed without the acquiescence of all
its members, includingJapan and the United States. See id.
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independent from each other. The Treaty's Protocol sets forth five factors that should be
6
taken into account in making the comparison to hypothetical independent enterprises.1 1
Associated enterprises are broadly defined to include any enterprise in one Contracting
State that "participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an
enterprise of the other Contracting State. "169
Enterprises need not be corporations, and two or more may be associated for Article 9
purposes if the same persons (whether or not residents of either Contracting State) wield
effective control (not necessarily legal control) over an enterprise in one Contracting State
and an enterprise in the other Contracting State. These principles are consistent with those
enunciated in both the OECD
Guidelines and the regulations under section 482 of the U.S.
70
Internal Revenue Code.

The international norm for policing transfer pricing between different countries' tax
jurisdictions has generally been the arm's length standard. The arm's length method
was formulated at a time when it was fairly practical to find a genuine arm's length
price in a comparable transaction. But with the rise in the volume of transfers of intangible assets and the increase in internal structural linkages between related firms, finding a comparable transaction is often impossible. For example, patents, copyrights, and
trademarks are by definition unique. Despite these problems, both the United States
and the OECD have expressed their firm commitment to the arm's length standard as
being the best theoretical model among alternatives.' The most often cited alternative is the formulary apportionment or unitary system under which an affiliated group
of companies is treated as a single enterprise, and the total worldwide net income of

168. According to Paragraph 5 of the Protocol, five factors that could affect comparability include:
(1) characteristics of the property or services transferred; (2) functions of the enterprises, taking into account
the assets used and risks assumed; (3) contractual terms between the enterprises; (4) economic circumstances;
and (5) business strategies of the enterprises. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, sipra note I, Protocol, T 5.
169. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 9(1). Paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the new Treaty appears to
extend the domestic time frames within which a Contracting State must initiate an examination of the enterprise in order to make a transfer pricing adjustment. Neither the U.S. Model Treaty nor the OECD Model
Treaty contains a comparable provision. According to Article 9(3), a Contracting State may not allocate profits
to an enterprise pursuant Article 9 unless an examination is initiated within the seven-year period following
the end of the taxable year in which the profits in question should have accrued to the enterprise. See id. art.
9(3). The U.S. Treasury's Technical Explanation questions whether the Treaty's longer assessment period will
have any real effect given the generally applicable three- and six-year statutes of limitations that apply in the
U.S. and Japan, respectively. See Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, T 178. But
Article 1(5) states that the new Treaty's Savings Clause (i.e., Article 1(4)), which normally retains full taxing
jurisdiction for a Contracting State over its residents or citizens, does not apply in the case of the limitation.
But as the Technical Explanation points out, Article 1(2) (General Scope) of the Treaty provides, interalia,
that
the Treaty shall not be construed to restrict a statutory allowance. Id. T 180. It appears that even though the
domestic limitations periods have run, the longer seven-year limitations period under the Treaty will allow a
Contracting State to make a refund of tax to an enterprise as the result of a correlative adjustment, since such
refund would not be a restriction of a statutory allowance. Under both domestic law and under the new Treaty,
all the general limitations periods are extended in the case of the taxpayer's fraud or willful deceit, or when the
inability to initiate an exam was due to the actions or inactions of the enterprise.
170. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 9(1); I.R.C. § 482 (RIA 2006); Treas. Regs. §§ 1.482-1
to -8 (as amended 2003).
171. See generally OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (une 18, 2001), available at http://www.oecd.org (follow "By Topic" hyperlink, then follow "Taxation"
hyperlink, then follow "Transfer Pricing" hyperlink, then follow "Publications & Documents" hyperlink, then
follow "Publications" hyperlink).

WINTER 2006

806

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

that aggregated enterprise is determined. The net income is then allocated to each of
the relevant taxing jurisdictions on the basis of objective apportionment factors associated with each jurisdiction. The advantage of this approach is that it avoids having to
find comparable transactions. The major drawback of formulary apportionment is that
all the countries involved would have to agree on the rules for defining the worldwide
income of the enterprise.'72 Although the formulary approach has been allowed by the
United States in certain limited contexts where it constituted the best method available,
it appears that some kind of multilateral framework is necessary to institute the approach
on more than a piecemeal basis.
The commensurate-with-income standard, which was added to Section 482 of the
U.S. Internal Revenue Code in 1986, is now viewed as consistent with the arm's length
standard as it is applied under Article 9 of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty. 7 ' The standard
is normally applied to the transfer of a newly created intangible under the reasoning
that an independent enterprise would not sell a new intangible to an unrelated party at
a set price until it is known what level of income the intangible will produce. Thus, the
standard, employing a fiction of yearly transfer, requires that a new price be determined
annually as though an annual royalty was being paid to the transferor. The so-called
"super royalty" is required to be commensurate with the income that the intangible
actually produced.

74

It is critical to note that although the text of Article 9 refers only to "profits," the Technical Explanation to the Treaty makes it clear that the article authorizes adjustments to any
tax attribute that will affect the enterprise's profits, including foreign tax credits, so long as
such adjustments reflect the arm's length standard. Moreover, the article also permits the
competent authorities to address thin capitalization issues. For example, they may scrutinize the capital structure of an enterprise and, apparently, may also re-characterize interest
on a loan as equity. The fact that Article 9 gives the taxing authorities the power to recharacterize income in an international context is representative of the OECD's commitment to add more weapons to the arsenal of anti-abuse provisions in bilateral tax treaties.
In cases where the Contracting States disagree on a transfer pricing issue, such as whether

a particular adjustment is appropriate, the Treaty authorizes the competent authorities to
employ the Treaty's Mutual Agreement Procedure to resolve the dispute.' 75

172. Defining an apportionment formula and effective control are issues common to the arm's length standard
and so, theoretically, do not pose an additional facilitative burden. Defining a worldwide tax base, however,
involves many additional burdens. Professor Richard Vann of Australia explained the problem as follows:
[T]he formulary approach takes as its starting point the worldwide profits of the corporations that fall
within the defined relationship. Unless there is agreement among all the countries that have a tax claim
in relation to a particular transaction on this matter, the same scope for double taxation will arise as
occurs in the bilateral context where the treaty partners cannot agree on the transfer price and in the
context of unilateral relief of double taxation where, for example, differing source or residence rules
are adopted by the countries involved. As soon as contacts with more than two countries are involved
in a particular transaction, agreement of three countries at least is involved.
Vann, Treaty for the Asian-Pacific?,supra note 30, at 105-06.
173. See Technical Explanation, spra note 9, 1 68. The OECD did not always view the commensurate with
income standard as being consistent with the arm's length approach. See Vann, Treaty for the Asian-Pacific?,
supra note 30, at 106.
174. See Revised OECD Guidelines, supra note 171, at J 6.28-6.35.
175. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 25(3).
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Transfer pricing principles are also reflected in the texts of several of the Treaty's other
articles, including the Royalties article, the Interest article, and Article 21 dealing with
Other Income.' 76

VI. Fiscally Transparent Entities
One of the most complex problems that countries have begun to seriously deal with in
their bilateral tax treaties has been the treatment of fiscally transparent entities. When an
item of income is derived through an entity that is classified inconsistently by the Source
State and Residence State-for example, as a fiscally transparent partnership by one State,
and as a corporate taxpayer by the other State-issues are raised as to which person or
persons are liable to tax on the income, and which persons qualify as residents for treaty
purposes.' 77 Without specific rules in a treaty to address this conflict-of-laws problem, the
classification discrepancy can easily result in an item of income being subjected to double
juridical taxation or, conversely, no tax at all.

A.

MULTIPLE JURIDICAL TAXATION OF SAME INCOME

Assume, as in Diagram 1, that a Japan-sourced royalty is paid to X, an entity organized
in Chile, and that X's interest holders (or investors) are U.S. residents. Neither the United
States norJapan has a bilateral income tax treaty with Chile.' 78 Assume X is an eligible entity
under the U.S. Entity Classification Regulations 79 and elects to be treated as a partnership
for U.S. tax purposes. Further assume that underJapanese law, X is viewed as a non-fiscally
transparent Chilean corporation. Thus, the company is a so-called hybrid entity, in that it
is classified inconsistently by at least two countries with arguable claims to tax jurisdiction
over the income it receives.
From Japan's perspective, the royalty is being paid to X Corporation, a resident of Chile,
with which Japan has no tax treaty. Thus, Japan would impose its full withholding tax on the
royalty income equal to 20 percent of the royalty. But because the United States views X as
a fiscally transparent partnership, it would treat the U.S. resident partners as deriving the
royalty income, whether or not distributed. 80 Finally, assuming Chile views X as a domestic corporation and does not exempt foreign-source income, Chile would also tax X on its
receipt of the royalty income. Thus, in the absence of specific treaty rules addressing how
parties to a bilateral tax treaty are to determine who is liable to tax on the income for purposes of identifying who is potentially qualified to claim treaty benefits, the royalty income

176. See Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 12(4) (Royalties); art. 11(8) (Interest); art. 21(3) (Other
Income).
177. Except as otherwise provided in the newJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, only persons who are residents of one
or both Contracting States are eligible for treaty benefits, such as reduced tax rates. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty,
rupra note 1, art. 1. See discussion of the residence and liable-to-tax prerequisites, supra note 9 and Part III.
178. However, the U.S. is in the preliminary stages of trying to negotiate a bilateral tax treaty with Chile.
See Tax Analysts, Germany-U.S. Tax Treaty Arbitration ProcessAddresses Sovereignty Issue, 2006 WORLDWIDE TAx
DAILY 133-3 (July 12, 2006), available in LEXIS, Intlaw library, TNI file, Doc 2006-13150 (Treasury official
characterizing as "insurmountable" the negotiating obstacles encountered by the U.S. in its efforts to expand
its South American tax treaty network).
179. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -5 (as amended in 2006).
180. I.R.C. §§ 701; 702(a), (b) (RIA 2006).
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could easily be taxed three times as in Diagram 1--once by Japan through its withholding
tax, once by the United States at the partner level,' 8 ' and once again by Chile. This tax
result would be a strong disincentive to making the investment in the first place.
B. DOUBLE NoN-TxATION
Not surprisingly, tax planners have been exploiting conflicts in entity classification laws by
deliberately structuring cross-border transactions with hybrid entities to avoid paying tax in
any country on items of income.8 2 As illustrated in Diagram 2, assume that X is organized in
a tax haven, the Cayman Islands, and that X elects under U.S. tax law to be taxed as a fiscally
transparent partnership for U.S. tax purposes. Further assume that Japan views the Cayman
entity as a non-fiscally transparent corporate taxpayer. X's interest holders are Japanese residents; the United States views them as partners liable to tax, and Japan views them as resident
shareholders of a foreign corporation.
Without special rules for determining who is liable to tax on the royalty income for treaty
purposes, each Contracting State would be left to apply its own classification rules without
regard to the other Contracting State's inconsistent classification and treatment. Thus, when a
U.S.-sourced royalty is paid to X as in Diagram 2, the United States, ignoringJapan's characterization, would treat the royalty as income of the Japanese partners of the X partnership and
would reduce its withholding tax to zero percent under Article 10 of the treaty.Japan, however,
would view the royalty as income of an opaque Cayman corporation and thus would not tax
181. Although the U.S. partners may be eligible to claim a foreign tax credit under I.R.C. § 901 for their
shares of the withholding tax paid by the partnership, their individual tax circumstances may prevent them
from fully utilizing the credit. See I.R.C. § 904 (foreign tax credit limitation).
182. Arbitrage structures, designed to avoid taxation altogether, became easier to structure in 1997 when the
United States made entity classification, even in the international context, largely elective through promulgation of the Check-the-Box Regulations. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -5 (as amended in 2006).
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the Japanese shareholders, even though the United States-the Source State in this example-reduced its withholding tax on the implicit but erroneous assumption that Japan-the
Residence State-also views X as a partnership and would therefore tax the income in the partners' hands. The royalty is subject to only a nominal tax in the Cayman Islands-a tax haven.
Thus, in the absence of special treaty rules for determining which persons are considered liable
to tax on the income received by a hybrid entity, the royalty income could conceivably cross
borders and be subject to no tax in the Source State, no tax in the Residence State, and little or
no tax in the country of the entity's incorporation because it is a tax haven. Although this tax
result distorts the true economic value of the investment, sophisticated tax planners continue
to use myriad variants of this structure to avoid tax on all kinds of cross-border transactions."'
Essentially, they structure transactions to take advantage of situations where there is either
no tax treaty in place, or an older treaty that fails to clarify which Contracting State's domestic laws are to be used in classifying entities in particular situations, and which Contracting
State's laws are to be used in identifying any residents of a treaty partner who are potentially
liable to tax on the income in question so that they can properly be accorded treaty benefits.
C. OECD

REPORT ON PARTNERSHIPS

In 1993, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) formed a working group to
study the entity classification problem-specifically, the application of the OECD Model
Income Tax Treaty to partnerships, trusts, and other unincorporated entities.' On January
183. The opportunities to employ hybrid entities, however, are becoming less abundant as more bilateral
tax treaties and domestic laws are being adopted to target this kind of tax arbitrage. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.

§ 1.894-1(d) (as amended in 2002).
184. See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships, 111(1999) [hereinafter the OECD Report on Partnerships].
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20, 1999, the working group officially adopted its first report on the subject, entitled "The
Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships." 5 In the report, the
CFA proposes that where an item of income is derived through an entity that is classified
inconsistently in the Source State and Residence State, then:
...the Source state, in applying the Convention where partnerships [or other transparent
entities] are involved, should take into account, as part of the factual context in which the Convention is to be applied, the way in which an item of income arising in its jurisdiction is treated
in the jurisdiction of the taxpayer claiming the benefits of the treaty as a resident." 6
Under this OECD proposal, if the Residence State treats the income as flowing through to
the partner, then the partner is the person who should be considered as being liable to tax and
entitled to the benefits of the tax treaty of the State in which he resides (assuming such a treaty
exists). On the other hand, if the income, although allocated to certain persons by the Source
State, is not similarly allocated for purposes of determining the liability to tax on that item of
income in the Residence State of the taxpayers who are claiming the benefits, then the Source
State should not grant benefits under the treaty. According to the CFA, "the underlying factual premise on which the allocation of taxing rights is based... [is] that the source State is
only obliged to reduce its domestic law tax claim where the income in question is potentially
liable to tax in the hands of a resident of the treaty partner...,n7
D.

ARTICLE 4(6)

Like other recently negotiated U.S. tax treaties, the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty attempts to
resolve the problem of fiscally transparent entities with its Residence article (Article 4)."ss
The relevant provisions in the new Treaty dealing with fiscally transparent entities are more
elaborate than those found in any U.S. tax treaty presently in force. The new Treaty also
represents the first time Japan has included such provisions in one of its treaties, perhaps
because the concept of flow-through-entity taxation has not been recognized in Japanese
tax law until quite recently,8 9 and Japan does not have anything on the order of the U.S.

185. Id. Although the OECD Report on Partnerships focuses exclusively on partnerships that qualify as such
under civil law or commercial law, the CFA acknowledges that many of the principles discussed in its report
may also apply to other non-corporate entities like trusts which, according to the report, will be the subject of
a "follow-up work." See id. at J 1, 37.
186. OECD Report on Partnerships, supra note 184, T 53.
187. Id. To reflect this specific proposal in the OECD's Report on Partnerships, the CFA amended the
official Commentary to the Residence article in the OECD Model Treaty, essentially proposing the same
methodology for determining who is liable to tax and eligible to claim treaty benefits in the case of a fiscally
transparent entity. See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention n Income and on Capital,
art. 1, 6.3 (2005) [hereinafter OECD Commentary].
188. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 4(6), (dealing with fiscally transparent entities).
189. Two different kinds of partnerships have long been sanctioned under Japan's Commercial Codethe gomei kaisba, or unlimited partnership, and the goshi kaisha, or limited partnership. However, neither
partnership form has played an important role in Japan due to their various restrictions. Until 2005, Japan
had never sanctioned a business entity that combined the following attributes: (1) limited liability for the
partners; (2) the ability to make special allocations of gains and losses that are disproportionate to the partners' relative equity interests in the partnership; and (3) pass-through taxation so that the entity itself is not
subject to tax. Finally, on May 6, 2005, Japan authorized a new kind of limited liability partnership (LLP)
that has this combination of attributes. The new law took effect on August 1, 2005. Yugen Sekinin Jigyo
Kumiai [Limited Liability Partnership Act], Law No. 40 of 2005 [hereinafter LLP Act]. The LLP Act amends
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Check-the-Box Regulations, which effectively give taxpayers the tools to perform international tax arbitrage. 9 °
Article 4(6) of the Treaty essentially codifies the basic approach of the OECD Report
on Partnerships by establishing the general rule that one must look to the internal tax laws
of the Residence State-not the State from which the income is sourced-to determine
whether or not an entity is fiscally transparent and who is actually liable to tax. It is the
Residence State's characterization that counts, and in almost all cases one is to ignore
the Source State's characterization (or a third state's characterization) of the entity if it
conflicts.' 9' The primary operational rule of the Treaty with respect to fiscally transparent entities is that when an item of income is derived from a Contracting State (i.e., the
Source State) through an entity organized in a second Contracting State (i.e., the Residence State), and that entity is treated as fiscally transparent under the internal tax laws
of the Residence State (e.g., as a partnership or tax transparent trust), the entity will be
entitled to treaty benefits only to the extent its beneficiaries, members, partners, or participants are residents of that second Contracting State and otherwise qualify for treaty
benefits under other provisions of the Treaty1 92
The Technical Explanation to the Treaty defines a fiscally transparent entity as one in
which the income is normally taxed at the beneficiary, member, or participant level. 193 U.S.

Part II of Japan's Commercial Code, and is part of the sweeping revisions of Japan's company laws. See 2005
Companies Law, supra note 94. Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has issued an English explanation of the proposed LLP bill, available at http://www.meti.go.jp/English/information/data/LLPe.
html. For U.S. tax purposes, the LLP is not a per se corporation under the U.S. Entity Classification Regulations. Although its default status is a corporation, it may elect to be treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes. For further explanation see Fuller, 2005 Int'l Legal Developments, Asia and Pacific Law-Japan, supra
note 97, at 521-23.
190. In light of the robust growth in Japan's M&A market in 2005 and the fact that Japan has been incrementally amending its company laws to sanction new types of business entities, holding companies, tax-free
spin-offs, and beginning in 2007, triangular cross-border mergers, it is quite foreseeable that Japan will also
promulgate more explicit entity classification rules for classifying foreign entities as such rules become necessary. Presently, Japan tends to accept, for purposes of applying its own tax rules, a foreign jurisdiction's classification of a non-Japanese entity. That may be why transactions involving so-called "domestic reverse hybrid
entities" (DRHE), and a set of controversial U.S. anti-abuse regulations denying treaty benefits to interest
holders in certain DRHE transactions, are not directly addressed in either the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty or the
Technical Explanation; treaty negotiators may have thought that the problem was not likely to arise. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.894-1(d) (as amended in 2002). A DRHE entity is defined as a "domestic [U.S.] entity that is treated
as not fiscally transparent for U.S. tax purposes and as fiscally transparent under the laws of the interest holder's
jurisdiction, with respect to the item of income received by the domestic entity." Id. § 1.894-1(d)(2).
191. But seeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1(4) (Savings Clause), discussed infra Part VI.E.
192. See Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(6)(a)-(e) (setting forth how the operative rule is applied
in various situations); Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, 1 73-78; see alsoTechnical Explanation
of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, IT 75-77. The Treaty's text does not use the term fiscally transparent
entities, but the term is defined in the Technical Explanation as:
... entities the income of which is taxed at the beneficiary, member, or participant level. Entities that are
subject to tax, but with respect to which tax may be relieved under an integrated system, are not considered
fiscally transparent entities. Entities falling under this description in the United States include partnerships,
common investment trusts under section 584, and business entities such as limited liability companies (LLCs)
that are treated as partnerships for U.S. tax purposes.
Id. 72; see alsoJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(2), (Essentially, any term used but not defined in
the Convention will have the meaning that it has at the time under the laws of that Contracting State whose tax
is being applied, unless the context requires otherwise and unless competent authorities agree otherwise).
193. Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, 72.
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partnerships, limited liability companies (LLCs), and revocable trusts, for example, are all
considered fiscally transparent from a U.S. legal perspective because they are not subject to
income tax at the entity level. Entities that are subject to tax, but with respect to which the
tax may be relieved under an integrated system, are not considered fiscally transparent for
purposes of the new Treaty.' 94
In applying this general rule of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, assume as in Diagram 3 that an
obligor, residing in Japan, pays 100 dollars of interest to Y, an entity that the United States
views as an LLC (taxable as a partnership under U.S. law). Further assume that the LLC has
ten equal members, each member qualifies as the beneficial owner of 10 percent of the interest, seven members also qualify as U.S. residents, each of the seven U.S. residents also satisfies
the Limitation-on-Benefits article of the Treaty, and the interest payments do not violate the
conduit rules discussed above.
With respect to the interest payment, Japan is the Source State because the obligor resides
in Japan. 95 The United States is the Residence State from the perspective the seven LLC
members that are qualified U.S. residents. Thus, under Article 4(6)(a) of the Japan-U.S.
Tax Treaty, only 70 percent of the interest paid to Y would potentially be entitled to Japan's
treaty-reduced withholding rate, since only seven of the ten LLC members are U.S. residents. But the analysis does not end there. Suppose one of the U.S.-resident members of the
LLC is a bank; then its ten-dollar share of the interest would be completely exempt from
Japanese withholding tax when it is paid to the LLC. 196 If another LLC member were an
insurance company, then its ten-dollar share of the interest payment would be completely
exempt from withholding tax as well, pursuant to the Treaty.197 Fifty dollars would be subject
to a maximum 10 percent withholding rate, assuming the other five U.S.-resident LLC
members do not fit within another exemption category of the Treaty. The remaining thirty
dollars of the interest paid to Ywould be subject to the fullJapanese withholding tax, without
any treaty benefit, unless the non-U.S. resident members could qualify for benefits under
a different Japanese tax treaty. This general rule applies, and the same result would obtain,
even if Y were organized in the third country-the Cayman Islands, for example-and Y's
members decided to elect to have Y taxed as a partnership for purposes of U.S. tax law.19
Because the United States sees Y as fiscally transparent, the U.S. residence status of Y's
beneficiaries, members, and participants suddenly becomes determinative of treaty benefits.
Whether Japan views Y as fiscally transparent or not is irrelevant in these two examples since
Japan is the Source State, and Y is not organized in Japan.' 99 The Cayman Island's characterization of Y is also irrelevant to the U.S. residents' qualifications for benefits under the
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty.
Conversely, if Y were being taxed as a separate corporate taxpayer by the United States
as shown in Diagram 4, then it would not be treated as fiscally transparent for treaty
purposes. Assume the same facts as in Diagram 3, except that the United States sees Y as
a non-fiscally transparent company-either because Y is an LLC and did not elect to be

194. Id.
195. See I.R.C. § 862(a)(1) (RIA 2006).
196. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11 (3)(c)(i); see Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty,
supra note 9, at
75-77.
197. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1l(3)(c)(ii).
198. Id., art. 4(6)(c).
199. But see id. at art. 1(4) (Saving Clause) and discussion of Savings Clause infra Part VI.E.
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taxed as a flow-through partnership for U.S. tax purposes, or because Y is organized as a
Cayman corporation.
In order to be eligible for the treaty-reduced withholding rate under the new Treaty,
Y itself would have to qualify as a resident of the United States (i.e., the non-Source State), 2
as well as the beneficial owner of the income.201' If Y Corporation were organized in the Cayman Islands, it would not qualify as a U.S. resident for treaty purposes. In that situation,Japan
would not be obligated to reduce its withholding tax on the interest income pursuant to the
Treaty. This is true even if all of Y's shareholders were U.S. citizens. Because Y in Diagram 4
is not treated as fiscally transparent by the Residence State (i.e., the United States in this
example), but as a separate corporate taxpayer, its own qualified resident status in the United
States is a prerequisite to obtaining treaty benefits.0 2 Conversely, if Y were organized in the
United States, it would qualify as a U.S. resident for treaty purposes assuming, if it is an LLC,
it does not elect to be treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes. If Y is a resident of the
United States, then Japan would reduce its gross withholding tax on the interest income paid
to Y, and the United States would tax it on a net basis at Y's regular corporate tax rate.
Next assume, as in Diagram 5, that Japanese-resident shareholders incorporate company Z
in Chile, which does not have a tax treaty with either the United States orJapan. The Japanese
shareholders elect to have the company treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes, but their
Chilean company is viewed as a taxable corporate entity underJapanese law.
If a U.S. debtor pays interest to the Chilean company, the interest payment would not
qualify for a treaty reduced rate under the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty because Japan (i.e., the
200. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(6)(b).
201. Entity Y would also have to clear other relevant hurdles to obtaining treaty benefits, such as satisfying
the LOB article clause of the treaty. See id. See also discussion of the LOB article infra Part V
202. See Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, 77.
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non-Source State) sees the entity as a non-resident of Japan. °3 The fact that the United
States (i.e., the Source State) sees the entity as fiscally transparent is irrelevant for purposes
of applying the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, as is Chile's characterization of the entity. This same
result would obtain under the facts presented above in relation to Diagram 2 if the new
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty were applied-that is, the United States would not grant a treatyreduced withholding rate-because the United States would first look to see whether the
royalty income was "treated as the income of the beneficiaries, members or participants of
that entity under the tax laws of" Japan before granting treaty benefits. 2° ,
Varying this fact pattern slightly, assume in Diagram 5 that Z is instead organized in the
United States (i.e., the State of Source) and Japan views Z as a corporation, while the United States continues to treat Z as a partnership, albeit a domestic partnership. Under the
general rule, the Source State is not obligated to cede its tax jurisdiction to the Residence
State where the Residence State does not, in fact, treat the income in question as being
derived by its residents. 05 Neither Z nor its Japanese interest holders would be eligible for
a reduced withholding tax rate under the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty because Japan-the nonSource State-treats the interest income as being that of a foreign, fiscally opaque entity,
20 6
which income does not flow through to any Japanese residents.

203. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(6)(d).
204. See id. art. 4(6)(c)(ii).
205. See OECD Report on Partnerships, supra Part VI.C. and note 184, 1 53; Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra
note 1,art. 4(6).
206. See Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(6)(e); see also Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax
Treaty, supra note 9, 9 88.
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E.

SAvINGs CLAUSE TRUMPS ARTICLE

4(6)

The text of Article 4(6) of the Treaty does not address the sixth fact pattern that commonly arises with respect to fiscally transparent entities. In the sixth case, as illustrated in
Diagram 6 as an item of income is derived from Japan or the United States through an
entity organized within that State (the Source State) and treated under the tax laws of the
other State as income of the beneficiaries, members or participants of that entity. For example, assume, in Diagram 6 the entity is organized in Japan as a tokureiyugen kaisha (TYK)-a
special kind of kabushiki kaisha (KK) or joint stock corporation that is treated as fiscally
207
non-transparent under Japanese law and taxed at the entity level. Further assume that the
TYK's members are residents of the United States, that the entity receives ajapan-sourced

207. TYK business entities are former Yugen Kaisha limited liability companies (YKs), and were created
by operation of law on the May 2006 effective date of Japan's new 2005 Companies Law, which substantially
rewrote Japan's company laws and revamped the types of entities available for doing business in Japan. See 2005
Companies Law, supra note 94. The 2005 Companies Law abolished the old YK form for doing business, which
had been sanctioned by Japanese law since 1938. See Yugen Kaisha Ho [Limited Liability Company Act-Law
Relating to Yugen Kaisha], Law No. 74 of 1938, § 8(1). Although the YK form was cumbersome and inflexible, it was nonetheless a popular vehicle for U.S. persons investing in or doing business in Japan because it
was listed as an eligible entity under § 301.7701-3 of the U.S. Entity Classification Regulations, meaning that
U.S. taxpayers could elect to have the YK treated as either a flow-through partnership or a taxable corporation
for U.S. tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2005) Since the 2005 Companies Law would
automatically turn all existing YKs into a special type of KK, and in light of the fact that all KKs are "per se corporations" under U.S. Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-2(8)(b), there was an issue as to whether the YKs would
lose their ability to elect their U.S. tax status once they became TYKs. In December 2005, the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service publicly ruled that any Japanese YK that becomes a Japanese TYK, pursuant to Japan's 2005
Companies Law, will remain an entity eligible to elect its tax classification for U.S. tax purposes pursuant to
Regulation § 301.7701-3. Rev. Rul. 2006-3, 2006-2 I.R.B. 276.
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interest payment, and that the TYK's members elect to have the TYK entity treated as a
fiscally transparent partnership for U.S. tax purposes.
In most cases, Article 4(6) provides that the State applying the Treaty-Japan, in this
example-is required to look to the internal tax law of the other Contracting State to see
whether any of its residents are liable to tax on the income before granting treaty benefits.
Further, if the general principle of the OECD Partnership Report2 °8 discussed above was
strictly followed in this example, Japan's ability to impose its 20 percent withholding tax
could be limited because TYK is a fiscally transparent entity and the Source State "should
take into account, as part of the factual context in which the Convention is to be applied,
the way in which an item of income arising in its jurisdiction is treated" by the Residence State.20 9 Here, the United States will tax the TYK partners are on their distributive
shares of TYK interest income.21 0 Nonetheless, the Technical Explanation to the Treaty
states that Article 4(6) does not apply to this situation and does not prevent the Source
State from taxing its domestic corporation or other taxable entity in accordance with its
domestic law under the Savings Clause of Article 1.' The result in this example turns on
the fact that TY-Ks are liable to tax at the entity level under Japanese law."' According to

208. OECD Report on Partnerships, supra Part VI.C., 53.
209. Id.
210. I.R.C. §§ 701, 702(a)-(b) (RIA 2006).
211. See Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Treaty, supra note 9, 90.
212. Under Japanese law, the Yugen Kaisha form (YK) was always taxable at the entity level underJapanese
law. See Yugen Kaisha Ho [Limited Liability Company Act-Law Relating to Yugen Kaisha], Law No. 74 of
1938. After the 2005 Companies Law converted YKs into a special class of KY, by operation of law, the YKs
remain taxable underJapanese law at the entity level, even though the YK may elect to be treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 2006-3, 2006-2 I.R.B. 276. See
Fuller, 2005 Int'l Legal Developments, Asia
and Pacific Law-Japan, supra note 97, at 518-19.
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the Technical Explanation, if an item of income is derived from one of the Contracting
States (i.e., the Source State) through an entity organized therein, and the Source State's
internal law treats that item as income of the domestic entity, then the Source State is not
prevented from taxing the entity in accordance with its own domestic law pursuant to the
Savings Clause in Paragraph 4 of Article 1 of the Treaty. 3 The Treaty's rules for the treatment of fiscally transparent entities are not an exception to the Savings Clause.1 4 Thus,
given the facts in Diagram 6, Japan may exercise its full taxing authority over the TYK's
receipt of the interest payment without ceding any of that authority to its treaty partner,
the United States.
Because the U.S. investors elected to have the TYK taxed as a partnership, they will be
subject to tax on their distributive shares of TYK's interest income." ' However, they are
also treated as paying a share of the taxes that are paid by TYK on the interest.2 1 6 Thus,
the U.S. investors in TYK will be allowed a foreign tax credit in computing their separate
income tax liabilities," 7 but not in excess of the tax they owe on their U.S.-source income."'
Although the United States is the country that always insists on the inclusion of the Savings
Clause in its bilateral tax treaties, it benefits Japan's treasury in this case.
E

WHAT

TAx POLICY

NORMS ARE SERVED BY ARTICLE

4(6)?

As evinced in the above examples, Article 4(6), applicable to fiscally transparent entities,
is not a simple provision to apply. It is the most detailed provision of its kind ever included
in U.S. tax treaty, and the first ever agreed to byJapan. Its inclusion in the newJapan-U.S.
Tax Treaty is also significant for a number of other reasons. First, unlike similar provisions found in other treaties and U.S. domestic law,2t 9 the purview of Article 4(6) in the
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is broader; it covers more than just the treaty benefits accorded to
dividends, interest, and royalties. For example, it could apply to identify the person who
is liable to tax on an item of business profit paid through a fiscally transparent entity. Second, although the concept of flow-through taxation has not been recognized in Japan until
recently,'20 the recent amendments to Japan's company and tax laws make it likely that fiscally transparent trusts and partnerships will be used with increasing frequency in domestic

213. The United States has always insisted on including the traditional savings clause in all its tax treaties,
which reserves the Contracting States' rights to tax their residents, and in the case of the United States, its citizens, as provided in their internal laws, despite contrary provisions in the treaty. Exceptions to the savings clause
are contained in Paragraph 5 of Article 1. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 1(4) (savings clause), art.
1(5) (exceptions). See also id. art. 23 (Relief from Double Taxation) discussed infra Part VIII.; I.R.C. §§ 894(a)(1)
(RIA 2006) (as amended in 1988) and 7852(d) (RIA 2006) (as amended in 1988) (discussed supra Part II.A.3).
214. Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, 90.
215. I.R.C. §§ 701, 702(a)-(b).
216. I.R.C. § 702(a)(6) ("In determining his income tax, each partner shall take into account separately his
distributive share of the parmership's... (6) taxes, described in section 901, paid or accrued to foreign countries and to possessions of the United States.").
217. I.R.C. § 903.
218. I.R.C. § 904.
219. See Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d)(as amended in 2002) (Denying treaty benefits on certain payments to
domestic reverse hybrid entities).
220. Not until 2006 did Japan have a viable business entity-the limited liability partnership--offering
pass-through taxation. See discussion of the newJapanese LLP vehicle supra note 189.
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as well as foreign transactions."' Thus, Article 4(6) will no doubt become more important
as time goes on-both to avoid double taxation on transactions involving U.S. and Japanese
entities, and to prevent tax evasion through arbitrage structures. Moreover, the provision codifies the conflict-of-laws tie-breaker mechanism described in Paragraph 53 of the
OECD Report on Partnerships, and in doing so, its helps resolve an age-old conundrum of
tax treaty interpretation-that is, which person or persons should be considered liable to tax
on income derived through a fiscally transparent entity, and which jurisdiction's laws should
be used to answer that question. Finally, because the world's two largest economic powers
have agreed to this complex but useful provision in their tax treaty, their inclusion of it may
signal what some have termed a growing consensus that the OECD's approach to fiscally
transparent entities is pragmatic and the best solution to the problem.
The general rule of article 4(6) may seem elegant in theory, but it could prove to be a
nightmare in application. The fact that the treaty between Japan and the United States (like
all bilateral treaties) even needed a special provision to attempt to more efficiently allocate
income between the Source State and the Residence State in transactions involving hybrid
entities lends credence to the argument that the Source and Residence concepts no longer
work well, if they ever did. The problem would be largely eliminated if every country had
the same rules for classifying entities, but that would require that all countries' business
entities function the same way in terms of their degree of transparency. Although Article
4(6) may be the best solution to the problem of fiscally transparent entities to date, it no
doubt carries with it high compliance burdens and transaction costs, which will reduce
efficiency. The State applying the Treaty-the Source State-must look to the peculiarities of a foreign jurisdiction's law to see which persons are "liable to tax." This could be an
expensive and arduous process. The long and labyrinthine U.S. withholding tax regulations
issued under Sections 1441 through 1446 of the Internal Revenue Code are a testament to
how complex this mechanism could become in practice.222
Article 4(6) clearly serves the tax policy objective of CEN to the extent it prevents
both double juridical taxation and complete tax evasion. 2 It may also serve the norm
of horizontal equity-the idea that all similarly situated taxpayers should be treated
equally-by leveling the international tax planning field. The individuals or companies
that regularly employ hybrid entities in their cross-border transactions can afford to
pay for sophisticated tax advice, while most taxpayers cannot. Thus, Article 4(6) may be
introducing more fairness into bilateral treaties based on the OECD Model, as well as
efficiency.
VII. Limitation-on-Benefits Article-Article 22
The 1971 Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty did not contain any Limitation-on-Benefits (LOB)
article. The complete absence of this anti-abuse provision meant it was easier for third
221. Moreover, the use of trusts-a few of them tax transparent is expected to greatly increase in Japan
with the enactment of Japan's new Trust Business Law, which, among other things, eases restrictions on trust
business licenses. Trust Business Law, No. 154 of 2004. Another statute, Japan's 80-year old Trust Law (Law
No. 62 of 1922) is being significantly revised in an effort to introduce new types of trusts, including those used
for securitization purposes. Trust Law, Law No. 62 of 1922. The revised Trust Law is expected to be submitted
to the Diet in 2006.
222. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1441-1 to -10 (as amended).
223. See discussion of capital export neutrality and other tax policy objectives infra Part II.A.-C.
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party residents to take advantage of the treaty. The new Treaty contains a fairly elaborate
LOB article, 2 4 comparable to the rules contained in recent U.S. tax treaties.
It has long been established that the benefits of a bilateral tax treaty are intended only

for bonafide residents of one of the Contracting States to the treaty. The Commentaries
to the OECD Model Treaty, for example, authorize a tax authority to deny treaty benefits,
pursuant to substance-over-form principles, to a nominee in one Contracting State deriving income from the other State on behalf of a third-country resident. The LOB article
and domestic law complement each other in preventing the misuse of the Treaty. The
anti-abuse provisions of internal law (e.g., step transaction doctrine, substance-over-form
and conduit principles,) are applied to recast suspect transactions in accordance with their
substance and to identify the true beneficial owner of the income. Then the LOB article is
applied to determine whether the beneficial owner, which is often an entity, has a sufficient
nexus to the Contracting State to be treated as a bonafide resident for treaty purposes.
The U.S. Treasury's Technical Explanation to the Treaty describes treaty shopping as
"the use, by residents of third states, of legal entities established in a Contracting State with
a principalpnrposeto obtain the benefit of a tax treaty between the United States and the other
25
Contracting State."" If the only prerequisite to obtaining treaty benefits was establishing
residency in one of the Contracting States, it would be very easy for third-country residents
to treaty shop. All someone would have to do is set up a corporation in one of the Contracting States, and then funnel payments through the corporation to the third-party interest
holder who, in the absence of the conduit, would not otherwise enjoy the reduced level of
taxation.
One way to police treaty shopping would be for the taxing authorities to investigate the
taxpayer's motives in establishing an entity in a Contracting State. But, of course, this system
would be very difficult to administer. To avoid having to investigate a taxpayer's motives,
the LOB article sets forth a series of objective tests that are intended to provide useful surrogates for subjective intent:
The assumption underlying each of these tests is that a taxpayer that satisfies the requirements
of the test likely has a real business purpose for the structure it has adopted, or has a sufficiently
strong nexus to the other Contracting State (e.g., a resident individual) to warrant benefits
even in the absence of a business connection, and that this business purpose or connection is
a principal
sufficient to justify the conclusion that obtaining the benefits of the treaty is not
2 6
purpose of establishing or maintaining residence in that other Contracting State. 1
Under Paragraph 1 of the new LOB article, a resident is entitled to all the benefits of
the Treaty only if it can be described as one of the following: an individual resident; certain
government entities, including central banks; a company that is publicly traded or has a par27
ent company that is publicly traded, as defined; certain charities and tax exempt organizations; a pension fund provided that more than 50 percent of its beneficiaries are individual
residents of either Contracting State; or an entity that satisfies both a resident-owner test
28
and a base-erosion test.

224. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 22.

225.
226.
227.
228.

Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, 383 [emphasis added].
Id.1 384.
SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 22(1)(c).
See id. art. 22(1)( 0 (two-prong ownership and base-erosion test).
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Even if a resident does not meet one of the above descriptions, the resident may be able
to claim treaty benefits for some items of income to the extent the resident can establish
that the items are sufficiently connected to an active trade or business in the resident's own
Contracting State.229 Residents who do not meet any one of the above tests, including the
active-trade-or-business test, may still be able to claim treaty benefits if the Competent
Authority of the Contracting State from which the benefits are claimed determines that it
is appropriate to grant benefits in that case. 30 While the Competent Authority's analysis
will likely differ from that necessitated by the above tests, the objective of the inquiry is the
same: to identify investors whose residence in the other Contracting State can be justified
by factors other than a purpose to derive treaty benefits.
The U.S. Treasury Department has indicated that a top priority in 2006 and 2007 will
be the introduction of more effective LOB articles in newly negotiated and existing treaties
within the U.S. tax treaty network."' While the sophisticated LOB article contained in the
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty helps solidify a new global standard for anti-treaty-shopping mechanisms, each newly negotiated LOB article will necessarily take account of the peculiarities
of the Contracting States' domestic laws and is unlikely to be a replica of that contained in
the new Treaty or even in the Model Treaties. Nonetheless, the inclusion of a modern LOB
article-indeed, any LOB article-in the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is a big "first" for Japan,
and it appears to be inspiring Japan to include stronger LOB provisions in its own bilateral
treaty network, which Japan is presently modernizing through bilateral negotiations with
its treaty parmers.23 Moreover, the addition of modern LOB articles in Japanese tax treaties will likely motivate other, less industrialized Asian countries to follow Japan's example.
As with Article 4(6) (applicable to income paid to fiscally transparent entities), the LOB
article serves the tax policy goals of CEN and horizontal equity, but the mere fact that it is
needed evinces the flaws in the present international treaty framework.
VIII. Relief from Double Taxation-Article 23
The new Treaty provides relief from double taxation in a manner consistent with the
U.S. Model Treaty. In general, the United States allows taxpayers to credit foreign taxes
paid against their U.S. income tax, with a limited carryover mechanism for unused foreign
tax credits.233 In the Treaty, Japan agrees to allow its residents to credit U.S. taxes paid
against Japanese taxes. The amount of the credit, however, cannot exceed the portion of
the Japanese tax that corresponds to that income. This provision prevents the use of credits
derived from low-taxed income to offset income that is generally subject to higher taxes,
and is similar to the basketing mechanism of the U.S. foreign tax credit.3 4 The new Treaty
includes a re-sourcing rule to ensure that a U.S. resident can obtain a U.S. foreign tax credit

229. See id. art. 22(2).
230. See id. art. 22(4).
231. See Robert Goulder, U.S. Treasury Official Spots Trends in Treaty Practice, WORLDWIDE Tx DAILY,
Nov. 30, 2005, available in LEXIS, Intlaw library, TNI file, 2005 WTD 229-2 (quoting U.S. Treasury
International Tax Counsel Hal Hicks).
232. Japan has recently renegotiated tax treaties with India, France, Indonesia, the Philippines, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom.
233. See I.R.C. §§ 901, 904(a), (c)(RIA 2006);Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 23.
234. See I.R.C. § 904(d) (RIA 2006). This section of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code was amended in2004
to reduce the number of income categories (known by practitioners as baskets) from nine to two.
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for Japanese taxes paid when the Treaty assigns Japan the primary right to tax an item of
gross income. A comparable rule applies for purposes of the Japanese foreign tax credit.
The first paragraph of the article provides that, if the Treaty allows the United States to tax
an item of income beneficially owned by a resident of Japan, that income will be deemed to
arise from sources in the United States forJapanese foreign tax credit purposes.
IX. Miscellaneous Provisions
The new Treaty has quite a few other provisions that differ from the old 1971 Treaty. In
the case of shipping income, the new Treaty eliminates Source-State taxation, and instead
allocates to the Residence State full taxing authority over profits from the operation of ships
or aircraft in international traffic.23 Moreover, the new Treaty exempts from Source-State
taxation all income from the use, maintenance, or rental of containers used in international
traffic.

3

Other changes found in the new Treaty affect the taxation of entertainers and sports-

men; corporate directors;23 government employees;239 and students, scholars, and business
apprentices. 240In general, the new Treaty broadens the availability of an exemption from host
country taxation for students and teachers with respect to certain classes of income.
237

X. Nondiscrimination-Article 24
Part IV discussed the ways in which the new Treaty limits source-based taxation for purposes of removing barriers to foreign trade and investment. To recapitulate, Articles 10, 11,
and 12 of the Treaty, limit the respective rates at which the Source State can tax nonresident
aliens and foreign corporations on the dividends, interest, and royalties they receive in the
absence of a PE. Even if the foreigner has a PE in the Source State, Article 7 restricts the
Source State's jurisdiction to tax the PE's income to that which is attributable to the PE.
Article 24 of the Treaty-the Nondiscrimination article-further prohibits a Contracting
State from imposing taxes on nationals of the other Contracting State that are effectively
24 1
more burdensome than the taxes it imposes on similarly situated domestic taxpayers.
In other words, under Article 24, foreign producers may not be taxed more heavily than
domestic producers. Thus, for example, if a Japanese corporation has a PE in the United
States, Article 24 prohibits the United States from taxing the profits of the PE more heavily
than it taxes its own domestic, similarly situated businesses. As another example of Article
24's application, if a U.S. citizen is living in Japan, Japan may not discriminate against him
235. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8 (Profits from Shipping and Air Transport).
236. Seeid. art. 8(4).
237. Seeid. art. 16.
238. See id. art. 15.
239. See
id. art. 18.
240. See id. art. 19.
241. Article 24 is not limited to income taxes, but applies to taxes of every kind. A person need not be a
resident of a treaty country to claim the protections of Article 24, but the person must be a national as defined
in Article 3(1)0), which term includes U.S. citizens as it pertains to U.S. law, and juridical persons, as the term
pertains to Japanese law. U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(1)0). Arguably, the Nondiscrimination
article serves the policy objective of capital import neutrality. See discussion supra Part H.B. (stating that vertical equity is served where all similarly situated persons are treated similarly; CIN is served when all business
activity derived within the same jurisdiction is subject to the same marginal tax rate regardless of whether the
investor is a domestic resident or a foreigner, so that those investors who invest both within and without the
jurisdiction are not disadvantaged as they are in pure residence-based systems).
WINTER 2006

822

THE TERNATIONAL LAWYER

or her by imposing taxes that are more burdensome than the taxes Japan imposes on its own
residents.242 The Nondiscrimination article in the Treaty is similar to that found in the U.S.
Model Treaty and in other recently negotiated U.S. treaties.
Not all instances of differing tax treatment or related tax requirements are considered
facially discriminatory for purposes of Article 24. Paragraph 2 stipulates that a Contracting State may not tax a PE of an enterprise in the other Contracting State in a manner less
favorably than a domestic enterprise "carrying on the same activities."2 43 In general, the fact
that a PE is taxable in the Source State only on income attributable to the PE pursuant to
Article 7, while a domestic corporation is taxable on its worldwide income, is not the kind
of different circumstance that would preclude the foreign owners of the PE from claiming
protection under Article 24 with respect to some other difference in tax treatment or relat
ed requirement 44 But there are situations where protection under Article 24 would be precluded because the claimant is not deemed similarly situated. If the United States required
the Japanese owners of a PE to provide information about its enterprise that is much more
detailed than the information required of domestic entities carrying on the same activities,
that requirement would not necessarily be discriminatory within the meaning of Article 24
because the requisite information concerning a foreign firm may not be as readily available
to the Internal Revenue Service as that concerning a domestic firm.2 41 Similarly, Article 24 is
not violated if a partnership with income effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business is
required under domestic law to withhold tax on amounts allocable to a foreign partner, even
though no similar obligation to withhold tax from the distributive shares of U.S. resident
partners is imposed. 24 6 Moreover, a Contracting State is not required to grant "any personal
allowances, reliefs and reductions for taxation purposes" to nationals of the other Contracting State. 247 Thus, if a Japanese resident has a PE in the United States, the United States is
not required to allow him or his family the personal allowances "that he would be permitted
24
to take if the [PE] were a sole proprietorship owned and operated by a U.S. resident. 1
There is an ongoing and increasingly controversial issue concerning the extent to which
the nondiscrimination principle found in bilateral tax treaties,2 49 in the U.S. Commerce
Clause,250 and in the European Community Treaty25' prohibits or should prohibit, under

242. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 24(1).
243. Id. art. 24(2).
244. Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, T 469.
245. Id.
246. See id. 470; see also I.R.C. § 1446 (withholding tax on foreign partners' share of effectively connected
income).
247. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 24(2).
248. Technical Explanation, Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, at 96.
249. Although the United States has argued that its thin capitalization rules do not violate the nondiscrimination clauses in tax its treaties, some scholars have argued otherwise. See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg,
The Enhancement of the Earnings Stipping Provision, 7 Tx NOTES INT'L 985, 986-87 (Oct. 18, 1993); Federal
Income Tax Project, American Law Institute, International Aspects of United States Income Taxation (pt. 2)
258-59, 280-82 (1992)(challenging U.S. congressional arguments that thin capitalization rules do not violate
U.S. tax treaty obligations under the typical nondiscrimination article).
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ([Congress shall have the power] "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
251. In 1986, the then twelve Member States of the European Community agreed to the Single European
Act, defining a common market and committing themselves to the so-called four freedoms: "the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital." Single European Act, art. 13, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
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coherent tax policy principles, the operation of countries' thin capitalization rules and other
anti-abuse measures. 52 One of the ways multinational corporations shift taxable income
from one jurisdiction to another is through strategic debt financing. Thus, if a parent corporation (situated in a low-tax country) capitalizes its subsidiary (located in a high-tax country) with debt, the subsidiary's interest deductions will reduce its taxable income while the
payments of interest will increase the parent's income. This mechanism,. if not restricted,
effectively allows multinational corporations to move the group's income from high-tax to
low-tax countries just by positioning its subsidiaries and parent corporations in the right
jurisdictions.
To prevent the erosion of their corporate tax bases, both Japan and the United States,
like many countries around the world, have enacted so-called thin capitalization rules,
often called interest stripping rules, that essentially deny thinly capitalized corporations a
deduction for interest paid to related parties on excessive debt.253 In recent years, scholars
have argued that the operation of these thin-capitalization rules can unfairly discriminate
against foreign producers as prohibited by the standard nondiscrimination article in bilateral tax treaties. For example, assume a country had a law under which domestic subsidiaries of foreign parent companies will be denied deductions for interest paid to their foreign
parents whenever the paying subsidiary has a high debt-to-equity ratio, although such
4
deductions are not denied if the interest is being paid to domestic parent companies.11
The underlying rationale of the law is that if the interest is being paid to another domestic
corporation, the income is still within the tax base of the residence country and so there
is less reason for the residence country to prohibit the interest deduction as compared to
the situation where the interest deduction is actually reducing the corporate tax base of the
country. But such a provision discriminates against a similarly situated foreign parent company. The Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty does not nullify the thin-capitalization rules ofJapan or
the United States. However, Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Treaty does expressly prohibit

The Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 3, incorporated the four
freedoms and other guarantees of the Single European Act of 1986: freedom of movement for workers, id. art.
39; freedom of establishment, id. arts. 43, 48; freedom to provide services, id. art. 49; and freedom of movement
of capital, id. arts. 56, 58.
252. Although an extensive analysis of the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) on this issue is beyond the scope of this article, it is further addressed below in the
context of alternatives to bilateral tax treaties. See discussion infra Part XII.D.3.b (analyzing several decisions of
the ECJ, including one in which the court struck down Germany's thin capitalization rules under its expansive
view of nondiscrimination). Other jurisdictions' analyses of the nondiscrimination principle in domestic contexts may impact the interpretation of the Nondiscrimination article contained in bilateral tax treaties. For an
insightful analysis of the recent nondiscrimination jurisprudence of the ECJ and its possible impact, seeMichael
J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Income Tax Discriminationand the Politicaland Economic IntegrationofEurope, 115
YALEL.J. 1186 (2006) (arguing that the developing jurisprudence of the ECJ threatens the ability of Member
States of the European Union to use tax incentives to stimulate their domestic economies and to resolve problems of international double taxation)[hereinafter Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination].
253. See I.R.C. § 1630) (RIA 2006) (Limitation of deduction for interest on certain indebtedness); see also
Ernst & Young's Foreign Desk, Proposed 2006JapaneseTax Reform, 17 J. INrr'L Tx. No. 3 (March 2006) (discussing proposed amendments to Japan's thin capitalization rules).
254. These are essentially the facts considered in a case before the ECJ in 2002. In Lankhorst-Hohort GmbH
v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, the ECJ held that Germany's thin capitalization rules, which denied deductions of interest paid to a foreign parent company, but not to interest paid to parent companies with their seats in Germany,
violated the freedom of establishrnent in the EC Treaty. Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v.Finanzamt
Steinfurt, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11779. See further discussion infra Part XII.D.3.b.
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this type of discrimination. Paragraph 3 provides that when a resident of a Contracting
State pays interest (or royalties or other disbursements) to a resident of the other Contracting State, the first mentioned State must allow a deduction for those payments as if
the payment had been made under the same conditions to a domestic person. " Paragraph
3 carves out a big exception to current deductibility where application of the arm's length
standard imposed on related persons pursuant to Article 9 (associated enterprises), Article
11 (interest), Article 12 (royalties), and Article 21 (other income) would require a different
result. Thus, the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty employs the arm's length standard as a backup
mechanism to ameliorate the effects of the nondiscrimination article 5 6 leaving a lot of
room for argument and making it more likely that such issues will be decided under the
Mutual Agreement Procedure.
XI. Mutual Agreement and Exchange-of-Information
Procedures
A.

MUTUAL AGREEMENT PROCEDURE

In recent years, the volume of cross-border trade and investments has risen dramatically.
At the same time, cross-border transactions have become massive and overwhelmingly
complex. These developments have not only put pressure on the treaty provisions that allocate substantive tax authority, they have also strained the procedural mechanisms for resolving international tax disputes. In particular, the volume and complexity of cross-border
transfer pricing issues has increased, causing the conciliatory dispute resolution mechanism
set forth in bilateral tax treaties to assume greater importance. Many transfer pricing issues
are resolved using this procedure, particularly in combination with an advanced pricing
agreement (APA).
Article 25 of the new Treaty-the so-called Mutual Agreement Procedure-closely follows the OECD Model Treaty. The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, in its 1984 Mutual
Agreement Report, characterized the Mutual Agreement Procedure as follows:
The mutual agreement procedure envisaged by Article 25 and adopted in many bilateral agreements on the OECD pattern is not, however, a process of litigationbetween the taxpayer and the

competent authorities: for such disputes the domestic courts are the appropriate forum. The
mutual agreement procedure is (unless there is specific provision to the contrary in the relevant
law of the countries concerned) simply a process of discussion between the competent authoritiesin
which they seek to explore the possibility of a solution to the relevant problem which can be accepted by
all concerned.257

255. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 24 (3); see Technical Explanation of theJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty,
supra note 9, at 97. Thus, the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty's resolution of the thin-capitalization issue is consistent
with the 2002 decision of the European Court of Justice in Lankhorst-Hohort GmbH v. Fmnanzamt Steinfurt,
Case C-324/00, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11779. See infra Part XII.D.3.b.
256. For one thing, the arm's length standard provides no guidance as to when a debt financing is excessive.
See, Vain, Treaty for the Asian-Pacific?,supra note 30, at 108 (arguing that "the OECD has effectively rendered
inapplicable one article of its Model treaty that seems to be applicable (the Nondiscrimination article) and
rendered applicable another article that seems inapplicable (the associated enterprises article)").
257. Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Report on
Mutual Agreement Procedure, T 98 (1984) (emphasis added)[hereinafter OECD Mutual Agreement Report of
19841.
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The history of the Mutual Agreement Procedure is as long and twisted as the history of
the OECD Model Treaty itself. Historically, such procedural mechanisms were included
in bilateral treaties because drafters thought some kind of on-going channel of negotiation
was needed to iron out fiscal authorities' differences as to the proper implementation of
5
any given tax treaty after the agreement actually became effective. Today, the Mutual
Agreement Procedure, as it appears in the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, looks like a product
of its past: the mechanism reflects a trial-and-error, ad hoc process of dispute resolution
that is non-binding, non-legalistic, and conciliatory. Currently, a debate is swirling as to
whether the process still works as well as it did when cross-border transactions were a lot
simpler.259
Structurally, Article 25 of the new Treaty attempts to resolve three different types of problems. The first, which is covered by the first two paragraphs of the article, arises "[wihere
a person considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting States result or will
260
result for him in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention."
The second set of difficulties-those arising from the interpretation or application of the
Treaty-is addressed in the first sentence of Paragraph 3. The third set of problems--cases
of double taxation not provided for6 in the Convention-are addressed in the second sentence of Paragraph 3 of the article.1 '
Paragraph 1 thus authorizes a person to bring to the attention of the competent author262
ity of the Contracting State where he is a resident any action by either Contracting State
2 63
that has resulted, or which will result, in taxation contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.
Although it is not necessary for the complainant to have exhausted remedies available
under domestic law before initiating the Mutual Agreement Procedure, "[t]he case must
ARBITRATION IN TAxATION 24 (Deventer: Kluwer 1981).
259. The debate is evinced in the fact that the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs is studying ways to
improve the Mutual Agreement Procedure. See Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Improving the Processfor Resolving InternationalTax Disputes, (July 24, 2004)
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/0/36079589.pdf [hereinafter OECD Proposals for Improving
Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes].
260. Japan-US. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 25(1). Thus, taxpayers are allowed to initiate the Mutual Agreement Procedure to resolve disputes regarding the application of the Treaty. Historically, this was not the case.
The U.S. Internal Revenue Service takes the view that specific tax disputes may also be raised sua sponte by the
competent authorities, but most authorities take the view that only the taxpayer may initiate the Mutual Agreement Procedure under Paragraph 1.See Rev. Proc. 2002-52, 2002-2 C.B. 242, § 2.04 ("The U.S. competent
authority also may initiate competent authority negotiations in any situation deemed necessary to protect U.S.
interests."); John Avery Jones et al., The Legal Nature of the Mutual Agreement Procedure under the OECD Model
Convention-I, 1979 BRIT. Tx REv. 333, 335 atn.5 (1979).
261. The competent authorities are given the power to raise the second and third sets of problems under the
Mutual Agreement Procedure. See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Commentary on Article 25 Concerning
the MutualAgreement Procedure, T 3, 35, 37 (2005).
262. If the case comes under Paragraph I of the Nondiscrimination article (Article 24), then the person need
only be a national, not a resident of the Contracting State to which he complains. Technical Explanation of
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, at 95. With respect to Japan, the competent authority is the "Minister of
Finance or his authorized representative." With respect to the U.S., the competent authority is "the Secretary
of the Treasury, or his delegate." Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3 (1)(k)(i)-(ii).
263. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 25(l). Revenue Procedure 2002-52 sets forth the details of
how a taxpayer may invoke the Mutual Agreement Procedure with respect to a U.S. Tax Treaty. In general,
a request for relief of double taxation, pursuant to the Revenue Procedure, may be filed only when there is
at least a probability, and not a mere possibility, of double taxation. See Rev. Proc. 2002-52, 2002-2 C.B. 242,
§ 4.01 ("Procedures for Requesting Competent Authority Assistance").

258. See, GUSTAF LINDENCRONA & NILS MATTSON,
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be presented within three years from the first notification of the action resulting in taxation
not in accordance with the provisions of the Convention."2 64 If the competent authority
of the State to which the case has been brought judges the case to have merit but cannot
resolve the problem unilaterally, Paragraph 2 provides that the competent authorities of
both Japan and the U.S. "shall endeavor.., to resolve the case by mutual agreement.. ... "265
This textual language highlights what many have characterized as a major deficiency in the
OECD's Mutual Agreement Procedure: that the competent authorities are only under a
duty to try or "endeavor" to resolve the case, rather than under an obligation to definitely
resolve it?6 6 The official OECD Commentaries point out that the Contracting States are
free to negotiate a more substantial and exacting commitment on the part of the competent
authorities to resolve the case beyond the mere duty to employ best efforts.167 Although
some countries, including the United States, have begun to negotiate and add new treaty
clauses providing for arbitration as a fallback to the Mutual Agreement Procedure,2 6 Japan

The Revenue Procedure specifically provides that transfer pricing disputes are within the purview of the
competent authorities' power to negotiate. Id. § 2.01 (General Scope). Since the U.S. introduced its Advanced
Pricing Agreement (APA) program for transfer pricing in 1991, competent authorities are often called upon to
negotiate these APAs on a multilateral basis between the U.S., the foreign tax authority, and the taxpayer. In
general, an APA is an agreement between the taxpayer and the relevant tax administrations that specifies the
criteria or method(s) to be used for determining arm's length transfer prices for future transactions between
related enterprises. An APA is tantamount to a contract that covers often numerous transactions over a fixed
number of years. If domestic legislation does not provide for such APAs, then they may be concluded under the
Mutual Agreement Procedure of an applicable tax treaty.
In 1987, Japan issued a directive introducing an APA procedure-makingJapan the first country in the world
to institute such a program. See Japan National Tax Agency, Guidance on Calculation of Arm's Length Prices
(April 24, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 APA Directive]. The 1987 APA Directive was revised in 1999 and 2001,
and was eventually superceded in June 2001 by the Directive on Methods of Calculating Ann's Length Prices,
which combines transfer pricing guidelines, APA procedures, and procedures for resolving transfer pricing
dispute through the Mutual Agreement Procedure provided by tax treaties. See Japan National Tax Agency,
APA Program Report 2005 1 (Sept. 2005).
264. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
265. Id. art. 25(2).
266. See, e.g., OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Commentary on Article 25 Concerningthe MutualAgreement
Procedure,supra note 262, $ 26 (Paragraph 2 of Article 25 entails a duty on the part of the competent authorities to
negotiate and a duty to use their best endeavors, but no obligation to achieve a result); Robert A. Green, Antilegaliscic Approaches to Resolving DisputesBetween Governments: A Comparison of the InternationalTax and Trade Regimes,
23 YALE J. ITr'L L. 79, 99 (1998) ("The treaty countries promise merely to 'endeavor' to resolve disputes; there is
no guarantee that they will succeed.")[hereinafter Green, Comparison ofInternationalTax and Trade Regimes].
267. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Commentary on Article 25 Concerning the MutualAgreement Procedure, supra note 261, T 26 (2005).
268. On June 1, 2006, the United States and Germany signed a protocol to their existing tax treaty which
will, when it becomes effective, provide for mandatory baseball-style arbitration of disputes when the competent authorities are unable to reach a complete agreement in a case regarding the application of the Residence,
Permanent Establishment, Business Profits, Associated Enterprises, or Royalties articles. Under the pending
protocol, which is expected to be ratified in 2007, the competent authorities may also agree to arbitrate other
subject matter. A determination of the arbitration board would constitute a resolution by mutual agreement
under Article 25 of the Germany-U.S. Tax Treaty, which was signed on August 29, 1998. When the protocol
becomes effective, it will make the U.S. tax treaty with Germany the first U.S. income tax treaty to provide for
mandatory arbitration of competent authority disputes. See Tax Analysts, U.S. Agrees to MandatoryArbitration
in German Tax Treaty, 2006 WORLDWIDE Tx DAILY 107-1 (June 5, 2006), available in LEXIS, Intlaw library,
TNI file, Doc 2006-10664. Clauses providing for non-mandatory arbitration have been included in some of the
tax treaties the U.S. has recently negotiated, including those with Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan,
Mexico, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
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supplementary
dispute resolution mechanism
and the United States have not included a 26
9
like arbitration or mediation in their Treaty.
Any agreement reached by the competent authorities ofJapan and the United States as to
a specific case is to be carried out "even if such implementation otherwise would be barred
by the statue of limitations or by some other procedural limitation, such as a closing agreement."7 0 However, the Technical Explanation notes that Paragraph 2 does not preclude
the efficacy of a domestic procedural limitation that gives effect to the decision reached
by the competent authorities-for example "a domestic-law requirement that the taxpayer
file a return reflecting the agreement within one year of the date of the agreement." 271 The
United States and Japan have explicit rules that coordinate the decisions of the competent
authorities and the domestic limitations periods.2 72 Under U.S. law, the time limits and
procedural limitations periods cannot be extended if a request for competent authority
273
assistance is denied or if the competent authorities fail to reach an agreement.
There is a longstanding issue as to whether an agreement on a specific case reached by the
competent authorities pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 2 ofArticle 25 overrides a domestic court
decision. In Japan, the decision reached by the mutual agreement procedure may be enforced
despite a contrary court decision.7 4 In the United States the issue is less clear, although U.S.
Revenue Procedure 2002-52 explicitly states that "[t]here is no authority for the U.S. competent authority to provide relief from U.S. tax or to provide other assistance due to taxation
arising under the tax laws of the foreign country or the United States, unless such authority
is granted by a treaty."275 Thus, if the issue arises, it is likely to be framed as a situation in
which the U.S. competent authority agreed to relief that was not authorized under the given
tax treaty, as previously interpreted by a prior U.S. court. Because there is a concerted effort
to ensure that the agreements reached by the U.S. competent authority are consistent with
U.S. law-for example, by explicitly requiring the U.S. competent authorities to be guided

In 1990, twelve Member States of the European Communities signed a multilateral agreement providing
for mandatory arbitration of certain issues that were not able to be resolved through the standard mutual
agreement procedure set forth in tax treaties. See Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in
Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, July 23, 1990, 90/463/EEC, reprinted
Aug. 20, 1990 0. J. European Communities, (L 225). In addition a few bilateral European treaties contain
arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Austria-ER.G., art. 25(5), Aug. 24, 2000, reprinted in Tax Analyst,
Worldwide Tax Treaties,2001 WORLDWIDE TAx DAILY 36-16, availableat LEXIS, TNI file, 2001 WTD 36-16,
Doc 2001-5225.
269. As expected, the new U.S. Model Tax Treaty, which was released on November 15, 2006, does not
contain a model provision providing for mandatory arbitration. See U.S. Model Tax Treaty, supra note 108; Tax
Analysts, Germany-U.S. Tax Treaty Arbitration ProcessAddresses Sovereignty Issue, supra note 178.
270. Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, at 100; cf.Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra
note 1, art. 9(3) (Contracting State may allocate profits to an associated enterprise pursuant Article 9 unless an
examination is initiated within the seven-year period following the end of the taxable year in which the profits
in question should have accrued to the enterprise); see discussion supra Part V, note 169.
271. Technical Explanation ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, at 100.
272. See Rev. Proc. 2002-52, 2002-2 C.B. 242, § 7 (Coordination with Other Administrative or Judicial
Proceedings), § 8 (Simultaneous Appeals Procedure), § 9 (Protective Measures).
273. Id. § 9.01 ("In addition, the particular treaty or the posture of the particular case may indicate that the
taxpayer or a related person must take protective measures with the U.S. and foreign tax authorities so that the
implementation of the any agreement reached by the competent authorities ...[is]
not barred.").
274. See Jones et al., supra note 260, at 346, n.62; see also discussion supra Part l11.B.3.
275. Rev. Proc. 2002-52, 2002-2 C.B. 242, § 3.02.
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by the arm's length standard within the meaning of the transfer pricing regulations under
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code276-few mutual agreements are likely to be
challenged on this basis, especially since the mutual agreement can be likened to a settlement. 77 However, if a U.S. taxpayer does not accept the mutual agreement reached by the
competent authorities, U.S. law permits the taxpayer to refer the issue to IRS Appeals for
further consideration. 27 8 Except in cases where the Treaty specifically delegates authority
to the competent authorities to resolve a particular issue-for example, the residence of a
person under Article 4(3)(d) of the Treaty-a taxpayer may generally appeal the results of
the Mutual Agreement Procedure to the domestic revenue authorities or to the courts. 79
The taxpayer's right to reject the mutual agreement of the competent authorities, combined with the fact that such agreements have no value as legal precedents, imparts a
transient quality to the whole dispute resolution process under Article 25, which some
have likened to an on-going political negotiation. 20 However, the potency of the Mutual
Agreement Procedure as a dispute resolution mechanism is bolstered by the fact that it is
expressly excepted from the Savings Clause of Article 1,211 which otherwise preserves the
rights of Japan and the U.S. to tax their own residents (and citizens) in accordance with
their domestic laws.
Paragraph 3 authorizes the competent authorities of Japan and the United States "to
resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or
application of"the Treaty.282 Paragraph 3 sets forth a nonexclusive list of treaty interpretation
and application issues that are within its purview, including inter aliathe proper attribution
or allocation of income, deductions, credits, or allowances between persons, or between an
enterprise in one Contracting State and a PE in the other Contracting State; the settlement
of conflicts regarding the characterization of persons, entities, and income; the application
of income source rules; advance pricing agreements; and the meaning of any term used
in the Treaty.2 3 Because the list is not exhaustive, there is an issue as to the scope of the
competent authorities' discretion under this paragraph. For example, can the competent
authorities devise an interpretation of the Treaty that is entirely of their own making? The
better view is that the scope of their authority under Paragraph 3 is limited to clarifying and

276. Id. § 3.03.
277. This issue is related to, but distinguishable from, the issue discussed supra Part III.A.3, which focused
on the status accorded by U.S. law to U.S. treaty obligations in the face of an ostensibly conflicting domestic
statute.
278. Rev. Proc. 2002-52, 2002-2 C.B. 242, § 8.01 ("A taxpayer filing a request for competent authority
assistance under this revenue procedure may, at the same time or at a later date, request [IRS] Appeals'
consideration of the competent authority issue under the procedures and conditions provided in this
section.").
279. Id. §§ 7, 8; see,BAKER, DOUBLE Tx CONVENrIONS, supra note 30, 9 25-13.
280. See, e.g., LINDENCRONA & MATTSON,supra note 258; Green, Comparison of InternationalTax and Trade
Regimes, supra note 266, at 79, 99.
281. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1(5) (listing exceptions to application of the Savings Clause
of art. 1(4)).
282. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 25(3).
283. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 25(3)(a)-(d). Because the list is not exclusive, the competent
authorities' agreements under Paragraph 3 may also include agreements regarding such things as the proper
methodology for determining something like a transfer price, a cost sharing agreement, or an acceptable range
of results using a particular methodology. Technical Explanation of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9,
at 100.
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completing definitions in the Treaty that are ambiguous or incomplete.11 4 Moreover, the
Technical Explanation broadens the discretion of the competent authorities in this regard
by stating that "[a]greements reached by the competent authorities under Paragraph 3 need
not conform to the internal law provisions of either Contracting State."" 5
Another longstanding issue is whether the competent authorities' agreements regarding
an issue of treaty interpretation are binding. The general view, according to the OECD
Commentaries, is that "[m]utual agreements resolving general difficulties of interpretation
or application are binding on administrations as long as the competent authorities do not
agree to modify or rescind the mutual agreement. "286 However, it is very doubtful that such
interpretive agreements would be viewed by domestic courts as legal precedents binding
their authority to arrive at a different interpretation. 87 But if the competent authorities'
interpretations of the Treaty's text are given no weight, then Paragraph 3 is superfluous.
That view does not likely comport with the intention of the Contracting States. Giving no
weight to such interpretive agreements would also be inconsistent with the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties-specifically Article 3 1 which provides, in its pertinent part,
that in interpreting a treaty, there shall be taken into account: "(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions; and (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."2"8
Thus, the Vienna Convention supports the view that while the interpretive agreements
reached by the competent authorities are not binding, they should at least be taken into
account by the courts when interpreting a treaty.8 9 The Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, consistent
with the U.S. Model Treaty, has taken a rather unique approach to resolving this issue.
Article 3(2) of the Treaty seems to augment the capacity of the competent authorities to
interpret the Treaty by providing in its text that undefined terms used in the Treaty "shall,
unless the context otherwise requires, or the competent authorities agree otherwise on the
284. See BAKER, DOUBLE TAx CONVENTIONS, supra note 30, It 25-14.
285. Id. $ 495.
286. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Commentary onArtide 25 Concerning the
MutualAgreement Procedure,
supra note 261, at 36; but c., Rev. Proc. 2002-52, 2002-2 C.B. 242, 1 7.05, which provides in its pertinent part:
Once a taxpayer's tax liability for the taxable periods in issue has been determined by a U.S. court
(including settlement of the proceedings before or during trial), the U.S. competent authority similarly will endeavor only to obtain correlative relief from the treaty country and will not undertake any
action that would otherwise reduce the taxpayer's federal tax liability for the taxable periods in issue as
determined by a U.S. court.
287. See BAKER, DOUBLE TAx CONvtIEriONS, supra note 30, 1 25-16 ("The general view seems to be that
mutual agreements do not bind the courts of the respective countries, who are free to adopt a different interpretation from that of the revenue authorities.")(citing Jones et al., supra note 260, 348-49).
288. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 3 l(3)(a)-(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.TS.331, 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969). The text of the Vienna Convention is available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
englishlconventions/1_1 _1969.pdf.
289. The United States has signed but not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. While the
principles of construction employed by the U.S. federal courts often seem consistent with the approach of the
Vienna Convention, the U.S. federal courts are more likely to look beyond the ordinary meaning of a treaty's text
to its underlying purpose, as well as to the particular purpose and context of the article in question. See, HUGH J.
AULT & BRLANJ. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAxATiON: A STRuc-ruRAL ANALysis 430 (Kluzver Laws Int'l, 2d
ed. 2004).Japan is a signatory to the Vienna Convention. Although the national courts do not refer to the Vienna
Convention in their opinions involving tax treaties, "the actual results of what sparse case law there is can be said
to be consistent with the result that would have occurred under the Convention." Id. at 431.
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meaning of a term for the purposes of applying the Convention pursuant to Article 25, have
the meaning which it has at that time under the" domestic law of the Contracting State
applying the Treaty. 9° Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Treaty neither includes the reference to the States' competent authorities, nor infers that their agreement will be determina291
tive of the meaning of an undefined term.
The second sentence of paragraph 3 of article 25 authorizes the competent authorities
ofJapan and the United States to consult each other regarding instances of double taxation
that are not covered by the Treaty. This provision, which is almost identical to the second
sentence of Article 25(3) of the OECD Model Treaty, is most commonly used to resolve
the double taxation that can occur in triangular cases where a resident of a third country has
PEs in both Contracting States. 92 A person may seek relief under Article 2 5 even if he is not
entitled to benefits of the Treaty under the LOB article (Article 22). The Technical Explanation provides that, "[a]s in all cases, the competent authority is vested with the discretion
to decide whether the claim for relief is justified."2 93 Paragraph 4 of Article 25 enables the
competent authorities of Japan and the United States to "communicate with each other
directly... for the purpose of reaching an agreement" without having to go through diplomatic channels. 2 94 Again, this power reflects the historic purpose of the Mutual Agreement
Procedure-to maintain an ongoing conciliatory conversation between the two Contracting States' fiscal authorities so as to provide a means to iron out differences in their tax
systems and the resulting problems those differences can create.
The official OECD Commentary to Article 25 notes that "[o]n the whole, the mutual
agreement procedure has proved satisfactory." 9 Perhaps the strongest indication of that
satisfactory assessment is the remarkable proliferation of bilateral tax treaties based on the
OECD Model, which today number in the thousands. 96 The OECD Commentary goes on
to observe that "Treaty practice shows that Article 25 has generally represented the maximum that Contracting States were prepared to accept," but the Commentary is not explicit
as to the nature of the maximum thing that the Mutual Agreement Procedure has caused
Contracting States to confront. 97 Nonetheless, it is clear that the Commentary is referring
to the level of sovereignty that Contracting States are willing to cede. One of the biggest
advantages of the present Mutual Agreement Procedure, from the States' perspective, is
290. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 3(2).
291. See OECD Model Treaty, supra note 29, art. 3(2).
292. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Commentary on Article 25 Concerning the Mutual Agreement Procedure, supra note 261, 37.
293. Technical Explanation of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, at 1 102.
294. Id. art. 25.
295. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Commentary on Article 25 Concerning the MutualAgreement Procedure, supra note 261, T 45 (2005).
296. See Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination,supra note 252, at n.30 (stating that as of 2006, there
were over 2500 bilateral tax treaties, most of them among developed countries and having structural features
similar to the OECD Model) (citing IEEs VANRoA, NONISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAx LAW (1986);

Mary Bennett, Director of Tax Treaty & Transfer Pricing, OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Admin., The
David R. Tillinghast Lecture delivered at New York University School of Law: Nondiscriminationin International Tax Law: A Concept in Search of a Principle,in 59 Tx L. REv.(forthcoming 2007); see also Victor Thuronyi,
InternationalTax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26:4 Brook. J. Int'l L. 1640 (2001) (noting that in 1998,
OECD publications indicated there were over 1500 bilateral tax treaties in effect, with approximately seventy-five new ones being added each year)(citing OECD, Tax Sparing:A Reconsideration 14 (1998))[hereinafter
Thuronyi, Proposal for a Multilateral Treaty].
297. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Commentary on Article 25 Concerning the MutualAgreement Procedure,
supra note 261.
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reflected in the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, with neither country ceding its sovereignty to a
supranational court or institution to resolve its international tax disputes. The whole procedure is instead an on-going, somewhat consensus-based, process of negotiation.298 This
characterization points out a second advantage of the Mutual Agreement Procedure-its
flexibility. The competent authorities are free to work out creative solutions to international tax issues which, especially in the transfer pricing area, can be unusual -due to the unique
interface between the two countries' tax systems. 99
A third advantage of the Mutual Agreement Procedure as a means of resolving international tax disputes is that the competent authorities are experts in the field. This is not
necessarily the case when tax disputes are decided by domestic courts. Presently, there is
no guarantee that if these disputes were decided by an international court (for example, the
European Court of Justice) or a supranational body (for example, the World Trade Organization), the international court or institution would be as well versed as the Contracting
States' competent authorities are on the Japan and U.S. tax systems.
A fourth advantage of the present Mutual Agreement Procedure is that it is relatively easy
for a taxpayer to institute the process; the taxpayer need not prove such technical requirements as constitutional standing or the justiciability or ripeness of the tax issue. Indeed,
under the Treaty's text, the tax liability need only be a probability-but not necessarily a
m
reality.3°
Under U.S. and Japanese law, failure to satisfy extreme technical regulations such
as personal standing, ripeness, and justifiability, will often preclude judicial review. The
Mutual Agreement Procedure does not impose these prerequisites.
The flaws in the Mutual Agreement Procedure are obvious, especially to taxpayers. First,
the competent authorities are under no legal obligation to resolve a dispute; they need only
try or endeavor to resolve it with no guarantee they will. Second, because there are no set
time frames and no legal precedents, the process is often long and drawn-out and can lead
to unpredictable results. Third, because the Mutual Agreement Procedure was originally
devised as a method to continue negotiating the proper purview and application of a tax
treaty, the process can take on the spirit of a political compromise wherein all kinds of
extraneous factors may enter the deal, much different from a well-reasoned judicial decision
where the law is applied to facts that have been formally admitted as evidence. Also, because
the competent authorities are handling many tax disputes at once, there is a perception that
the competent authorities are making trade-offs or package deals in order to settle a large
number of unrelated tax disputes as quickly as possible. It is not always clear to the taxpayer
that horse trading is going on since the competent authorities are under no duty to publish
the rational (if any) of the agreements they reach. This suggests a fourth disadvantage of
the Mutual Agreement Procedure-its lack of transparency. A taxpayer can feel alienated
from the whole process since it is handled by the competent authorities-often in seeming
secrecy-and often without the taxpayer's full input. Arguably, a fifth flaw in the Procedure

298. There is a fear that mandatory arbitration, as an alternative to the Mutual Agreement Procedure, will
cause Contracting States to cede their sovereignty to a panel of experts who could interpret U.S. tax law differently than U.S. courts. See Tax Analysts, Germany-U.S. Tax Treaty Arbitration Process Addresses Sovereignty
Issue, supra note 178.
299. Note, however, that the competent authorities are not allowed to get too creative, as they are bound to
the provisions and general purpose of the treaty to avoid double taxation. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2002-52, 2002-2
C.B. 242, § 3.03 (Applicable Standards in Allocation Cases).
300. See id § 4.01 (requiring that double taxation be a probability, not a mere possibility, before the Mutual
Agreement Procedure is invoked).
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is that the competent authorities' compromise or interpretation of the Treaty is not binding
on the taxpayers. They can most often seek redress through the domestic revenue authorities' administrative procedures or in the courts if they don't like the deal that was struck by
the competent authorities.30 This feature, which can delay a case's resolution by years, has
prompted many observers to call for the adoption of alternatives to the Mutual Agreement
Procedure, like mediation and mandatory binding arbitration.
The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs has expressed concern that the increasing volume of cross-border tax disputes will pose a serious barrier to trade if the Mutual Agreement Procedure is not revised and revamped. Accordingly, the Committee has convened a
working group to study ways to improve the effectiveness of the Mutual Agreement Procedure, including the possibility of adopting supplementary methods of dispute resolution
like binding arbitration. In July 2004, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs released a
progress report on its efforts entitled "Improving the Process for Resolving International
Tax Disputes."0 2 The report includes various draft amendments to Article 25 and the official
OECD Commentaries. Included among the working group's ideas to improve the Mutual
Agreement Procedure are proposals aimed at increasing the transparency of the system, proposals to add optional and mandatory arbitration clauses to Article 25, proposals to clarify the
time frames for instituting the Procedure, and a tentative list of best practices. One best practice promulgated by the working group advocates that competent authorities take a principled approach to their decision making, much like a judicial proceeding, with decisions
resting on the legal merits of the case, rather than on arbitrary trade-offs, as is sometimes
done in transfer pricing disputes. The goal of satisfying standards that smack of judicial due
process may potentially conflict with Contracting States' concerns about not ceding more
of their sovereignty and judicial powers to a decision-making body that might be applying
standards fashioned by the OECD, and not by its own courts. The working group is scheduled to conclude its study and present its findings and proposals byJanuary 2007, at which
time the Committee on Fiscal Affairs is expected to endorse many of them.
B.

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION-ARTICLE

26

A provision to facilitate information sharing is typically included in bilateral tax treaties
for two reasons: (1) to ensure that each country will have enough quality information to
know which rules of a particular tax treaty are implicated and how they should be applied,
and (2) to provide reciprocal information enabling each country to better apply their own
domestic tax laws even if there is no question about a particular provision of their tax treaty.
The Exchange-of-Information article-Article 26-in theJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty is based on
the U.S. Model Treaty, and is of the highest quality according to U.S. Treasury officials.0 3
The scope of authority granted to the competent authorities by Article 26 of the new Treaty
is very broad. The information that the competent authorities are required to exchange is
not limited to the taxes covered by the Treaty. Rather, it covers all information about any
kind of tax that is relevant either to carrying out the Treaty or to the domestic tax laws of

301. Consequently, many in the private sector have urged adoption of supplementary dispute resolution procedures like mandatory binding arbitration. See discussion supranotes 264, 268, 273-74 and accompanying text.
302. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Improving the Process for Resolving International Tax Disputes
(July 27, 2004), availableat http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/6/336294447.pdf.
303. Tax Analysts, Japan-US.Tax Treaty of Crucial Importance, U.S. Treasury'sAngusSays, supra note 12.
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Japan or the United States. Moreover, the sharing of information is authorized even if it
relates to a purely domestic transaction. For example, if a U.S. corporation does business
with a Japanese company through a company residing in a third country, either the United
States or Japanese competent authorities may request information about the transactions
that occurred between the third-country-resident company and the company residing in
the other Contracting State, respectively. Article 26 is not limited by Article 1; thus, the
information requested or provided may concern persons who are not residents of either the
United States or Japan. For example, if a third-country resident maintains a bank account
in Japan and the U.S. Internal Revenue Service reasonably suspects that the funds in that
account should have been reported as income for U.S. tax purposes, the U.S. competent
authorities may request information about that account holder from Japan's competent
authorities even though the person is not a resident of either Japan or the United States
and the putative taxpayer is not under examination. The information requested or provided
may relate to civil or criminal tax matters, regardless of whether those matters are under
investigation, being prosecuted, being litigated, in collection, or on appeal.
Article 26 also authorizes the competent authorities to request that the information be
presented in a form that could be admissible as evidence in a court of law-for example,
authenticated copies of original documents, including books, records, statements, and
accounts. Unlike the U.S. Model Treaty, Article 26 does not explicitly authorize the competent authorities to depose witnesses to obtain the desired information. The information
contemplated by Article 26 may be exchanged by the competent authorities on a routine
basis, spontaneously, or in response to a specific request.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 26 impose restrictions on competent authorities' powers
to handle the information. Thus, Paragraph 2 requires that the information exchanged
be treated as secret, and disclosed only to those persons, authorities, or supervisory bodies involved in the tax matter at issue, and only to the extent necessary to allow them to
discharge their responsibilities. The information exchanged may, however, be disclosed in
34
public court proceedings and judicial decisions. 0
Paragraph 3 provides that the obligation to exchange information does not require a Contracting State to take measures that vary from either Contracting State's laws or administrative
practices. The obligation also does not require the Contracting States to supply information
that would effectively disclose a commercial, business, or professional trade secret, or be contrary to public policy. Thus, the competent authorities of one Contracting State may refuse to
provide information that is illegal to disclose, or to take measures that would be overly broad,
in the requesting State. However, Paragraph 4 requires both Japan and the United States
to take the necessary measures, including possible legislation, to ensure that its competent
authorities have sufficient powers under domestic law to exchange the information contemplated by Article 26.101 Such information may include private "information held by financial
institutions, nominees, or persons acting in an agency or fiduciary capacity,"3" but it does not
include information protected by the attorney-client privilege under U.S. law) °7

304. Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,art. 26(2).
305. U.S. law already allows its competent authorities to obtain the information contemplated by Article 26,
and a 2003 change in Japan's laws ensures that Japan's competent authorities also have the legal capability to
obtain the requisite information. Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, at 105.
306. Id. 512.
307. Id.
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XII. Alternatives to Bilateral Tax Treaties
Parts I through Ell discussed the foundational norms underlying the international tax policies of Japan, the United States, and their new income tax treaty. Parts IV through X then
analyzed selected provisions of the Treaty in light of various tax policy objectives, including
economic efficiency, fairness, inter-nation equity, and national concerns such as the need to
raise revenue through tax incentives, the need to maintain tax sovereignty, and the need to
maintain a healthy balance of payments. In addition, various articles were evaluated in terms
of their transparency, their concomitant compliance burdens and transaction costs, and the
degree to which the given provision relates (or fails to relate) to the way modem cross-border
transactions are often conducted that is, through multinational corporations and electronic
commerce. Despite the many improvements to the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty and its more inno3°8
vative solutions to longstanding problems such as fiscally transparent entities, a constant
theme running throughout the discussion has been that the entire international tax systemencompassing both national tax laws and the growing network of OECD tax treaties-is
founded on the iconic but anachronistic principles of source and residency, as well as the erroneous and outdated assumption that international trade is still dominated by physical transfers
°9
of tangible goods between unrelated parties dealing at arm's length. These may have been
reasonable assumptions fifty or sixty years ago, but the reality today is that international trade
is dominated by electronic and digital transfers of intangible assets between affiliated corporations that are often vertically or horizontally integrated and not dealing at arm's length. The
new high-tech world has created many opportunities for exploiting the old normative rules
31°
for taxing international income and, in effect, diminishing countries' tax sovereignty.
tax
jurisdicallocating
of
as
methods
are
compromised
Whenever source and residency
tion between countries, that degree of compromise will always be accompanied by, and
indeed proportional to, the decline of the Nation State as an actor on the world stage. That
is because income source and residency-as anachronistic as they may seem in the world of
electronic commerce and integrated multinational corporations-go to the heart of territorial jurisdiction. 3 ' Thus, unless one is willing to see the Nation State decline, these fundamental concepts of territorial jurisdiction should not be tossed out lightly, and certainly not
without seriously considering the alternative models for allocating tax jurisdiction and the
accompanying rules such models and forums would likely impose.
Critics of the bilateral tax treaty system have long argued that there is a better way to
tax cross-border transactions. Some argue that a binding multilateral treaty based on the
308. See e.g., discussions supra Parts JV-VII.
309. See discussion supra Part fI.D.-E.
310. In recognition of the deleterious effects electronic commerce and globalization has had on international taxation, the OECD launched two initiatives aimed at: (1)combating so-called harmful tax rate competition, and (2)establishing new rules for the taxation of electronic commerce. For an overview of the initiative
on harmful tax competition see, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Harmfl Tax Competition: An Emerging
Global Issue (1998), availableat http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/l/1904184.pdf; OECD Committee on Fiscal
Affairs, The OECD's Projecton Harmful Tax Practices(A 2004 Progress Report to the Ministerial Council Meeting) (Paris: OECD, 2004) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf. For an overview
of the issues raised by electronic commerce, see OECD Conference Report, Dismantlingthe Barriersto Global
Electronic Commerce (Finland, 1997), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/55/2751237.pdf; OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Implementation of the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions-Tbe 2003 Report
(Paris: OECD, 2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/19/20499630.pdf [hereinafter OECD
Ottawa Taxation Framework].
311. See discussion supra Part tL.D-E.
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OECD Model would resolve many of the problems plaguing the current system." 2 Others
argue that regional trade blocks provide useful models to design better ways to integrate
diverse national corporate tax regimes."' Still others argue that a new supranational institution is needed for direct taxes'4-'-something similar to the World Trade Organization
(WTO)-to introduce meaningful reforms at the global level, such as replacing the arm's
length method of allocating income with formulary apportionment." 5 This Part XII briefly
assesses each of these suggested alternatives to the bilateral tax treaty network in terms
of their substantive desirability, as well as the political and transaction costs each could
pose. Transaction costs and external frictions can greatly alter the efficiency equation of a
theoretical model, creating barriers to the implementation of a model not only on a global
scale, and also on a more limited regional one.3" 6 At this juncture, it may be helpful to first
summarize the alleged deficiencies of the bilateral treaty network which, like the OECD
Model Tax Treaty itself, have prompted calls to adopt a whole new approach. Since these
deficiencies have been discussed in prior Parts in relation to the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, the
following section is a recapitulation of arguments posed by strong critics of the OECD
bilateral tax treaty network-in some instances by scholars who seemingly would prefer it
be completely scrapped and replaced.3" 7
312. See, e.g., Thuronyi, Proposal for a Multilateral Treaty, supra note 296, at 1667)("The first part [of the
proposed multilateral treaty] would be ...initially based on the OECD Model.").
313. See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, Developing an InternationalTax Policy Strategyfor NAFTA Countries, 42
Tax Notes Int'l, No. 11,975 (une 12, 2006) (arguing that North Americans can draw useful lessons from
the European experience with cross-border tax reform efforts, and that NAFTA countries should create a
centralized body to grant approval of tax-free mergers and acquisitions between NAFTA countries on a caseby-case basis); butcf., ADOLFOJ. MARTINJIMENEZ,TowARDS CORPoRATETAx HARMONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY-AN INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ANALYsIs, preface at p. xv (1999)(noting that "the corporate
tax policy of the European Commission has proved to be one of the major failures in the EC's history, despite
the constant demand for harmonization throughout the business community...")[hereinafterJimenez, Corporate
Tax Harmonization in the European Community].
314. There is a lot of confusion over the terms direct tax and indirect tax. Black's Law Dictionary defines
direct tax as one that is imposed directly upon property, according to its value. It is generally spoken of as a
property tax or an ad valorem tax. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1496 (8th ed. 2004). On the other hand, Black's
Law Dictionary defines an indirect tax as a tax upon some right or privilege or corporation franchise, a tax laid
upon the happening of an event as distinguished from its tangible fruits. Id. at 1497. However, international
tax scholars routinely refer to value added taxes (VATs) and sales taxes as indirect taxes, which seems to clearly
contradict Black's Law Dictionary's definition. Moreover, scholars refer to taxes on capital and income as direct
taxes. For purposes of this article, taxes that are not routinely or easily shifted to another person or company
in the absence of special planning structures will be included under the rubric of direct taxes, and this term
thus includes company income taxes and gross withholding taxes. Because VATs can be imposed on either on
an origination or destination basis, and thus easily shifted to another person, they will be included under the
rubric of indirect taxes for purposes of this article.
315. See, e.g., Vann, Treaty for the Asian-Pacific?, upra note 30 at 156 (suggesting that an international tax
institution structured like the GATT would offer flexibility and could be adopted by countries on a graduated
basis, beginning with minimal but binding general rules, leading togreater tax law reforms and a convergence
of systems by bestowing the GATT-like institution with a more powerful interpretive role than that now possessed by the OECD); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, TreatingTax Issues Through Trade Regimes, BROOK.J. INT'L L. 1683,
1692 (2001) (suggesting that the WTO may be the "most promising forum for" resolving problems like harmful tax competition)[hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Treating Tax Issues Through Trade Regimes].
316. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & EcoN. 1,37 (1960).
317. Although each of these arguments has some credence, Part XII and the one that follows it should make
it clear that the author believes the existing OECD bilateral tax treaty network is the most pragmatic alternative for allocating international tax jurisdiction in the Information Age, and will continue to evolve and be
strengthened through its transgovernmental networks of tax authorities from countries around the world.
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Although the foundational norms of source and residency are pervasive and will probably
never disappear as long as the Nation State exists, a bilateral treaty is not an ideal vehicle
for allocating tax authority in transnational business environments where these principles
have become increasingly vulnerable to manipulation. The OECD Model Treaty is inefficient in large part because it relies so heavily on these concepts in its schedular layout.
Each type of income is categorized and subject to different allocation rules and tax rates.
Because countries' tax bases and rates are not uniform, taxpayers are inevitably motivated
to manipulate the residence of their companies," 8 as well as the source and character of
their investments, depending on their tax objectives. For example, they may try to convert
nondeductible dividends to deductible interest, or business income to royalties--categories
of income carrying dramatically different tax treatment under most bilateral tax treaties and
national tax rules. With the help of tax planners, taxpayers may defer recognition of their
income in a foreign tax haven or create hybrid entities and instruments to reduce or escape
income tax entirely.
The manipulable character of the OECD Model raises both fairness and economic efficiency concerns. Taxpayers who can pay for sophisticated tax planning advice can more
easily exploit the differences in countries' rules for determining income source, company
residence, entity class, and income character. This advantage infringes upon the tax policy objective of horizontal equity, which requires that persons who are similarly situated
receive equal treatment 1 i9 Moreover, as previously noted, economists have long believed
that worldwide economic welfare is reduced when capital resources cross national borders in response to tax policies and incentives, rather than in response to pure economic fundamentals.32 ° The efficiency problem is exacerbated by the OECD Model Treaty's
requirement of tax rate reciprocity. Due to differences in each Contracting State's level of
corporate integration,321 a formal requirement of rate reciprocity does not mean that the
effective rates of each Contracting State are identical once a bilateral tax treaty is applied.
Most often, taxpayers' behavior will still be biased by the differences in the effective tax
rates despite the nominal rate caps. Bilateral tax treaties can mitigate huge disparities by
imposing limits on tax rates, but rarely if ever will the treaties have the effect of equalizing
the effective rates since they depend on other aspects of the jurisdictions' tax systems, such
as the degree and method of corporate integration.
318. As shown in Part VI, this is often fairly easy to do especially with the U.S. Check-the-Box regulations.

See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -5 (as amended in 2006).
319. See discussion supra Parts H.A, and VI.E
320. See RiCHMAN, supra note 15; MUSGRAVE, supra note 15; see also Treas. Subpart F Tax Policy Study, supra
note 15 at 23-54; but cf., KLAUS VOGEL, JOHAN BRANDS, KEESVAN RAA, TAXATION OF CROSs-BORDER INCOME,
HARMONISATION, AND TAx NEUTRALITY UNDER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw-AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

27-29 (1994) (Vogel argues that if the right to tax is allocated solely to the state of source, inefficiencies would
be mitigated because states would compete to provide provisions and services to firms at the lowest (tax) prices.
In other words, Vogel seems to think tax subsidy competition is a good thing.)[hereinafter Vogel et al., Taxation
of Cross-Border Income].
321. If corporate- and shareholder-level taxes are perfectly integrated, there is effectively only one layer of
tax imposed on the income earned by a corporation. For many years, the U.S. corporate tax system has not
been integrated since corporate income was fully taxed at both the entity level and the shareholder level when
corporate earnings were distributed. When the tax rate on qualified dividends was lowered to 15% in 2003,
the U.S. corporate tax system became partially integrated. See Discussion of the Jobs Growth Tax Relief and
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (Pub. L. 108-27) (May 28, 2003) supra Part IIl.A. .b. and note 48.
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A major issue that pervades international tax regimes at all levels is whether groups of
affiliated corporations should be taxed on a single entity basis (where intra-firm transactions
are essentially ignored and the group's total income is consolidated and tallied as one huge,
unified entity) or on a separate entity basis (where the relationships between the affiliated
corporations are acknowledged but not ignored). Rules policing the pricing of transactions between related corporations strive to create fair methods that will arrive at prices
that clearly reflect the income that was actually earned. 22 Treaties based on the OECD
Model Treaty are drafted on the assumption that all entities, even related entities, should
be treated as separate persons. But staunch adherence to this separate entity accounting
convention has invited all manner of tax planning and treaty exploitation, including the
use of conduit corporations whose whole raison d'etre is treaty shopping and other tax saving schemes devoid of economic substance. As corporate groups have become increasingly
transnational and their activities more vertically and horizontally integrated and interdependent, the OECD Model's unwavering imposition of the arm's length standard in setting
transfer prices has necessitated the creation of artificial constructs and complex rules in an
attempt to find a comparable transaction (or to create one hypothetically).
The Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty expressly incorporates the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as they evolve over time, which at least identifies the body of rules that will govern. 323
But, the costs of complying with and administering those rules are high, and the numerous
disputes that they generate make up a vast portion of the issues that competent authorities
and courts are called upon to handle. Even with the advent of advanced pricing agreements
(APAs), the OECD's steadfast adherence to the arm's length standard as a way to conceptually cram group transactions into the deficient separate-entity principle-which, in turn, is
drawn from the fundamental principles of source and residence-has impaired the overall
efficiency of these business structures.324 Hypothetical transactions-sometimes seemingly
absurd and contorted must be artificially constructed to find a comparable transaction
to which the arm's length standard can be applied. Often, a bevy of tax experts must be
employed to apply and enforce the standard. A formulary method of apportioning income
based on the single entity principle would eliminate the need for these hypothetical transactions and artificial constructs, but the consensus is that such an apportionment formula
as applied in a multi-jurisdictional setting can only work where there is a high degree of
economic integration between the subscribing jurisdictions and that, in any scenario, either
a binding multilateral treaty or supranational institution would need to be firmly in place to
administer the formula since it would raise political issues.
The OECD Model Treaty has traditionally ignored a number of other tax planning strategies that raise efficiency concerns, including finance leases, thinly capitalized companies,
322. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (RIA 2006) (granting the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to "distribute,
apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among" commonly controlled organizations, trades, or businesses "in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income
of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.").
323. See discussion infra Part V (Transfer Pricing).
324. See, Musgrave, Sovereigney, supra note 23, at 1342-43 ("The current international practice of assigning
the profits of a multi-national company to separate business entities operating in source countries by means
of unilateral separate accounting is proving to be increasingly arbitrary as international business operations
become more intertwined and integrated with shared costs and overheads, and other interdependencies.")
(citing Charles E. McLure, Jr., Defining a Unitary Business: An conomist's riew, in THE STATE CORPORATION
INcO.ME Tx: Issuts IN WoRLDWID

UNITARY COMBINATION 89 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., Hoover Institution

Press 1984)).
WINTER 2006

838

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

and foreign currency conversions.3 5 Although OECD reports have examined these problems, many of their recommendations have failed to substantively alter the actual text of
the Model Treaty upon which most bilateral tax treaties are based. For example, although
Article 4(6) of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, dealing with fiscally transparent entities, is aimed
at ending abusive finance leases, recent U.S. tax legislation has arguably done a better job
26
of policing these tax planning schemes.
Historically, the OECD Model Treaty has not been very effective at serving national welfare concerns. For example, if a party to a bilateral tax treaty wants to raise its tax rates on
inbound portfolio investments, it may be reluctant to do so for fear that other third-party
countries will not do the same, resulting in the outbound flow of portfolio investments to
the country with the most competitive tax rates. This raises the classic prisoner's dilemma
in game theory, where countries strongly suspect they will all be better off if they all resist
offering radical tax incentives, but each is compelled to maintain revenue losing tax rates
in order to stay competitive. The country that wants to raise its tax rates has no assurance
that a third country, or even its own tax treaty partners, will follow suit.27 In the absence of
a system that harmonizes countries' tax systems and eliminates large discrepancies in their
corporate tax rates, the whole international tax system is vulnerable to harmful tax competition and a classic race to the bottom where countries are compelled to set their tax rates
so low that they lose revenues and incur huge deficits."' Although the OECD has made
a great deal of headway in fighting harmful tax competition practices through its recent
multilateral initiatives,329 there is a real risk that unbridled tax subsidy competition could
spell the demise of the income tax, forcing both developed and developing countries to rely
on other types of taxes that are less progressive than the income tax, posing greater proportional burdens on the poor, and thus diminishing equity between individuals, possibly also
between developed and developing nations.3 0
Another factor bearing on inter-nation equity is the fact that the coverage of the OECD
bilateral treaty network is incomplete, leaving poorer nations out of the loop. Although

325. See Vann, Treaty for the Asian-Pacific?, supra note 30, at 108-09. However, the OECD has assumed a
leadership role in addressing a number of these problems. See, e.g., OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Report
on Thin Capitalisation(1986), reproduced in volume II of the loose-leaf version of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, at p. R(4)-1.
326. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2002) (Application to domestic reverse hybrid
entities).
327. For a discussion of game theory aspects of tax competition, see generally Green, Comparison ofInternational Tax and Trade Regimes, supra note 266.
328. However, this problem would not necessarily be relieved by a multinational treaty that fails to equalize
effective tax rates. No tax treaty has heretofore forced a country to impose a minimum tax rate; tax treaties only
limit tax rates by setting the maximum rate allowable.
329. In 1998, the OECD began a multilateral program aimed at combating harmful tax competition. For
an overview of this initiative see OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Harmful Tax Competition:An Emerging
Global Issue, supra note 310 (Paris: OECD, 1998), and OECD Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, Committee on
Fiscal Affairs, The OECD's Project on Harmful Tax Practices(A 2004 Progress Report to the Ministerial Council Meeting) (Paris: OECD, 2004) available at htp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf. See further
discussion supra Part XII.E.2.
330. See Reuven S.Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition,and the FiscalCrisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARv.
L. Rev. 1573 (2000) (arguing that both economic efficiency and equity among individuals and between nations
support limits on international tax competition, and proposing that all portfolio income be taxed solely in the
state of the investor's residence, and income earned by multinational corporations be taxed primarily in the states
where the products or services are consumed)[hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Fiscal Crisis ofthe Welfare State].
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there are now over 2500 bilateral tax treaties largely based on the OECD Model Treaty,3 1
small developing countries do not always have the requisite resources to negotiate a set of
advantageous bilateral tax treaties and are effectively excluded from the network, leaving
them at a critical disadvantage in terms of attracting desirable investments. Moreover, the
OECD Model Treaty's coverage of taxes is incomplete, focusing mostly on taxes levied on
income and capital.
Although the coverage of the OECD bilateral treaty network is far from universal, some
scholars have argued that its reach is sufficiently extensive and its Model Treaty is sufficiently institutionalized so as to impair the network's flexibility and ability to invoke major
substantive changes to its text. In other words, as more bilateral treaties are negotiated
and added to the network, the more individual treaties there are to amend in order to fully
implement any one OECD initiative.332 For example, if n number of countries wanted to
achieve the equivalent effect of a multilateral treaty with a set of bilateral agreements running between all the countries, the number of treaties that would be needed in order to
achieve full connectivity is equal to the combination of n things taken as a function3 of n:
n (n-1) OR n2-n
2
2
Thus, in order to fully institute an amendment to the Model's text via a network of 100
bilateral tax treaties, 4950 separate bilateral treaties would need to be amended (i.e.,
100(100-99) divided by 2 = 4950), as opposed to just one multilateral treaty.3 4 Critics
argue that the most the OECD can do is tweak the Model through small textual amendments and revisions to the Commentaries, and once these revisions are made, it still can
take decades for the hundreds of tax treaty partners to institute such suggested amendments
through renegotiations of their bilateral agreements. Although the OECD has attempted
to circumvent this problem by pushing new interpretations of its Commentaries, national
courts are not that receptive to such changes, particularly when another common law court
has ruled to the contrary on a given issue.333 The OECD can make recommendations as soft
law, but it has no way of enforcing these recommendations or sanctioning offenders.

331. See supra note 296 and sources cited therein.
332. See, e.g., Vann, Treatyfor the Asian-Pacific?,supra note 30, at 110-11 (arguing that the OECD Model is
increasingly inflexible because "[a]s more treaties are negotiated, the more treaties there are to change if any
new initiative is adopted in relation to terms of the actual Model").
333. See RICHARD STEVENS BURINGTON & DONALD Cuirris MAY, JR., HANDBOOK OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS WITH TABLES 26-27 (1953) (1910) (showing the arithmetic development of the combination of n things,
taken r at a time).
334. This formula has also been used to estimate the value of adding connections to various business models, such as computer operating systems, software packages, or social networking websites. In these contexts,

the formula is often loosely referred to as "Metcalfe's Law" (although Metcalfe certainly did not invent the
algorithmic function), in that it ostensibly has some ability to predict whether a particular vendor, interface
standard, or connection method will tend to dominate competitors. See George Gilder, Metcalfe's Law and
Legacy, FORBES ASAP, Sept. 13, 1993, at S158; Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. Riv. 479, 483 n.9 (1998) (finding it "highly unlikely that Metcalfe's Law in fact
holds strictly true," but that "there is clearly something to the idea that social value increases with adoption
from some goods") [hereinafter Lemley & McGowan, Legal Implications ofNetsworks].
335. See Vann, Treatyfor theAsian-Pacific?,supra note 30, at 110.
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Critics charge that because the OECD has no power to legally bind its member countries, its leadership role in reforming the normative international tax system is arguably
attenuated. Amendments are sometimes initiated in the bilateral context well before the
point at which the OECD Model's text is actually changed. This is the case with the LOB
article (Article 22) that the United States has long required in all of its tax treaties; such
clauses are not part of the text of OECD Model Treaty even though they are designed
to prevent treaty shopping. Mandatory arbitration clauses are now being incorporated
into bilateral tax treaties, 3 6 while at the same time the OECD is still just studying the
prospect of including supplementary dispute resolution mechanisms in the Model's text
33 7
and Commentaries.
It has long been established that if all countries' international tax systems were fundamentally the same, with uniform tax rates, substantially similar tax bases, and uniform
rules to classify entities and characterize income, virtually all the current difficulties in taxing international income would not exist.3 11 Problems of double taxation and fiscal evasion

arise because of the diversity of tax systems and tax rates, and these problems have been
exacerbated by the growth of electronic commerce, the rise in international transactions
between related corporations, and the globalization of economies where vast amounts of
capital and labor resources easily cross borders, often with the click of a computer mouse.
Thus, a major underlying debate is focused on the best way to bring about a convergence
of the world's various tax systems and tax rates. Some scholars have argued that a new
international institution, with more clout and power than the OECD, is needed to forge
a convergence. Of these proponents, many have argued that a multilateral treaty based on
the OECD Model is the answer.3 9 Others maintain that regional trade blocks, like the one
forged by the European Community, might serve as good models to enhance multilateral cooperation,34° while still others propose models based on the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor agreements, which the WTO is charged with
enforcing. 41 Some scholars, including this author, continue to believe, however, that given

336. SeeJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 13(3); see also Tax Analysts, U.S. Agrees to MandatoryArbitration in German Tax Treaty, supra note 268.
337. See OECD CoMMrrEE ON FiscAt AFFAIRS, Improving the Processfor Resolving InternationalTax Disputes,
supra note 302.
338. See generally Musgrave, Sovereignty, supra note 23; see also Vann, Treaty for the Asian-Pacifir?,supra note
30, at 153 ("[Ihe desire on the part of drafters of model treaties to move to multilateralism is really a (disguised) call for more uniformity in tax systems.").
339. See, e.g., Thuronyi, Proposal for a Multilateral Treaty, supra note 296, at 1667 ("The first part [of the
proposed multilateral treaty] would be... initially based on the OECD Model.").
340. See, e.g., Cockfield, supra note 313 (arguing that North Americans can draw useful lessons from the
European experience with cross-border tax reform efforts, and that NAFTA countries should create a centralized body to grant approval of tax-free mergers and acquisitions between NAFTA countries on a case-bycase basis); but cf, Jimenez, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Community, supra note 313, at
xv (noting that "the corporate tax policy of the European Commission has proved (to be] one of the major
failures in the [EC's) history... " despite the constant demand for harmonization throughout the business
community.").
341. See, e.g., Vann, Treaty for the Asian-Pacific?, supra note 30, at 156 (suggesting that an international tax
institution structured like the GATT would offer flexibility and could be adopted by countries on a graduated
basis, beginning with minimal but binding general rules, leading to greater tax law reforms and a convergence
of systems by bestowing on the GATT-like institution a more powerful interpretive role than that now possessed by the OECD); Avi-Yonah, TreatingTax Liues Through Trade Regimes, supra note 315 (suggesting that the
WVTO may be the most promising forum for resolving problems like harmful tax competition).
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the present level of diversity between the world's economies and legal systems, it would be
most wise to stay with the present system of bilateral tax treaties based on the Model Treaty
and Commentaries issued by the OECD, and to augment the influence, if not the authority, of that consensus seeking organization, which uses soft law at the multilateral level to
encourage reforms of tax practices, and which also allows countries to maintain a high
degree of sovereignty over their power to tax. The following sections explore and evaluate these alternatives to the existing OECD Model Tax Treaty network, of which the new
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is a big element, both economically and symbolically.
B. OECD-BASED-MULTILATERAL TREATY ALTERNATIVE
1. Background
A multilateral treaty based on the OECD Model's text is not a new idea. Rather, it has

been around since the infancies of the models advanced by the OECD and United Nations.
Although those who drafted the 1963 version of the OECD Model Tax Treaty decided that
a formal multilateral convention "would meet with great difficulties," 3 42 they also recog3 43
nized that the Model could be used for both bilateral and multilateral treaty negotiations.
Moreover, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs' resolution adopting the 1977 Model invited
countries to use it as a basis for drafting regional multilateral treaties.344 Since 1992, however, Paragraph 40 of the Model's official Introduction has expressed the deep reservations
OECD countries have concerning the feasibility of a multilateral tax convention:
... [T]here are no reasons to believe that the conclusion of a multilateral tax convention
involving all Member countries could now be considered practicable. The Committee [on Fiscal Affairs] therefore considers that bilateralconventions are still a more appropriateway to ensure
34
the elimination ofdouble taxation at the internationallevel 5
Despite the OECD's dim forecast for a formal multilateral agreement based on the
Model, it is clear that its hope for some form of multilateralism continues. The Introduc-

tion to the Model Treaty still implicitly encourages countries to rely on the Model's text
to harmonize their disparate tax systems, 346 and many scholars believe that a multilateral

agreement, although perhaps not inevitable, can and should be forged out of the bilateral
model at some point.3 47 The founders of the OECD Model Tax Treaty clearly recognized
the deficiencies inherent in a diverse network of bilateral tax treaties, and that is no doubt
why they expressed hopes that multilateral agreements would evolve.
Theoretically, if all countries had agreed to all the details contained in the 1963 OECD
Model Treaty, obligating them to use fundamentally the same tax rules and tax rate limitations, most of the problems noted in the previous section would have been resolved.
342. Introduction to OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, 1 37.
343. Id.
344. See id. Vann, Treaty for the Asian-Pacific?,supra note 30, at 151.
345. OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, T40 (emphasis added).
346. Id. 1 12-15.
347. See, e.g., Thuronyi, Proposal for a Multilateral Treaty, supra note 296, at 1662-67 ("Currently, a number of favorable factors help set the scene for a multilateral agreement, making it more likely than in earlier
periods.");

cf

PASQUALEPISTONE, THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITY LAw ON TAx TREATIES: ISSUESAND SOLUTIONS

235-323 (2002) (advocating a multilateral tax treaty for the European Community largely based on the OECD
Model Treaty).
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Tax harmonization obviates practices like treaty shopping, unfair tax rate competition, and
arbitrage structures that exploit conflicts of law and reduce economic efficiency. But while
a multilateral treaty based on the OECD Model may resemble a cure-all to the ills of
the bilateral treaty network, the prognosis for moving into a multilateral mode is not as
bright.
At the outset, two fundamental issues emerge: (1) what are the substantive and long-term
advantages of a multilateral decision-making institution, and (2), assuming a formal multilateral institution would be an improvement from the current OECD bilateral network,
what procedural mechanisms would be needed to implement the new system. A multilateral tax treaty's substantive appeal cannot be isolated from the practical obstacles and
institutional costs that would inevitably be encountered in implementing it. Those challenges could impair or destroy the perceived benefits of moving to a multilateral tax treaty
system.

34

8

2. Substantive Desirability
Many scholars agree that some form of intensified multilateral cooperation is needed
to overcome the challenges the bilateral treaty network is current facing-in particular,
problems posed by electronic commerce; harmful tax rate competition, which threatens
to impair countries' abilities to raise adequate national revenues; inconsistent entity classifications, income characterizations, and treaty interpretations, all of which exacerbate the
opportunities for tax arbitrage through the use of hybrid entities and instruments; and
complexities associated with the imposition of the arm's length standard on multinational
corporations whose cross-border operations are becoming increasingly integrated. But tax
scholars do not agree on what kind of multilateral cooperation would be most desirable. By
far, the biggest drawback to a formal multilateral tax treaty is that it would require countries
to cede a greater degree of their tax sovereignty to an international institution, regardless
of what form this decision making body might take. If the decision making body is one that
employs a majoritarian voting mechanism, the European experience has shown that countries will likely be wary of sacrificing control over their ability to raise national revenues
to an international decision making body in the absence of the right to veto objectionable
policies. 49 On the other hand, if the decision making body is one that requires a consensus
of Member States, there is a risk that deadlock will result. Although a multilateral treaty
is often characterized as being more flexible than a bilateral treaty in terms of instituting
new rules and dealing with changes in technology and business practices, there is a strong
possibility that a binding multilateral agreement could serve as a barrier to change. The
bilateral system offers the advantage of being able to try out new methods and rules on less

than a worldwide basis by introducing the new rule or procedure in a few treaties.35° If the
rule or procedure proves successful, it is likely more treaties will adopt the changes. Indeed,
this phenomenon of reforming harmful tax practices one at a time, or at least one treaty at

348. See Coase, supra note 316 (In this paper, Coase sets forth the essence of his seminal theorem that in the
absense of transaction costs-he did not actually use this term until later-all government allocations of property are equally efficient, because interested parties will bargain privately to correct any externality. High transaction costs, on the other hand, can exceed the perceived benefits, discouraging bargained-for exchanges.).
349. See Diane M. Ring, Prospectsfor a Multilateral Tax Treaty, 26:4 BROOK.J. INrr'L L. 1699, 1705 (2001);
seediscussion infra Part XII. D.3.b.
350. Id. at 1703-06.
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a time, occurs within the present system, although change sometimes seems to move at a
glacial pace.
Apart from questions of sovereignty, deadlock, and the optimal level of power to be
accorded to any institution chosen to administer a multilateral treaty, there is also the primary concern that a formal agreement may not be more effective than an informal one at
resolving substantive tax problems. A multilateral treaty, certainly one based on the OECD
Model, is not a panacea. For example, a multilateral treaty would not necessarily solve the
problem of harmful tax rate competition. Even if a worldwide treaty were adopted that
imposed uniform caps on tax rates, no treaty to date has ever required a sovereign state
to impose a tax or a certain level of tax.35 ' Thus, one Member State that offered lower tax
rates could still potentially attract more foreign investment than another State imposing
the highest allowable rate. The game of inadequate assurances would still be in play. If the
underlying purpose of a multilateral convention is to bring about an eventual convergence
of tax systems and rates, it is questionable that it would prove to be an effective harmonizing vehicle." 2
3. Pragmaticand ProceduralProblems

Paradoxically, the robust and ongoing expansion of the bilateral tax treaty network has
served as a deterrent to serious efforts to shift to a formal, explicidy binding, multilateral
tax treaty. The prevailing attitude seems to be that if the present system, albeit flawed, is
functioning fairly well and getting better all the time, why change course?" 3 Even if there
were more widespread enthusiasm for a move to multilateralism, the difficulties associated with negotiating a bilateral agreement between two sovereign states only hints at the
hurdles that would have to be cleared in getting numerous sovereign states to agree to one
set of rules. Given the great diversity of tax systems, the obstacles to achieving a binding
worldwide tax treaty could be insurmountable-especially since some of them are probably
unforeseen. Nobody seems to believe that a sudden shift to multilateralism is possible in
the absence of a major catalyst or, as Professor Richard Vann puts it, "a convenient world
54
war that wipes the slate clean.'

351. In 1992, a mandatory 30% withholding tax was proposed by the Ruding Committee, but never adopted.
In 1990, the European Commission appointed a Committee of Independent Experts, chaired by former Dutch
Finance Minister, Onno Ruding (the Ruding Committee) to study the economic effects of company taxation
in Europe and to make recommendations. For a description of the Committee's findings, see REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON COMPANY TAXATION,

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

(March 1992). For further discussion of the Ruding Report, see infra Part XII.D.3.b.
352. Tax harmonization implies action at the level beyond what is necessary to achieve the goal of removing
tax distortions. Tax coordination, on the other hand, may be accomplished without a supranational institution.
This distinction was noted by the Ruding Committee in 1992. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT
EXPERTS,

supra note 351.

353. See OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, T 40 (stating that the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs
believes "that bilateral conventions are still a more appropriate way to ensure the elimination of double taxation
at the international level."); Hugh J. Ault, The Importance ofInternational Cooperationin Forging Tax Policy, 26
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1693, 1694-97 (2001) (questioning the wisdom of making the OECD Model Tax [T]reaty
more explicitly multilateral when international cooperation, without binding commitments has accomplished
so much to date) [hereinafter Ault, InternationalCooperation in Forging Tax Policy]; but cf, Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome,supranote 15, at 269 (admitting that "the international income tax system has served reasonably
well" and "may even have facilitated" international flows of goods, services, and capital, but that now is still a
propitious time for making major improvements).
354. Vann, Treaty for the
Asian-Pacific?,supra note 30, at 101.
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Typically, proposals for a formal multilateral tax treaty advocate that the new system be
"5
introduced on an incremental basis, either temporally, regionally, or topically. But history
suggests that the coexistence of a multilateral tax agreement with bilateral tax treaties can lead
to problems if they cover the same subject matter. For example, if a multilateral tax treaty is
entered into by countries in a certain region, it is reasonable to assume that the treaty will
adopt methods of allocating income that differ in some way from traditional norms, otherwise
there would be little reason to enter into the new agreement. Scholars often contend that a
main benefit of a multilateral tax treaty would be the ability to replace the arm's length standard
of apportioning income between related companies with a formulary apportionment method
more in keeping with those enterprises' integrated substance. However, the experience of
the United States356 shows that when some jurisdictions adopt unitary methods of tallying a
multi-jurisdictional enterprise's income, and then apply a formulary apportionment method
to allocate that income, double juridical taxation can easily result when surrounding jurisdictions do not employ the same accounting method. This conflict-of-laws problem, which commonly arises in federal systems where the constituent jurisdictions have their own tax regimes,
could create huge new problems of double juridical taxation if formulary methods of assigning
income were adopted on a regional scale. Indeed, this is why the European Commission's
Ruding Committee," 7 after studying the problem, recommended in 1992 that, if the European Community adopted a formulary apportionment method for its resident companies, such
method should not be applied on a global scale, but rather be limited to the "water's edge,"
meaning that the arm's length standard should continue to be used to allocate income in transactions involving residents of jurisdictions outside the European Community.s

355. See, e.g., Thuronyi, Proposal for a Multilateral Treaty, supra note 296 (proposing a gradual transition
to a multilateral tax treaty during which period bilateral treaties would remain in force); PISTONE, supra note
347, at 235-323 (proposing a multilateral tax treaty, but limited to the Member States of the European Union);
Ring, Prospectsfor a MultilateralTax Treaty, supra note 349, at 1701, 1703-06 (tentatively suggesting that the
best way to shift to a multilateral tax treaty might be to start with multilateral agreements limited to prominent
topics or specific treaty abuses like treaty shopping).
356. Early in the 20th century, several of the United States recognized that as the activities of their business
enterprises became more integrated, calculating the income of a multistate company as if it were a single unit
would be more efficient and in keeping with the transactions' substance since intercompany transactions could
be ignored and the separate pricing of those transactions could be obviated. In 1957, a group of state legislators
drafted the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), the principles of which were later
incorporated in the Multistate Tax Compact 11967. In general terms, under this type of formula apportionment
system, once a group's combined income is calculated, excluding intercompany transactions, a formula is applied
to allocate the income of the multistate enterprise to various locations on the basis of where its activities are
conducted. Typically, these activities are measured on the basis of a company's property, payroll, and gross sales.
Thus, if a multistate enterprise conducts 65% of its activities in California, 10% of its activities in Wisconsin, and
25% of its activities in North Carolina, such formula would attribute the income of the enterprise accordingly,
disregarding any arm's length price. For a discussion of the history of formulary apportionment in the United
States, see Joann M. Weiner, Using the Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula
Apportionment at the InternationalLevel, 13 Tx NOTES INT'L 2113 (1996), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
TNI file, Doc 96-32691 [hereinafter Weiner, Using U.S. States' FormularyApportionment Experience].
357. See REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS, supra note 351. In 1990, the European
Commission appointed the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, chaired by former
Dutch Finance Minister Onno Ruding, to study the propriety of tax harmonization (involving secondary rules
at the Community level beyond what is necessary to remove distortions) as opposed to mere tax coordination of
the various tax rules of the Member States of the European Community. For a description of the Committee's
findings, see id.
358. Id. •
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Of course, if an explicit multilateral tax treaty were adopted by a large region such as the
EU, rules could be fashioned to eliminate the conflicts at the interface; however, the added
costs and complexities associated with eliminating the new potential for double taxation
could outweigh the hoped-for benefits of switching to an explicit multilateral tax treaty.
Scholars have warned that success in implementing formulary apportionment by constituent members of federations, like those of the United States, should not lead to a quick
conclusion that similar success would occur if formulary apportionment were adopted at
the national or international level. Economic conditions of the state jurisdictions within the
United States that adopted formulary apportionment were relatively similar, and their tax
systems and legal cultures were far less diverse than what currently exists around the world
today.5 9 Until there is a greater level of convergence economically and legally, it may be
more cost-efficient to maintain an international consensus as to the best income allocation
method for multinational corporations, rather than to attempt to incrementally introduce
36

a totally inconsistent one.

0

There are presently a small number of regional multilateral tax treaties in force, most
of which are based on the OECD Model Treaty. But there is little about these multilateral
treaties' experience to suggest that their agreements will expand to include major economic
powers like the United States or Japan. The Nordic Treaty, which was initially entered into
by five countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) in 1983, relies heavily on the OECD Model's text although it does depart from formal tax rate reciprocity by
361
taking account of the different corporate tax systems of the five contracting countries.
Negotiating the Nordic Tax Treaty was made easier by the fact that the Nordic countries'
tax systems were quite similar to begin with. As previously noted, the main advantage of a
regional treaty is that it can supply uniform definitions, take a singular approach to assigning income and, as in the case of the Nordic Tax Treaty, make special exceptions tailored to
a signatory country's legal peculiarities. But negotiating such a treaty between five similar
tax jurisdictions cannot begin to approximate the difficulties that would arise in attempting
to negotiate a binding commitment with twenty-five, fifty, or two hundred countries with
diverse tax systems. 62 The complexities and challenges that would inevitably be encountered at a worldwide level could prove insurmountable and not worth the effort.

359. See Weiner, Using U.S. States' FormularyApportionment Experience, supra note 356, at 175-76.
360. The European Commission has recently proposed creating a common corporate tax base for the
European Community, with the idea of instituting a system of formulary apportionment similar to that used
within the United States. See,

COMMISSION OF THE

EutroPEAN

COMMUNITIES,

COMMUNICATION FROM THE

MISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMIT-EE:
AN INTERNAL MARKET WITHOUT

COM-

TOWARDS

TAX OBSTACLES-A STRATEGY FOR PROVIDING COMPANIES WITH A CONSOLI-

see discussion infra Part XII.D.3.b.
361. Convention Between the Nordic Countries for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to
Taxes on Income and Capital, 98 TN.I 9-25, Doc. 98-1713 (replacing 1989 Nordic Convention). Signatories
to the Nordic Convention on Income and Capital include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
The Faroe Islands is also a signatory of the 1989 and 1996 Conventions.
362. Moreover, bilateral norms seep into the multilateral arrangement since the multilateral group is compelled to negotiate with third countries on a bilateral basis. Professor Richard Vann of Australia notes that the
drafters of the 1971 multilateral Andean Tax Treaty also produced a model tax treaty that could be used by the
signatories in dealing with third countries, although this external model was never used in actual negotiations,
which have tended to conform to bilateral norms. Moreover, Chile has left the group. See Vann, Treatyfor the
Asian-Pacific?,supra note 30, at 151-52 (citingA. ATCHABAHIAN, FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN THEANDEAN COUNDATED CORPORATE TAx BASE FOR THEIR EU-WIDE ACTIVITIES (2001);

TRIES

(1975), which contains a translation of the Andean Treaty).
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Some scholars have suggested that the most expedient way to transform the bilateral tax
treaty network into an explicit multilateral agreement might be to topically circumscribe
the multilateral proposal, seeking binding agreements only with respect to more important
issues like treaty shopping or unfair tax competition. The implicit hope is that once binding
agreements are reached on a few topics, multilateral norms will evolve, take root, and lead
to a broader multilateral tax treaty.63 Proponents of this theory often point to the multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAAT), which
evolved from a bilateral OECD Model.e 4 The MAAT enables governments to fight tax
evasion by sharing tax information on a multilateral basis. It calls for signatory countries to
provide assistance in three forms: the exchange of information; assistance in the collection
of taxes; and the delivery of documents. In the eighteen years since the MAAT has been
open for signature, a dozen or so countries have signed it including developed countries like
65
the United States and Canada.1
It is noteworthy that the MAAT is a multilateral convention that developed from a bilateral OECD Model. How can its ostensible success as a multilateral tax treaty be explained?
Professor Richard Vann of Australia notes that the OECD Model Tax Treaty was silent on
many of the administrative details covered by the MAAT, so the extensive bilateral treaty
network has not served as an obstacle to the MAAT's development. 66 Second, the MAAT's
purpose of fighting tax evasion is an objective common to most sovereign countries. Third,
domestic laws policing tax fraud are far more consistent than the various tax systems themselves. Fourth, although elements of domestic law may deter some countries from agreeing
to the MAAT-their bank secrecy laws, for example-such deterrents are far less numerous and complex than those that would be encountered in negotiating a broad substantive
3 67
multilateral treaty where competing tax interests are at stake.
During the eighteen years that the MAAT has been open for signing, literally hundreds
tax treaty partners have successfully negotiated binding Mutual Agreement Procedures
(Article 25) and Exchange-of-Information (Article 26) articles on a bilateralbasis. But when
similar matters are made the subject of an explicitly binding multilateral treaty, only a small
handful of countries have agreed to those seemingly innocuous multilateral exchangeof-information provisions. It is difficult to believe that the subject matter of the MAAT is
the only factor preventing more countries from agreeing to it since so many countries are
making similar promises on a bilateralbasis.

363. See, e.g., Ring, Prospectsfora MultilateralTax Treaty, supra note 349, at 1699 (2001) (suggesting that the
best way to shift to a multilateral tax treaty might be to start with multilateral agreements limited to prominent
topics or specific treaty abuses); but cf, Thuronyi, Proposal for a Multilateral Treaty, supra note 296 (proposing
a multilateral tax treaty, consisting of common textual templates for the overall treaty, followed with optional
topics for agreement-"general undertakings for cooperation"-covering specific topics such as nondiscrimination, unfair tax competition, and information sharing).
364. Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, U.S.-Azer.-Belg.-Can.-Den.-Fin.Ice.-Italy-Neth.-Nor.-Pol.-Swed. Jan. 25, 1988, S. TRErv Doc. 101-6, 27 I.L.M. 1160 (1988). Some of the
countries have made reservations. The United States and Canada agreed only to the Exchange of Information
articles of the Convention.
365. However, both the United States and Canada agreed only to exchange information and reserved on
the other portions. Id.; Tax Analysts, CanadaSigns OECD/CEAdministrativeAssistance Treaty, 2004 WORLDWIDE
TAx DAILY 106-21, June 2, 2004 (noting that Canada agreed only to exchange tax information).
366. See Vann, Treatyfor the Asian-Pacific?, supra note 30, at 152-53.
367. Seeid.
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Those who would propose introducing explicit multilateralism one tax topic at time
should consider the recent practice of including arbitration clauses in bilateral tax treaties.3 68 The issues that are frequently identified as potential candidates for arbitration are
among the most fundamental issues in tax treaty practice. For example, the new protocol to the U.S.-German Tax Treaty provides for mandatory arbitration of disputes when
the competent authorities are unable to reach a complete agreement in a case regarding
the application of the Residence, Permanent Establishment, Business Profits, Associated
Enterprises, or Royalties articles. 69 If the competent authorities of two countries are having
trouble resolving disputes on fundamental issues, like delineating the meaning of associated
enterprise within the context of a particular country's unique and perhaps insular corporate
culture, or the meaning of "PE" or "royalty"-concepts that have been part and parcel of
the OECD Model Treaty since its inception-how realistic is it to assume that numerous
countries will find it appealing to sign a bindingmultilateralagreement comprised of untested rules governing such uncharted and sensitive areas as harmful tax competition, hybrid
instruments, thin capitalization, floating interest rates, and currency fluctuations?
Another disadvantage of attempting to develop a substantive multilateral tax treaty by
making certain topics the subject of binding agreements is that countries would be sacrificing their opportunity to test the predetermined solution to any given problem, one treaty at
a time. Obtaining the agreement of many countries could be an extremely slow process370 if
all of them are being called to adopt ex ante a particular approach that was developed largely
in the abstract by a group of experts. Although countries might recognize the benefits of a
multilateral agreement to address a perceived threat, many might decide to forego signing
the proffered accord, opting instead for a wait-and-see strategy out of concern that being
bound to a largely untested approach may not serve their best interests over time."'

Although the founders of the OECD Model Tax Treaty initially expressed hopes that
multilateral tax treaties would evolve out of the Model, such development, at least in
terms of explicit, binding agreements, has been more of an anomaly than the norm.
The impact of formal multilateral tax treaties on normative international tax policy has
been negligible as compared to the robust growth of the OECD bilateral tax treaty network. Moreover, the OECD arguably has been the most successful of any international
368. See Ring, Prospectsfor a Multilateral Tax Treaty, supra note 349.
369. See id.
370. See Ring, Prospectsfora MultilateralTax Treaty, supra note 349, at 1703 (noting that agreement could
take a long time if the agreement of a large group of nations was necessary to adopt a particular provision).
371. This scenario is another example of how the implementation of a multilateral treaty is likely to generate behavioral games-the classic prisoner's dilemma and the game of inadequate assurances where a player is
called upon to make decisions without knowing what choices the other players will make that will affect him.
Professor Diane Ring notes that an example of this phenomenon occurred in the early 1990s when the United
States introduced its Advanced Pricing Agreement (APA) program (see supra note 264, defining an APA), to
resolve cross-border transfer pricing disputes with other countries.
[M]any countries were quite suspicious of the United States' motives and of the likely results of such agreements. Nevertheless, the United States initiated the process and pursued agreements involving one or two
other countries. Over time, many more countries began participating in the APA program and developed
programs of their own. If the United States had needed to obtain up-front support of a large number of
countries before starting the APA process, it seems unlikely that such support could have been garnered.
Ring, Prospectsfor a MultilateralTax Treaty, supra note 349, at 1703-04 (citing Diane M. Ring, On the Frontierof
ProceduralInnovation: Advance PricingAgreements and the Struggle to Allocate Incomefor Cross Border Taxation, 21
MIcH.J. IT-r'L L. 143, 157-58, 174. n.127, 175 nn.130-31).
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institution in forging informal multilateral agreements on highly controversial topics
through the use of soft law recommendations, monitoring, and amendments to the
OECD Commentaries, which are often incorporated into the texts of the treaties. The
disadvantage of this method of gaining international tax cooperation is that it seems slow
and there is no guarantee of success because the OECD does not have the power to bind
sovereign states.

C. THE WTO-FoR-TAXEs

ALTERNATIVE

In 1995, Vito Tanzi, former head of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), wrote that "[tihere is no world institution with the responsibility
to establish desirable rules for taxation and with enough clout to induce countries to fol37
low those rules. Perhaps the time has come to establish one.""
Many scholars believe that
neither the current bilateral system of tax treaties nor a new multilateral treaty based on the
OECD Model Tax Treaty, as suggested above, are adequate to deal with the tax avoidance
problems that have stemmed from increased capital mobility and electronic commerce.
More specifically, they point out that the ability of nations to protect their corporate tax
bases is being greatly impaired by the advent of e-money and other electronic transactions
that leave no paper trail; more intra-firm trade that is often unaccounted for tax purposes;
the growing use of off-shore financial centers, tax havens, and exotic financial instruments
used to shelter or obfuscate true income and evade taxes; and competition between countries to attract investment by lowering their tax rates to revenue-losing levels."' They argue
that in order to develop new approaches and rules to effectively police practices like harmful tax rate competition,374 some kind of supranational institution is needed that has the
power to bind participating countries and to act more independently to encourage policies,
like inter-nation equity, that have often been overlooked.3 7 This section briefly explores
whether a new supranational tax institution, with powers analogous to that of the W'TO
or the IMF, is substantively desirable, and whether it would be procedurally practical to

372. VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 140 (1995).
373. See, e.g., Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Developments, and the Work ofFiscalTermites, 26 BROOK.J.
INT'L L. 1261 (2001) (detailing the ways that globalization and electronic commerce are reducing industrialized
countries' abilities to sustain high levels of taxation); Jack M. Mintz, National Tax Policy and Global Competition, 26 BRooK. J. INT'L L. 1285, 1298-99 (2001) (noting that "[tlhe shrinkage of corporate income taxes, and
perhaps, their eventual demise will have a profound impact on tax structures" perhaps causing governments to
rely more on consumption, payroll, property taxes to fund public expenditures).
374. See Avi-Yonah, Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, supra note 330 (observing that tax competition is linked
to mobility of capital, and that together, these factors threaten corporate income taxes, which have been the
main source of funding for countries that provide social safety nets for their citizens).
375. See Graetz, Taxing International Income, supra note 15 (arguing that economists and governments,
blinded by pure efficiency concerns, too often ignore how a tax policy affects the economic welfare of its own
citizens and residents, as well as how a policy affects the distribution of wealth between nations); Vann, Treaty
for the Asian-Pacific?, supra note 30, at 156 (suggesting that an international tax institution structured like the
GATT would offer flexibility and could be adopted by countries on a graduated basis, beginning with minimal
but binding general rules, leading to greater tax law reforms and a convergence of systems accomplished by
bestowing on the GATT-like institution a more powerful interpretive role than that now possessed by the
OECD); Avi-Yonah, Treating Tax Issues Through Trade Regimes, supra note 315 (arguing that tax expenditure
competition threatens to undermine countries' ability to raise tax revenues and that the WTO may be "the
most promising forum for finding a solution").
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move to such a system.376 To begin, the theoretical differences between trade and tax law
are briefly sketched.
1. Theoretical Bases of InternationalTax and Trade Policies

Because taxation is often an important factor in determining the location and level of both
foreign portfolio and foreign direct investments (FDIs), it may seem strange that international tax law and international trade law have developed on separate tracks since at least
the mid-twentieth century when the OECD and United Nations first put forth their model
bilateral tax treaties. Some countries, like the United States, have expressed the view that
trade policy should not directly impact countries' overall tax policies or tax sovereignty, and
that bilateral tax treaties are currently the most practical vehicle to resolve international
tax conflicts between trading partners. Other countries have treated taxation as part and
parcel to their trade objectives. For example, the European Economic Community (now the
European Union), since its inception, has moved aggressively to eliminate Member States'
taxes to the extent those taxes are perceived as posing barriers to the formation of a common
market by unfairly discriminating against foreign products, foreign producers, and foreign
production in favor of domestic products, domestic producers, and domestic production. 7
Many reasons could be unearthed in the literatures of public finance, behavioral economics, and political science to explain why international tax policy and international trade
policy have developed on essentially different tracks,378 and have not directly clashed in
their stated objectives.379 The simplest answer is that the goal of international trade law is
to remove barriers to cross-border investment, while the central goal of tax law is to fuind
governments. If trade tariffs are reduced to zero, trade will increase, and with free trade, the
welfare of the trading states is also assumed to increase under the doctrine of comparative
advantage.380 But while an ideal trade tariff might be zero, taxes cannot be reduced to zero if
376. An extended description of the WTO and IMF are beyond the scope of this article. For details as to
the structure of these organizations, see their websites at http://www.wto.org (World Trade Organization) and
http://www.imf.org (International Monetary Fund).
377. See Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination,supra note 252; see discussion infra at Part XII.D.3.b.
378. Certain issues do, however, come within the purview of both international tax law and trade law, particularly with respect to the GATT. For a discussion of the interaction of trade agreements and international tax, see
Justus Fischer-Zernin, GATI versus Tax Treaties? The Basic Conflicts Between InternationalTaxation Methods and
the Rules and Conceptsof GATT, 12 J. WORLD TRADE 39 (June 1987); Avi-Yonah, Treating Tax Issues Through Trade
Regimes, supra note 315, at 1684-88 (discussing two articles of the GATT that bear directly on taxation).
379. See, e.g., RicHmAN, spra note 15; see MusGRAVE, supra note 15 (arguing that taxes should be neutral to the
tendencies of trade flows and that capital export neutrality (CEN) is the best tax policy criterion to cause worldwide resources to be allocated efficiently); Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1622
(2001) (distinguishing between tax rules that are the normative benchmarks of a tax system which, according to
McDaniel, should be outside the scope of trade agreements, and putative tax provisions that are actually special
government subsidies, which should properly be scrutinized under trade law) [hereinafter McDaniel, Trade and
Taxation]; Green, Comparison of InternationalTax and Trade Regimes, supra note 266, at 124-39 (observing that
although both international tax and international trade agreements have the same goal of facilitating trade and
investment, legalistic dispute resolution mechanisms are more critical to maintaining cooperation in the trade
context, whereas conciliatory mechanisms work better in the tax context due to better information flows).

380. See

DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TxATION

(3d ed. 1821) (1817),

availabe at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.cat'econ/ugcm/3113/ricardo/prin/prinl.txt (in essence, Ricardo's
theory of comparative advantage, which forms the basis of modem trade theory, holds that even if a country
could produce everything more efficiently than another country, it would reap gains from specializing in what
it was best at producing, and then trading with other nations for the rest of its needs) [hereinafter RICARDO,
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION].
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governments are to survive. Moreover, trade policy has long assumed that reducing barriers
to trade improves not only worldwide efficiency, but also the welfare of an individual state
that might decide to reduce trade barriers unilaterally."' However, economists have not
reached an equally strong consensus on whether these same welfare benefits occur in the
international tax context when all restrictions on capital flows are removed.1 2 Countries are
thus much more reluctant to relinquish their power to raise revenues through the design of
their tax systems, than to cede their power to place tariffs on imports and exports.
Professor Paul McDaniel has often made the point "that, as a conceptual matter, there
38 3
is no inherent conflict between a normative income tax and [an] optimal trade policy.
McDaniel, along with his late colleague Stanley Surrey, argued in their seminal work on tax
expenditures that the only tax provisions that tend to conflict with free trade objectives are
4
those tax rules that are not absolutely essential to implement a given country's tax system.1
Thus, if tax rules are confined to the essential tasks of defining a tax base, setting rates, identifying the taxable units, and accounting periods, these rules will usually not conflict with
free trade objectives. But the ostensible tax rules that are designed to induce or discourage
particular behaviors-putative tax rules that are really government subsidies, incentives,
and penalties-will often conflict with trade policies.383 The great increase in international
capital flows and cross-border transactions in the last two decades of the twentieth century
has increased the incidence of conflicts between international trade and tax rules because,
as capital has become more mobile, governments
have tended to favor domestic investment
3 6
and exports through preferential tax subsidies. 1

2. Substantive Desirabilityof SupranationalTax Institution
Analogous to WTO
The WTO is a multilateral organization that dates back to the Bretton-Woods Conference in 1944, where the contracting countries contemplated the creation of an International Trade Organization (ITO) and entered into the GATT 387-a multilateral treaty that
focuses mainly on the free trade of products, although it also impacts indirect taxes that
affect product consumption. The GATT is the only formal element of the ITO proposal
that has survived, and it is seen as the predecessor institution to the WTO. The Uruguay
Round of negotiations, which began in 1984 and concluded in 1995, expanded the GATT's
coverage388 and established the WTO, which was charged with administering and extending

381. See id.
382. See Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome, supra note 15, at 280 (arguing that the CEN does not necessarily benefit all nations, and that "the benefits of free trade are not replicated by free flows of capital ....
") (citing,
inter alia, RICARDO, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TXATION).
383. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, supra note 379, at 1626.
384. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R.McDANIEL, TAx EXPENDITURES 186-87 (1985).
385. See id.
386. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, supra note 379, at 1627-32.
387. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 10, 1947, 55 U.N.TS. 188.
388. The 1994 version of the GATT is part of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, established in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. See General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) availableat http://www.wto.org/English/docse/legal.e/final-e.hm
[hereinafter GATT 1994].
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both the GATT and approximately thirty other trade agreements. The WTO, unlike the
GATT, has a substantial institutional structure comprised of a series of hierarchical councils
that specialize in different fields, including goods, trade related aspects of intellectual property rights,389 and services.3 o The WTO makes its decisions through a process of negotiation and consensus, with dispute resolution procedures that, unless there is a consensus
otherwise, are binding on the countries whose regimes will be affected.
Although the councils within the WTO have numerous and precise undertakings aimed
at lowering trade barriers and providing a platform for negotiation of trade, their governing
principles are relatively general, and their rules tend to be worded very broadly compared
to the provisions found in bilateral tax treaties. Although the trade agreements are more
likely to impact indirect taxes (or taxes that are capable of being viewed as subsidies), several of the general principles have the potential to impact direct taxes: the requirements of
according members most-favored-nation (MFN) status and national treatment, and the
prohibition against expropriations."' In brief, the MFN principle provides that any country
that is a party to the GAT must extend to other contracting parties any benefit, advantage,
or favor granted to a third party's nationals or residents in specified matters. This type of
mechanism does not normally appear in bilateral tax treaties, except occasionally in protocols as a special protection measure.
The national treatment obligation is similar to the Nondiscrimination article found in
the OECD Model Tax Treaty and may impact direct taxes.392 In general, national treatment
requires a contracting party to accord to a person, item, or activity originating in another
contracting country, treatment that is no less favorable than the treatment accorded to
a domestic person, item, or activity. The national treatment concept is broader than the
Nondiscrimination article found in the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, in that it has multilateral
dimension and could apply to a much broader range of activities. Another driving principle
underlying trade agreements administered by the WTO is the prohibition on expropriations. Since the GATT's inception, this basic principle has been used to call into question
the propriety of certain taxes that arguably amount to expropriations. If the tax is found to
be an expropriation, it is prohibited if it operates in a discriminatory manner.
The literature debating the advantages and drawbacks of creating a new supranational
formal tax institution like the W'TO (for direct taxes) is extensive and nuanced.3 93 Basically,
the arguments for and against moving to such a system can be summarized as follows.
389. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round):
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1997,67 Stat. A-I1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
390. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
391. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, Trade Agreements and Income Taxation: Interactions, Conflicts, and Resolutions,
57 TAx L. REv. 275 (2004) (tracing the history of the GATT and VTO decisions that held certain U.S. tax
preferences were impermissible export subsidies under the trade treaties).
392. See, e.g., Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 26.
393. The United Nations has recommended establishing a supranational tax organization. See Recommendations of the High-level Panel on Financing for Developmeni, delivered to the General Assembly). U.N.
Doc. A/55/1000 (June 26, 2001); see also, Charles E. McClure, Globalization, Tax Rules and NationalSovereignty,
55 BULL. INT'L FIsCAL Doc. 328, 340-41 (2001) (pointing to "overwhelming political obstacles" that would be
encountered in trying to create a GATT for taxes or a "WTaxO" with broad powers) [hereinafter McClure,
Globalization Tax Rules]; Tanzi, TxATioN iN AN INTEGRATING WORLD, supra note 373 (suggesting the time has

come to establish a world tax organization); Frances M. Horner, Do We Needan InternationalTax Organization?,
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a. Advantages
First, placing the development of international tax policy under the direction of a single, supranational, formal tax organization with sufficient powers to bind the participating
nations would arguably be more flexible than the current network of bilateral tax treaties. For
a rule change to be fully effected in the present bilateral system, over 2500 tax treaties must
be renegotiated. With a supranational tax organization on the order of the WTO, rule and
policy amendments would only have to be negotiated one time, and agreed protocols could
arguably be instituted quickly 94 Second, proponents of such an organization argue that it
would be able to forge a greater convergence in tax systems than that achieved by the bilateral tax treaty network. For example, the organization could create uniform definitions and
set minimum or maximum tax rates so as to divide up the global tax base more fairly between
developed and developing nations. Third, proponents argue that a formal tax organization
on the order of the WTO would have the power to institute completely new approaches to
international taxation, including, but not limited to, a system of formulary apportionment
which, as previously discussed,3 95 could eliminate many of the systemic problems that plague
397
the present international system, including treaty shopping, 96 international tax arbitrage,
393
competition.
harmful
tax
subsidy
inappropriate transfer pricing, and
Even if a new organization were not formed, and instead jurisdiction over direct tax
policy was subsumed under the umbrella of the WTO, that arrangement might help resolve
the problem of harmful tax subsidy competition because the WTO has many more official
members than the OECD and already has rules in place to combat forms of such practices. 399 Moreover, the WTO's dispute resolution procedures, unlike those of most bilateral
tax treaties, are binding unless there is a consensus not to implement them. Finally, proponents argue that the MFN and national treatment principles, which underlie the treaties
administered by the WTO, are flexible tools that could be used to combat the problems of
tax subsidy competition. 4°°

93 Tx NOTES 709; Avi-Yonah, Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, supra note 330, at 1670-74 (advocating an
extension of tax measures through the WTO); Thuronyi, Proposal for a Multilateral Treaty, supra note 296, at
1675-81 (arguing that some kind of international organization with more power than the OECD is needed to
administer a multilateral tax treaty). An extensive review of the abundant literature is beyond the scope of this
article. For recent treatment, see ArthurJ. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal World Tax Organization
through NationalResponses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. & TEcH. 136 (2006) [hereinafter Cockfield,
OECD as Informal World Tax Organization).
394. But, unlike many nations' bilateral tax treaties, GATT provisions are not self executing and, in most
cases, do not automatically become part of national law. See discussion supra Part flI.A.3, B.4 (discussing status
of tax treaties under U.S. and Japanese law, respectively).
395. See supra Part V (discussing formulary apportionment as a way to alleviate transfer pricing manipulation) and Part XII.B.3 (discussing whether formulary apportionment would be an advantage of adopting an
explicit multilateral tax treaty).
396. See supra Part VII (discussing LOB article ofJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty).
397. See supra Part VI (discussing how Article 4(6) of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty prevents certain tax arbitrage structures).
398. See supra Part V (transfer pricing).
399. See Avi-Yonah, Treating Tax Isrues Through Trade Regimes, supra note 315, at 1686-90 (arguing that the
WTO would be a well-suited forum to handle many forms of harmful tax subsidy competition and detailing
what kinds of tax havens are covered by the GATT).
400. See Vann, Treaty for the Asian-Pacific?, supra note 30, at 157 (arguing that a supranational tax organization, to avoid the problems of manipulation created by the precise income categories and rules found in bilateral tax treaties, should probably apply "more general and flexible" rules similar to those found in the GATM).
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b. Drawbacks
Many of the drawbacks to the creation of a supranational tax organization on the order of
the WTO echo the disadvantages relating to the establishment of a multilateral treaty based
on the OECD Model. Tax Treaty. 4° ' Skeptics of both proposals argue that their proponents
are making a huge and misplaced assumption that formulary apportionment on a global
scale would be a good thing. Just because formulary apportionment has been successfully
implemented by constituent members of federations, like those of the United States and
Canada, that should not lead to a hasty conclusion that similar success would occur if formulary apportionment were adopted at the international level. Economic conditions of the
state jurisdictions within the United States that adopted formulary apportionment in the
mid-twentieth century were far more integrated and their legal cultures, tax systems, and
accounting systems were far more similar than those presently found within the extremely
broad international spectrum. 42 U.S. tax practitioners highly experienced with various
kinds of apportionment formulas have gone so far as to warn the U.S. Congress that any
worldwide formula would be tantamount to a design for disagreement. 4° They argue that
despite the difficulties inherent in applying the arm's length method to transactions within
integrated enterprises, that method at least provides a neutral standard that can be applied
to any set of facts, while a formulary apportionment is no standard at all, but rather a set
of political compromises that have neither an inherent rationale nor guiding principles as
to what a fair allocation of tax authority should be. Those tax practitioners further contend that such an arbitrary formula would involve revenue risks greatly exceeding the usual
uncertainties that accompany drastic changes in tax policy, and that for wealthy countries,
like the United States and Japan, it would essentially be a "recipe for revenue hemorrhage"
because of the concessions they would have to make to bring recalcitrant countries into
the fold. 404
Even if worldwide formulary apportionment were theoretically sound, implementing it in a practicable manner would probably be impossible. For one thing, because
worldwide formulary apportionment would eliminate withholding, collecting revenue
from foreign affiliates in any given unitary enterprise would become much more difficult because government tax auditors would be left to the mercy of books prepared and
maintained outside their own jurisdictions, which are often more difficult, if not impossible, to audit and challenge. Moreover, such a drastic tax policy change could have huge
unintended effects on taxpayer behavior. To take a simple example, any country that
gives the payroll or assets factors more weight (in a three-factor formula) than the international average might be creating huge incentives to shift employment and investment

401. See discussion supra Part XII.B.2-3.
402. See Weiner, Using U.S. States' Formulary Apportionment Experience, supra note 356, 9 85-94, 175-76
(arguing that given the disagreements among the states of the United States in defining a tax base and apportionment formula, there is little to suggest that the world should mimic the states' approach, and noting that
Canada's system would be a more viable model, but only if international economic conditions converged to a
greater extent).
403. William J. Wilkens & Kenneth W Gideon, Memorandum to Congress: You Wouldn't Like Worldwide
FormulaApportionment, 65 TAx NOTES 1259 (Dec. 5, 1994) (arguing that replacing the current U.S. system
for determining the income of multinational enterprises with a worldwide formulary apportionment method
would create huge and enduring political debates among all the tax jurisdictions affected, and would be contrary to the interests of political and economic interests of the United States).
404. Id. at 1262.
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overseas. 5 Achieving an international agreement on a fair apportionment formula would
essentially be a political wrangle in a zero-sum game for tax revenue. The controversy
surrounding every aspect of any arbitrary formula, even small ones, would be magnified
exponentially at the international level, generating a kind of eternal political debate and
dissension that would dwarf any of the present problems created in applying the arm's
length standard. Finally, if ever such a system were instituted, the "tyranny of the status
quo might take over, and further change would proceed at a glacial pace, if at all." 401
Those opposed to creating a WTO-type tax organization argue that not only is the
need for such an organization obviated by the fact that the leading reason for creating one
(i.e., facilitating worldwide formula apportionment) is an undesirable objective, but that
some diversity in tax systems is advantageous because diversity can lead to policy experimentation and innovation that might lead to increased efficiency in the long run. 407
A supranational organization with binding powers would likely discourage this type of
tax innovation, and decrease the need for governments to administer their tax systems as
efficiently as possible. 4°8
A third argument against creating a WTO-type tax institution is that national governments are better equipped than any large, bureaucratic institution to tailor their tax
regimes to their individual economic needs. The strength of this point has been questioned in light of the fact that countries' corporate income tax bases are shrinking due to
uncurbed harmful tax practices. Advocates of a WTO-type tax organization have argued
that it would allow developing countries to have real clout, as compared to the respect
they are accorded in the OECD.4 9 But this assertion stands in stark contrast to the recent
history of the WTO, in which developing countries and their sympathizers have engaged
in violent protests to demonstrate their opposition to the WTO, claiming that the organization is dedicated to serving the interests of wealthy countries at the expense of the
405. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Slicing the Shadow: A Proposalfor Updating U.S. InternationalTaxation, 58 Tx
NOTES 1511 (Mar. 15, 1993) (discussing the incentive effects of a three-factor formula, and advocating an apportionment formula using only the sales factor, which he argues would have desirable effects on U.S. exports).
406. McClure, GlobalizationTax Rules, supra note 393, at 341; See Paul Blustein, WTO FissureMay Magnify
Tremors Over Globalization (uly 2006), availableat http://archives.seatdetimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/
web/vortex/display?slug=wto30&date=20060730&query=World +Trade +Organization.
407. For example, it will be an interesting learning experience to see how far the European Commission gets
in its quest to create a common corporate tax base within the EU. All other tax jurisdictions will learn from its
mistakes and successes.
408. In 2001, U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill expressed strong reservations about U.S. participation
in the OECD's efforts to fight so-called harmful tax competition, on the grounds that it would cause governments to administer their tax systems inefficiently. O'Neill said:
The United States does not support efforts to dictate to any country what its own tax rates or tax system should be, and will not participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax systems. The United
States simply has no interest in stifling the competition that forces governments--like businesses-to
create efficiencies.
Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dept. Treasury Secretary O'Neil Statement On OECD Tax Havens (May 10,
2001), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po366.htm). See also, Vogel et al, Taxation of CrossBorder Income, supra note 320, at 27-29 (Vogel argues that Source State taxation would be advantageous in
that it would force states to administer their tax systems more efficiently so that they can provide goods and
services at the lowest (tax) price).
409. See Avi-Yonah, Treating Tax Issues Through Trade Regimes, supra note 315, at 1689-90 (arguing that the
OECD is identified as the "rich countries' club" and that developing countries would be better served in a
WTO-type organization that has broader membership).
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poorer, developing ones, and that, in any event, it is neither a democratic nor a transparent
institution."'

Overall, the primary argument against creating a supranational tax institution is the
loss of national sovereignty it would require. In order for countries to be willing to cede
their sovereignty to an international tax organization, they would have to be sufficiently threatened with losing their corporate income tax bases, and also convinced that an
international tax institution can protect their bases through rules that bind the offending
countries. However, given the present political landscape, in which large countries like
the United States and Britain have demonstrated their unwillingness to include tax provisions in trade agreements, 41' there is little reason to believe that countries will be willing
to engage in a massive surrender of their national tax sovereignty to a WTO-type tax
institution anytime soon.
D. REGIONAL TRADE BLOCK ALTERNATIVE
If increased economic efficiency achieved through the elimination of the tax barriers
to unfettered trade is an underlying objective of increased international tax cooperation,
might regional trade agreements provide a better model for achieving this objective, as
compared to bilateral tax treaties? Some scholars have suggested that forming regional tax
agreements within the context of regional trade agreements is a more realistic goal than
attempting to negotiate a binding worldwide multilateral treaty. Regional tax cooperation,
they argue, could produce more immediate benefits. 42 Opponents of this idea, including
this author, argue that regional tax agreements would likely diminish the influence of the
OECD, and discourage or impede that organization's more broadly based and global efforts
to coordinate diverse tax systems through its nonbinding Model Tax Treaty, studies, and
other soft law and consensus-seeking initiatives. This section briefly explores the experiences of two treaty-based, regional trade agreements-the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the treaties defining the European Community-to see whether regional
trade agreements could serve as viable models on which to pattern new supranational tax
institutions aimed at better coordinating or harmonizing international tax systems within
particular regions. It also discusses the implications of the growing trend and recent calls
among Asian Pacific nations, including Japan, to negotiate regional trade and tax agreements between Asian Pacific nations, and whether there should be an effort to harmonize
the tax regimes of those nations, in much the same way that the European Union has tried
to harmonize direct taxes, with limited success, in Europe.
410. See Kevin Sullivan, ProtestersDefend Cause at Trade Talks, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2003, at A20; Charles
Babington, ProtestsCloud Clinton Message on Free Trade, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1999, at A32; but cf Juliane Von
Reppert-Bismarck, Activits Take the Fight Inside, WALL ST.J., DEC. 13, 2005, available at http://online.wsj.com/
PA2VJBNA4R/article_print/SB 113442804613020591 .html.
411. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dept.,Treasury Secretary O'Neil Statement On OECD Tax Havens
(May 10, 2001), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po366.htm (then Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill stating, emphatically, that the United States "will not participate in any initiative to harmonize world
tax systems.").
412. See, e.g., Cockfield, Developing an International Tax Policy Strategy for NAFTA Countries, supra note
313, at 981-82 (recommending a number of short-term tax coordination proposals for the NAFTA countries,
including elimination of withholding taxes on dividends paid by affiliated corporations within the NAFTA
region, and the creation of a centralized body to grant case-by-case approval of certain tax-free mergers and
acquisitions).
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1. Levels ofEconomic Integration

Few scholars disagree with the proposition that taxes on income and capital can powerfully impact trade and capital flows. Indeed, taxes, particularly corporate income taxes, are
41 3
viewed by some as one of the last great trade barriers left to be torn down or harmonized.
In general, the greater a region's degree of economic integration, the more likely tax rules
will be incorporated into the region's trade policies. Economist Bela Balassa, in his seminal
1961 work, identified five different levels of economic integration that regions tend to pass
through as they become more unified:
(1) Free trade zone: Typically, in this first stage of trade cooperation, Member States
agree to eliminate tariffs and quota restrictions on the free movement of goods, but
only with respect to goods moving within the free-trade area. Each Member State is
free to impose its own tariffs on third-party states, which could vary considerably.
(2) Customs Union: Typically, at this stage, more obstacles to the free movement of
goods are eliminated, and the customs union imposes a common external tariff on
dealings with third-party states.
(3) Common Market: At this stage of integration, the region strives to remove not only
barriers to the free movement of goods, but also barriers to the free movement of
capital, labor, and other factors of production.
(4) Economic Union: At this stage, Member States' national policies are coordinated at
many levels so as to eliminate the potential for unfair discrimination against the products, producers, or factors of production originating in other Member States. The
Union usually imposes its own common tariffs on dealings with third-party states.
(5) Full Economic Integration: In this last stage, Member States' fiscal, monetary, and
social policies are harmonized and not merely coordinated. Member States are able to
accomplish this by ceding more of their authority to a higher governmental authority
whose decisions are binding on the Member States. Social integration often precedes
or accompanies full economic integration, although it is not an absolute prerequisite
for lower forms of economic integration.414
As will be shown, North America, Europe, and East Asia are all at different stages in their
efforts to become more economically integrated.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement-NAFTA

On January 1, 1994, the United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into a regional trade
agreement-the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)41s-the broad purpose
of which is to create a zone in which goods and services can move between the three countries free of the tariffs and other restrictions normally imposed by the three trading partners.
413. But see Graetz, TaxingInternationalIncome,supra note 15, at 297-99 (arguing that unencumbered flows
of capital do not always benefit individual nations or serve the policy objective of inter-nation equity).
414. See BELLA A. BAtAssA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (1961).
415. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA is a treaty under international law, although it is classified as a congressional-executive
agreement under U.S. law. It was passed in the United States as fast-track legislation by a simple majority in
both houses of Congress, rather than as a treaty under Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution requiring two-thirds
approval of the U.S. Senate. NAFTA was implemented in the United States through the adoption of the North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Star. 2057 (1993) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. 3301-3473 (2000)).
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Unlike the European Union, NAFTA does not create a set of supranational governing
bodies or a body of law that is superior to national law.416 The free flow of goods is accomplished under NAFTA by its imposition of a nondiscrimination rule requiring each trading
partner to grant the same treatment to nationals of the other two trading partners that it
would grant to its own nationals, and to treat foreign investors or investments originating
in the other two countries the same as it would treat its domestic investors and investments.
The three NAFTA countries also agreed to progressively remove numerous tariffs over a
period of fifteen years.
Despite NAFTAs sweeping coverage, the agreement clearly and affirmatively left the subject of taxation untouched. The only article in NAFTA dealing directly with tax policy is
Article 2103, which provides that "nothing in [NAFfA] shall apply to taxation measures"
and that "[n]othing in [NAFFA] shall affect the rights and obligations of any [of the three
countries] under any tax convention." 47 Thus, in stark contrast to the treaties forming the
European Union, the NAFTA allows its three trading partners to develop their own tax policies, and it relies solely on bilateral tax treaties between the three countries to coordinate the
4
trading partners' tax systems and to lower tax impediments to cross-border investments. 11
Although recent revisions to the NAFTA countries' bilateral tax treaties have helped to
better coordinate their tax systems, little has been done within the context of the NAFTA
itself to address the inefficiencies that have arisen due to increased trade. Most significantly,
the three NAFTA countries are still applying the arm's length pricing rules embodied in their
bilateral tax treaties and their domestic tax law. But, as foreign direct investment between
the three countries continues to rise, 419 and as the activities of multinational corporations
operating in the NAFTA countries become more integrated, proposals for enhanced tax
420
cooperation between the NAFTA countries have been made with increasing frequency,
421
including the controversial idea, previously discussed, that a new system of formulary
apportionment should seriously be considered by the NAFTA countries to replace the cur42 2
rent arm's length method of allocating tax revenues among the three countries.

416. However, NAFTAs dispute resolution mechanism creates special administrative panels to hear appeals
from administrative determinations of antidumping and other trade issues under the authority granted to them
by the national legislation implementing NAFTA.Domestic law gives the panels final and conclusive judicial
review, except for constitutional challenges to the procedure itself. See Paul B. Stephan, PartIV Relationship of
the United States to InternationalInstitutions-The New InternationalLaw-Legitimay, Accountability,Authority,
and Freedom in the New Global Order 70 U. CoLO.L. REv. 1555, 1557 (1999).
417. NAFTA, supra note 415, art. 2103.
418. The official White House description of the agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico
included the following statement: "The NAFTA provides that, as a general matter taxation questions will be
governed by applicable double taxation agreements between the NAFTA countries. Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement proposed by The Government of Canada, The United Mexico
States, and The United States of America (August 12, 1992), reproduced at INT'L TRAIDo
REP. (BNA) Vol. 9,
No. 34, at 1454 (August 19, 1992).
419. See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Country and Industry Detailfor
CapitalOutflows, 1992-2002 (Wash., D.C., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 2003).
420. See, e.g., Cockfield, Developing an InternationalTax Policy Strategyfor NAFTA Countries, supra note 313,
at 981-82 (recommending a number of short-term and long-term tax coordination proposals for the NAFTA
countries).
421. See earlier discussion of formulary apportionment at text accompanying notes 355-58, 394-404, and
421-25.
422. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, NAFTA andFormularyApportionment:An Explorationofthe Issues, in EssAYs ON
INTERNATIoNALTAXATiON IN HONOR OF SIDNEY I. ROBERTS 293 (Herbert H. Alpert & Kees Van Raad, eds., 1993)
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Proponents of formulary apportionment argue that as the level of exports and imports
between the United States, Mexico, and Canada increase under NAFTA, the fundamental flaws in the arm's length method are being magnified, augmenting the complexity and
opportunities for tax avoidance. They argue that given the common market ultimately
423
envisioned by NAYFA, formulary apportionment makes more sense. They contend that
NAFTA presents a viable opportunity to introduce formulary apportionment on a regional
scale, and that the moving to such a system would be eased by the fact that only three
countries are involved, and that the United States and the provinces of Canada already use
formulas to apportion tax revenues between jurisdictions.
As envisioned by the proponents, the NAFTA countries would presumably adopt by
treaty a formulary method of apportioning taxable income for enterprises doing business
in one or more of the three countries. The formula would presumably be similar to the
three-factor formula presently used in the United States based on property, sales receipts,
and payroll.424 Although proponents argue that formulary apportionment would simplify
business operations within NAFTA, there are a plethora of issues that would need to be
resolved to institute such a system. First, at a bare minimum, the treaty would need to
establish the minimum threshold of activity an enterprise would have to conduct in one of
the three countries in order to trigger a country's jurisdiction to tax the enterprise. Presently, the definitions of permanent establishment in the countries' three bilateral treaties
reflect their differing economic positions, and the definitions are thus not identical. Determining what constitutes a PE and what income is attributable to a PE are two of the most
contentious issues in treaty interpretation and so can be expected to generate a great deal of
debate in designing a new apportionment formula involving these same fundamental issues.
Second, the treaty would have to set the parameters of what constitutes a unitary business,
the income of which is to be apportioned; corporate forms would essentially be irrelevant,
as they are often ignored under the current transfer pricing rules. Third, the three countries would have to reach agreement on how the three factors in the formula should be
weighted, and what kind of income the formula should encompass-business income only,
or business and investment income. If the current international tax rules were to continue
to apply to portfolio income, the disparate treatment would introduce an additional layer of
complexity for multinational corporations and tax administrators; they might have to apply
two different apportionment methods to related transactions. Similarly, if a multinational

(stating "that in the common market ultimately envisioned by NAFIA, formulary apportionment is the more
logical method to allocate revenue among the three countries") [hereinafter McDaniel, NAFTA and Formulary Apportionment]; See Avi-Yonah, Slicing the Shadow, supra note 405, (arguing that the United States should
begin to shift to a system of worldwide formulary apportionment for multinational companies on the basis
of sales); Jerome R. Hellerstein, FederalIncome Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of Separate Accounting
with FormularyApportionment, 93 TAx NOTES 179-62 (Aug. 27, 1993), available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library,
TNT file, 93 TNT 179-62 (calling for the United States to begin using formulary apportionment for multinational mercantile and manufacturing companies, and if that proves successful, to begin extending the formulary apportionment method to other industries); Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre, Commentary:
Using NAFTA to Introduce FormularyApportionment, TAx NOTES INT'L 851 (April 5, 1993), available in LEXIS,
INTLAW Library, TNI file, 93 TNI 64-9 (calling for the United States to promote the use of formulary
apportionment under NAFTA which, according to the authors, would give a major boost to the worldwide
adoption of formulary apportionment).
423. See sources cited in preceding footnote.
424. See generally Weiner, Using U.S. States' FormularyApportionment Experience, supra note 356. For a brief
description of the formulary apportionment system employed among the states of the U.S., see supra note 356.
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corporation has more than one unitary business, agreement must be reached on whether
the arm's length method or the formulary method should apply to transactions between two
unitary businesses.
Although some have argued that the countries subscribing to a common formula for
apportioning income must necessarily have the same corporate tax rates, identical rates
are probably not a prerequisite, though too great a disparity in tax rates would encourage manipulation of the formula. Some have also argued that formulary apportionment
requires that countries have identical tax bases with identical rules for computing taxable
income. However, Professor McDaniel contends that in the context of a limited common
market involving only three countries, special tax expenditures, if confined to one country,
4 5
will not necessarily operate to reduce the tax revenues produced by the original formula.
Of course, the NAFTA countries would have to decide whether the formulary apportionment method should be applied on a worldwide or water's edge basis, both with respect to
businesses based within the NAFTA countries and with respect to businesses based in thirdparty countries. Special rules would have to be established to define the extent to which a
unitary business should take into account income-generating activities taking place outside
of the NAFTA countries. If the formulary apportionment is to work within the NAFTA
region, the countries would have to establish procedures to resolve, in a timely fashion,
disputes regarding the proper interpretation and application of the formula. Because only
three countries are involved, their competent authorities could be used, and if their competent authorities cannot agree, disputes could be referred to binding arbitration.
The thorniest problems in attempting to make a formulary apportionment method work
well within a trade region like that defined by NAFTA are likely to stem from what happens
at the geographical interface. If the formulary apportionment method is used inside NAFTA
and an arm's length method applies outside NAFTA, the dual methods of apportioning
income could create conflicts of law, as well as problems in applying existing bilateral tax
treaties with third countries. Thus, the incidence of double juridical taxation is likely to
increase. Moreover, NAFTA tax administrators and multinational corporations within the
purview of NAFTA would be subject to significantly greater information gathering and
reporting requirements. Having to comply with two fundamentally different income allocation schemes would multiply their transactions costs and possibly saddle them with such
onerous compliance burdens that the new system may not be cost effective. Thus, while
proponents of formulary apportionment argue that it would greatly simplify the calculation of international income, more thorough studies are needed to determine whether
formulary apportionment carried out on a regional basis will, in fact, work better than
the arm's length method. There is a real risk that such a fundamental shift away from the
foundational norms and principles of income apportionment, which are now embodied in
bilateral tax treaties and domestic laws, would subject multinational corporations and tax
administrators to the worst complexities of both worlds.
3. European Union
By far the most integrated international trade bloc in the world is the European Union
(EU). Indeed, Europe has moved far beyond its original aspirations of forming a customs
425. See McDaniel, NAFTA and FormuayApportionment, supranote 422, at 303-304. It is worth noting that
McDaniel's rationale may not pass muster in the European Union if formulary apportionment is adopted there,
given the tenor and direction of the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence concerning nondiscrimination.
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union involving just six countries in the 1951 Treaty of Paris, 4 6 to subsequently a common market, known as the European Economic Community (EEC), first established in the
1957 Treaty of Rome. 427 In 1986, the then twelve members of the EEC agreed to the Single
European Act, further delineating the internal market by guaranteeing "the free movement
of goods, persons [including corporations], services, and capital," which have long been
known as the four fundamental freedoms, and which have become a basis for invalidating
many Member States' tax laws that are found to infringe on these freedoms. 48 Since at least
1992, when the Treaty of Maastricht was concluded, 429 the Member States have functioned
as a political and economic union, cooperating in areas as diverse as foreign relations, criminal law, and military defense, in addition to economic and fiscal matters, including trade,
currency, and taxation. 4 0 But despite this high level of integration, efforts to harmonize
Member States' various corporate tax regimes have proved to be one of the major failures
431
in the European Community's (EC) history.
This section briefly explores why Europe has not been able to pass legislation harmonizing company taxes, and how efforts to coordinate or harmonize direct taxes are now being
left to the EU's constitutional court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ).432 Unfortunately, it appears that the ad hoc jurisprudence of the ECJ, which has invalidated an alarming number of national tax provisions in recent years, is impairing the ability of the EU

426. In 1951, the Treaty of Paris, Apr. 18, 1951,261 U.N.TS. 140, established the European Coal and Steel
Community, consisting of Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, for the
purpose of eliminating tariffs on coal and steel.
427. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.TS. 11 (1958)
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the European Economic
Community in 1973, followed by Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986.
428. Single European Act, art. 13, Feb. 17, 1986,1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. The Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3, incorporated the so-called four fundamental freedoms of
the Single European Act, but renamed them as follows: the freedom of movement for workers, id. art. 39; the
freedom of establishment, id.arts. 43, 48; the freedom to provide services, id. aft. 49; and the freedom of movement of capital, id. arts. 56, 58.
429. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, also known as the Treaty on European Union, renamed and amended
the Treaty of Rome, renamed the EEC the "European Community" and established the political union of
Europe-the so-called European Union. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
EU Treaty]. The EU Treaty entered into force November 1, 1993.
430. See id. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU, bringing the number of Member States
to fifteen. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam amended the EU Treaty, consolidating and renumbering its
articles. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1. In 2001, the Treaty of
Nice further expanded the powers of the EU's Parliament and revised the EU's governance in anticipation of
the EU's expansion to twenty-five Member States [hereinafter Treaty of Nice]. See Treaty of Nice Amending
the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related
Acts, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1. Hereinafter, citations to articles in the European Treaties will be to the
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24,2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325)
33 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
43 1. Jimenez, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Community, supra note 313, at 329 (strongly
suggesting that the failure of the European Union to harmonize Member States' corporate taxes may be due
to the inadequate institutional structure of the EU, the lack of a constitution, and parliament's lack of power to
pass tax legislation without the unanimous consent of the Member States).
432. As further argued below, I do not believe the EU model would serve as a good substitute for the flawed
OECD bilateral tax treaty network, or as a good model for East Asia, either in terms of removing trade barriers
or harmonizing tax regimes. For one thing, East Asia is far more diverse economically, politically, and socially,
than Europe.
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Member States to stimulate their economies through corporate tax incentives, hampering
their efforts to prevent international tax avoidance, and threatening to undo longstanding
mechanisms designed to avoid international double taxation, and in so doing, also creating
uncertainties regarding the continued viability of bilateral tax treaties both between EU
Member States, and between EU Member States and countries that are not members of
the EU.433
a. Overview of EU Institutions
To understand why the EU has been unable or unwilling to harmonize its Member States'
corporate taxes through legislation, it is necessary to put the relative powers of the EU
government institutions in context. The EC Treaty provides for a European Parliament,
Council, Commission, Court ofJustice, 43 4 and Court of Auditors. 45 The Parliament is the

only institution whose members are directly elected by the people; members of Parliament
are elected to five-year terms based on their political affiliation, not on their nationality.
The Commission, as the EU's executive body, has the exclusive power to propose and draft
legislation, and it regularly sets forth long-term tax policy objectives in Communications to
its co-legislators, the Council and the Parliament. The Council is the EU's main decision
making body, comprised of sitting ministers of Member States who have the authority to
bind their respective states.
When it comes to income tax policy, neither the EU Parliament, nor the Council, nor
the Commission has the authority to adopt direct tax measures independently, or without
an extremely high level of consensus unheard of in federations like the United States and
Canada. Moreover, the fundamental principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in the EC and EU
Treaties, 436 tends to limit major EU-level tax reforms by holding that action may only be
taken at the EU level if it would be more effective at achieving the objectives of cooperation
than action taken at the national government level. In other words, if a tax policy objective
could be accomplished by cooperation at the Member State level, then a top-down, centralist approach is to be rejected.
Typically, the Commission will initiate or propose tax legislation to the Parliament and
to the Council. The EU Council has the power to regulate commerce among Member
States, and the Parliament is given a right of consultation in tax matters, but not a right
433. As will become apparent, I strongly agree with the assertions of Professors Graetz and Warren on this
subject. See Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination,supra note 252 (arguing that the ECJ's approach to tax
harmonization is incoherent because the court is trying to eliminate tax discrimination both on the basis of the
origination of activity (or capital import neutrality) and on the basis of the destination of economic activity (or
capital export neutrality), which is impossible in the absence of identical tax rates and bases).
434. The ECJ is comprised of twenty-five judges, each appointed by his or her respective Member State to
a renewable six-year term. The ECJ has the power to resolve disputes between two or more Member States,
disputes between Member States and EU institutions, or disputes between various EU institutions. For the
jurisdiction of the ECJ, see EC Treaty, supra note 430, arts. 230-40 and EU Treaty, supranote 429, art. 35.
435. See EC Treaty, supra note 430, art. 7 (providing for a European Parliament, Council, Commission,
Court of Justice, and Court of Auditors). The Court of Auditors monitors the internal activities and financial
accounts of the Community, and will not be discussed any further. For a helpful and concise explanation of
the EU governmental institutions, see RUTH

MASON,

PRIMER ON DIREcT TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

4-17 (2005).
436. Article 5 of the EC Treaty states that "[iln [matters] which do not fall within its exclusive competence,
the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States." Article 2of the EU Treaty
confirms the subsidiarity principle set forth in the EC Treaty. Treaty of Nice, supra note 430.
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of co-decision with the Council.4 7 A branch of the Council, the Economy and Finance
Council (ECOFIN), is specifically empowered to deal with tax matters. 41 Article 94 of the
EC Treaty gives the Council, acting on a proposal by the Commission after consultation
with the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, the power to issue directives
on tax matters. But the Council cannot issue a binding directive without the unanimous
consent of members of the Council. This special rule effectively gives each Member State
represented on the Council the right to veto, single-handedly, any tax proposal it finds
objectionable. In recent years, there have been numerous calls to replace the unanimous
voting rule with a more attainable threshold of approval. In its 2001 Communication, 43 9 the
EU Commission proposed moving to qualified majority voting on some tax matters since
reaching a unanimous decision will only become more difficult as more countries become
members of the EU. To date, however, the requirement that EU tax laws be unanimously
approved by the Council has not been repealed and still poses a huge obstacle at the EU
level to the effective harmonization of Member States' corporate tax laws. The draft EU
Constitution, which failed to be ratified by France and the Netherlands in 2005, would not
change the unanimity requirement. 440
Not surprisingly, the pace of legislative reform of direct taxes, including efforts to harmonize corporate income taxes, has been very slow in the EU. So far, major substantive Council directives seeking to remove Member States' direct tax barriers to the internal market
include: the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 44' which eliminates Source-State withholding
taxation (and thus double juridical taxation) of cross-border distributions from qualified
subsidiaries located in countries other than where the parent corporation is situated; the
Merger Directive, 442 which requires Member States to defer taxes on qualified transfers
within the context of certain cross-border mergers and acquisitions; and the Interest and
Royalty Directive, 43 which seeks to eliminate Source-State taxation of interest and royalty
payments between related companies established in different Member States. An underlying objective of these three Directives is to require that the taxation of a given cross-border
transaction be no more burdensome than it would be had the same transaction taken place

437. Different legislative rules and thresholds of approval apply to different types of legislation. Most
legislative proposals are subject to the co-decision procedure outlined in Article 251 of the EC Treaty, in which
the Parliament and Council share legislative power and must both agree on the proposals for them to be enacted
into law. However, with respect to tax issues, the Parliament has only the right of consultation with the Council
and no power to vote on them. Article 93 of the EC Treaty provides that harmonization of indirect taxes shall
be done in consultation with the Parliament, and Article 94 provides that directives for the approximation of
law that directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market (i.e., direct taxes) shall be issued
only after consulting with the Parliament. See EC Treaty, supra note 430, arts. 93 and 94.
438. The ECOFIN Council is comprised of each Member State's minister of finance. SeeEC Treaty, supra
note 430, art. 94; seealso M.AsorN, supra note 435, at 7.
439. See Tax Policy in the European Union-Priorities for the Years Ahead: Communications from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, COM (2001)
260 final, at 7 [hereinafter 2001 Commission Communication, Priorities for the Years Ahead].
440. For the text of the draft EU Constitution and an overview of the ratification process, see the website of
the European Union at http://europa.eu.int/constitution/index_en.htm.
441. Council Directive 90/435, 1990 OJ. (L 225) 6 (EC), amended by Council Directive 2003/123, 2004
O.J. (L 7) 41 (EU) (concerning parent-subsidiary taxation).
442. Council Directive 90/434, 1990 OJ. (L 225) 1 (EC), amended by Council Directive 2005/19, 2005 OJ.
(L 58) 19 (EU) (concerning mergers).
443. Council Directive 2003/49, 2003 OJ. (L 157) 49 (EU) (concerning interest and royalty payments
between related companies).
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entirely inside one Member State. Thus, the directives proscribe various forms of fiscal
4
discrimination against foreign factors of production within the EU 1
44s
In its 1992 report, the Ruding Committee found significant differences between Member States' corporate tax bases, rates, and systems, and that these differences did indeed cause
economic distortions violative of the tax neutrality objectives of CEN and CIN. However,
the Ruding Committee failed to choose between CEN and CIN as the preferred tax policy
objective and seemed to give short shrift to a serious analysis of tax neutrality in general. The
Committee made numerous policy recommendations, including the recommendation that
the Commission issue legislative proposals aimed at harmonizing corporate taxes. Specifically, the Ruding Committee recommended that a common corporate tax base be defined by
setting minimum standards regarding Member States' tax treatment of depreciation, leasing, stock valuation, business expenses, thinly-capitalized companies, capital gains, and the
carryover of foreign losses. More radically, the Ruding Committee recommended that the
Commission consider proposing a common and complete corporate tax system for the entire
European Community.446 Although the Commission issued a communication in response to
the Ruding Committee's report,"4 it did not attempt to advance the more radical recommendations contained in the Ruding Report, most likely because it knew such recommendations were not politically expedient and would never pass, given the staunch resistance to
corporate tax harmonization already expressed by some Member States, especially Britain. 44
Yet, even given the Commission's toned down legislative proposals, most of the proposals
concerning company taxation were disregarded by the Council in light of the importance
Council members placed on giving their respective Member States adequate leeway to use
tax incentives to stimulate their economies. 449 Since the Ruding Report, other proposals have
been advanced to harmonize EU corporate tax regimes, 4 0 but none have resulted in more
directives. In sum, the task of corporate tax coordination and harmonization has fallen to the
ECJ because the other EU institutions are inadequately empowered to accomplish the job
due in large part to the Member States' retained power to implement tax policies consistent
with the subsidiarity principle, and to effectively veto any tax proposal found objectionable.

444. Two other Council Directives impact EU Member States direct taxation. The Taxation of Savings
Directive, which entered into force in 2003, is aimed at combating harmful tax competition caused by the
easy mobility of capital. The Directive requires Member States to exchange information so as to ensure that
the beneficial owner of any interest payment is subject to a minimum threshold of taxation on cross-border
interest payments in the state of the beneficial owner's residence. See Council Directive 2003/48, 2003 OJ.
(L 157) 38 (EU) (concerning taxation of savings). The Mutual Assistance Directive, which entered into force in
1977, was adopted to police tax avoidance and evasion by requiring the competent authorities of the Member
States to exchange information that could assist in the proper assessment of taxes. This Directive was adopted
at time when many bilateral tax treaties did not have adequate Exchange of Information articles. See Council
Directive 79/1070, 1979 OJ. (L 331) 8 (EU) and Council Directive 92/12, 1992 O.J. (L 76) 1 (concerning
mutual assistance).
445. See infra note 451.
446. See id.
447. See Guidelines on Company Taxation Linked to the Further Development of the Internal Market:
Communications from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee, SEC (92) 1118, June 26, 1992.
448. For a detailed description of the Commission's and Council's reaction to the Ruding Report, see
Jimenez, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Community, supra note 313, at 131-36.
449. See id.
450. For a description of these proposals, including a 1996 memorandum submitted to an informal meeting
of the ECOFIN by the former EU Commissioner Monti, see id. at 142-43.
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b. Power and Recent Decisions of the European Court of Justice
The ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret the EU Treaties 4 ' and to decide whether Member
States' laws are consistent or inconsistent with the four fundamental freedoms enshrined
in the Treaties-the freedom of movement for workers, the freedom of establishment, the
452
freedom to provide services, and the freedom of movement of capital. Issues of direct
taxation typically come before the ECJ in one of two ways: (1) when the Commission (or
a Member State) brings an action against a Member State for failure to comply with EC
law, 453 or (2) when a national court of a Member State requests a preliminary ruling on an
interpretation of EC law. 454 Thus, the EU Commission need not rely on the cumbersome
and often fruitless legislative procedures to carry out its preferred tax policies. Instead, the
Commission can attempt to enforce its tax policies judicially by exercising its wide latitude
to bring enforcement actions against Member States in the ECJ. In its 2001 Communication, the Commission indicated that it was planning to adopt a more proactive strategy
in the area of tax infringements by initiating more actions against Member States in the
ECJ. 455 To date, the ECJ has considered numerous tax cases, and in most of these, the
Member State's tax law was struck down because it was found to unlawfully discriminate
on the basis of nationality4 6 or to violate one of the four fundamental freedoms guaranteed
by the treaties.
Professors Graetz and Warren have astutely observed that the ECJ has been an extremely
powerful and centralizing force in the EU by adopting "a different and more expansive
view of nondiscrimination" going far beyond that typically required in international trade
agreements and bilateral tax treaties. 457 They note that there are three basic ways in which a
country can use its income tax laws to discriminate against international commerce: a country "could favor domestic products over foreign products, domestic producers over foreign
producers, or domestic production over foreign production. ' 450 Free trade agreements like
the NAFTA 419 and the GAT'74 and successor agreements to the GATT, typically prohibit
unfair discrimination against foreign products, while bilateral tax treaties prohibit Contracting States from discriminating against foreign producers. 461 The ECJ, however, has gone
two ways of prohibiting discrimination by holding, further, that a Membeyond these first
ber State's tax laws violate the nondiscrimination principle implied by the four freedoms
whenever their laws favor domestic production over foreign production as in the case of
note 430, arts. 230-40 and EU Treaty, supra note
451. For the jurisdiction of the ECJ, seeEC Treaty, supra
429, art. 35.
452. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 3, art. 39 (freedom
of movement for workers); arts. 43, 48 (freedom of establishment); art. 49 (freedom to provide services); arts.
56, 58 (freedom of movement of capital).
453. See id.; see also EC Treaty, supra note 430, arts. 226-77.
454. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 452; see also EC Treaty, swpra note 430,
art. 234.
455. 2001 Commission Communication, Priorities forthe Years Ahead, supra note 439, at 22-23.
456. EC Treaty, supra note 430, art. 12.
457. Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination,supra note 252, at 1194.
458. Id. at 1195.
459. Supra note 415.
460. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.TS. 194.
461. See discussion of the Nondiscrimination article (Article 24) in the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra Part X.
Under most OECD-based bilateral tax treaties, including the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, a Contracting State is
precluded from taxing a PE of an enterprise based in the other Contracting State more heavily than it would tax
its own similarly situated domestic companies. See OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, art. 24(3).
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domestic tax incentives. 2 Because this form of discrimination is not prohibited by either
international trade agreements or bilateral tax treaties and is, in fact, deeply imbedded in
many countries' tax systems in the form of tax incentives to stimulate domestic investment,41' the ECJ's jurisprudence is bound to conflict with many aspects of national tax
systems and constrain their fiscal autonomy.
An important recent case illustrates how the ECJ is using the Treaty freedoms as a means
to strike down national provisions that promote internal trade to the possible detriment of
intra-community trade. Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey464 involved a famous British retailer that had a number of subsidiaries in France, Belgium, and Germany, all of which had
incurred substantial net operating losses before they were either liquidated or sold. In a
request for a preliminary ruling, the issue before the ECJ was whether the U.K. could
prevent the British retailer (i.e., the taxpayer) from using its foreign subsidiaries' losses to
offset the income of its affiliated group on its consolidated tax return. As under U.S. and
Japanese tax law, U.K. corporations are taxed on their worldwide income, although the
income of their foreign subsidiaries is not recognized until their profits are repatriated
to the U.K. When the profits are repatriated, double taxation is eliminated or mitigated
through a foreign tax credit. As is typical with many consolidated corporate tax systems,
including that of the United States and Japan, the U.K.'s tax law allowed only domestic
subsidiaries to be included in a U.K. consolidated return; foreign subsidiaries were always
excluded from group relief.
The taxpayer in Marks & Spencer argued that the freedom of establishment guaranteed
by the EU treaties should be interpreted as preventing a residence country from interfering
with its companies' freedom to invest abroad by favoring domestic investments over foreign
investments. The U.K. government, on the other hand, argued that because the income
of the taxpayer's foreign subsidiaries was not subject to U.K. income taxation for the years
at issue, there was no reason to include their losses in the return-to do so would create
unsymmetrical tax treatment. However, the ECJ was not persuaded by the government's
argument and held that the U.K. provisions excluding the foreign losses from tax consolidation must be struck down as discriminatory in derogation of the EU treaty freedoms since
they essentially disadvantaged investments abroad relative to investment in the U.K. The
Advocate General 465 noted that the only way the U.K. could prevent the offset of the foreign losses would be if the foreign subsidiaries were able to absorb their unused net operating losses in prior or future tax years.466 The Marks & Spencer decision has raised a great
deal of controversy since many EU Member States have rules similar to the U.K.'s and the
462. See Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Distcrimination,supra note 252, at 1198-1219.
463. Countries commonly favor domestic production over foreign production by offering various tax incentives to invest domestically. For example, in 2004, the United States enacted I.R.C. § 199, which allows for
a special deduction for income attributable to domestic production activities. Other examples of this kind
of preference include accelerated depreciation deductions, which are available for business equipment and
machinery that is used predominantly inside the U.S. See I.R.C. § 168(b)(RIA 2005). However, the slower
straight-line method of depreciation must be used if the depreciable assets are used predominantly outside the
U.S. See I.R.C. § 168(g)(1)(A), (g)(2 ).
464. Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc. v. Haley (Dec. 13, 2005), availableathttp://www.curia.eu.int/en/
content/juris/index.htm (search for "Case C-446/03").
465. Eight Advocates Generals assist the ECJ by rendering their own opinions, which the Court usually
follows. See MAsoN, supra note 435, at 13.
466. Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc
v. Halsey (Apr. 7, 2005) (opinion of Advocate General Maduro),
http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (search for "Case C-446/03").
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ECJ's decision interpreting the Treaty freedoms is binding on all Member States of the EU.
Thus, a great deal of money, tax planning, and the very fundamentals of nations' tax systems
were at stake. The ECJ has invalidated a number of other national tax provisions relating
to foreign production and foreign portfolio investment using a rationale very similar to that
in its Marks & Spencer decision.
Although the ECJ's robust application of the nondiscrimination principle may be seen
as necessary to remove tax barriers to the formation of a more perfect internal market
in the EU, scholars have argued that the Court's recent decisions go too far and are
greatly impairing the ability of Member States to stimulate their economies, to prevent
double taxation, and even to prevent blatant tax avoidance. 4"7 Lankhort-HohorstGmbH v.
Finanzamt Steinfurt4 6 is a stunning recent example of how the ECJ has essentially struck
down a set of laws, known as thin capitalization rules, designed to prevent tax avoidance
through the shifting of highly taxed income into low-tax countries through deductible
payments that are really disguised dividends in light of the meager capital account of the
payor. In Lankhorst, the Court considered a German tax provision that disallowed deductions by thinly capitalized German subsidiaries on interest payments if such interest was
being paid to a foreign parent (and was thus being removed from Germany's tax base).
Under the provision in question, if the interest was instead being paid to a German parent corporation, the deduction would not necessarily be disallowed even if the subsidiary
was thinly capitalized, most likely because the payment would still be within Germany's
tax base when received by the German parent corporation. Despite this tax avoidance
purpose of the law, the ECJ struck it down, holding that it violated the Treaty freedoms
by discriminating against intra-community commerce in favor of domestic commerce.
While the ECJ decision did not make thin capitalization rules in the EU illegal per se,
such rules must be applied in a way that does not disadvantage the nationals of other
Member States or discourage cross-border investments in order not to violate the Treaty
freedoms.
One of the most striking and disturbing effects of the ECJ's far reaching nondiscrimination jurisprudence can be seen in the demise of shareholder-imputation credit systems to
achieve corporate integration in European companies. As previously explained in Part III,
there are several ways to prevent the double taxation of corporate income at both the entity
and shareholder levels. For example, the United States now partially exempts certain dividends from income taxation. Until recently, many countries in the EU gave shareholders a
dollar-for-dollar credit for taxes that were paid (or deemed paid) at the corporate level, so
that the income was taxed only once, but at progressive shareholder rates. Longstanding
issues inherent in this system include the extent to which such imputation credits should be
granted to foreign shareholders, and whether foreign taxes paid by the corporation should
be eligible for the credit. For years, many anticipated that the ECJ would eventually strike
down some Member State's shareholder imputation credit system under the nondiscrimination principle. Although this did not happen until 2004,469 most countries in the EU
had already anticipated this result by dismantling or replacing their imputation credit systems with exemption systems, which means that progressivity was sacrificed for simplicity.
467. See Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination,supra note 252, at 1201-02.
468. Case C-324/00, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11,779.
469. Case C-319/02, In re Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7477 (striking down the Finnish shareholder-imputedcredit system as discriminatory against foreign commerce).
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Professors Graetz and Warren rightly point out that this choice seems "quintessentially
legislative," and when the ECJ makes "nondiscrimination the sole criterion for the choice
fairness, and administrability that
[it] necessarily suppresses considerations of47efficiency,
0
should inform difficult tax policy decisions.
How far the ECJ will extend its nondiscrimination doctrine is uncertain, but so far it
appears to have no bounds. In April 2004, the ECJ was asked to invalidate a Member State's
controlled-foreign-corporation [CFC] regime, a complex regulatory mechanism for eliminating the tax deferral that is generally enjoyed by foreign subsidiaries of parent corporations that reside in jurisdictions employing the foreign tax credit.471' The argument for
striking down the CFC anti-deferral regime is that it penalizes only foreign subsidiaries
engaged in passive or conduit activities, not domestic corporations, and so ostensibly discriminates against intra-community commerce.4 72 Given that the majority of EU Member
States have CFC provisions, the litigation has generated a great deal of controversy and
criticism. At least one scholar has observed that if the ECJ does invalidate CFC regimes in
Europe, that decision could trigger the demise of the whole system of taxing companies on
473
their worldwide income and granting a foreign tax credit to eliminate double taxation.
This is because the taxation of foreign income would be undermined by its indefinite deferral in the absence of the CFC anti-deferral provisions. Of course, the whole system of taxing persons on their worldwide income and granting a foreign tax credit to relieve double
taxation arguably violates the EU's fundamental treaty freedoms because this system effectively prevents a person residing in a high-tax country from fully enjoying the low taxes
offered abroad. 474 This argument, however, strikes at the very heart of CEN-the idea that
capital will be allocated more efficiently when decisions about to where to locate an investment are based on the underlying business fundamentals, free of tax considerations.475 If
the ECJ's nondiscrimination jurisprudence goes so far as to dismantle the CFC and foreign
tax credit systems, it will be hugely ironic since a foundational principle for the formation
of the EEC was CEN, which is epitomized by the taxation of worldwide income and the
accompanying foreign tax credit.

47 6

The ECJ has made nondiscriminationthe primary centerpiece of its direct tax jurisprudence, intended to promote the four freedoms guaranteed by the European treaties-the
free movement of goods, people, services, and capital. However, the broad nondiscrimination concept, as articulated by the ECJ, does not appear to be an adequate device for

470. Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination,supra note 252, at 1212.
471. See Case C-I 96/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue (filed Apr. 29, 2004).
472. This argument is similar to the taxpayer's position in Marks & Spencer that a residence country should
not be able to interfere with its companies' freedom to invest abroad. For a brief explanation of anti-deferral
1.b.
regimes, see the discussion supra Part III.A.
473. See, e.g., Malcolm Gammie, The Role of the European CourtofJustice in the Development of Direct Taxation
in the European Union, 57 BULL. INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 86, 96 (2003).
474. See Peter J. Wattel, Home Neutrality in an InternalMarket, 36 EUR. Tx'N 159 (1996) (maintaining that
the foreign tax credit does not comport with the concept of an internal market).
475. See discussion of CEN supra Part II.A.
476. See Jimenez, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Community, supra note 313, at 7-13
(discussing how the policy objective of capital export neutrality became identified with the concept of the
common market in the early stages of the EC's existence) and 19-38 (comparing various tax policy theories
and noting that public finance economists in the late 1950s and early 1960s, including Peggy Musgrave and
Richard A. Musgrave, advocated that CEN should be the guiding principle for a tax union like the European
Economic Community).
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determining how best to divide the worldwide tax base between source and residence
countries, the historical resolution of which is the so-called 1920s' Compromise previously discussed, 4"1and not some inherently rational or scientific principle. The ECJ, as
evinced by its jurisprudence, appears to view the four treaty freedoms as protecting transnational commerce from laws designed to serve domestic investments at any cost; the only
relevant issue appears to be whether transnational commerce is disadvantaged by the law
in question. The problem with the Court's emerging doctrine is that it produces irreconcilable claims of discrimination because of the inevitable overlap of source and residence.
If the ECJ prohibits discrimination based on the destination of an investment (e.g., a holding that a country cannot prevent a company from enjoying the benefits of low-taxed
foreign investments), then this holding automatically conflicts with a prohibition against
discrimination based on the origin of an investment (e.g., holding that a country must treat
domestic and foreign producers equally). In other words, the ECJ appears to be attempting to implement CEN and CIN simultaneously in its jurisprudence. 47 8 But, as previously
noted, the only way that CEN and CIN can both be served at the same time is where all
jurisdictions' tax rates and bases are identical. 4 9 And as noted, harmonized corporate tax
rates in the EU appear very unlikely to occur in the near future unless and until the rule
requiring the unanimous consent of the Council to enact new tax legislation is repealed in
40
favor of a lower approval threshold.
In the meantime, there are many possible future implications of the ECJ's nondiscrimination jurisprudence. Given the large number of Member States' corporate tax laws that have
been struck down, it is conceivable that Europe's corporate income tax base will shrink over
time, with Member States forced to raise revenues by other means-perhaps through excise
and other indirect taxes. The EU Commission seems to have resigned itself to the fact
that income tax rates will not be harmonized anytime soon, and has now launched a major
legislative initiative to create a common corporate tax base for Europe, 4s' coupled with the
objective of replacing the arm's length method of allocating income among related enterprises with a formulary apportionment method. 482 The Commission has justified this initiative by pointing out that a uniform tax base will serve the tax policy goal of simplification
and reduce compliance costs. Nonetheless, scholars have surmised that the Commission's
push to create a common corporate tax base may be just another ploy to ultimately push

477. See discussion of the 1920s' Compromise supra Part II.D.
478. See Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination, supra note 252, at 1216-20 (arguing that the ECJ's
nondiscrimination jurisprudence is inherently incoherent and setting forth logical proofs of this contention).
479. See id; see also Jimenez, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Community, supra note 313, at
21 (noting that the two forms of neutrality are mutually exclusive in the absence of identical tax systems); see
discussion of CEN and CIN supra Part II.A. & B.
480. The draft EU Constitution, which failed to be ratified by France and the Netherlands in 2005, would
not change the unanimity requirement.
481. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee: Towards an Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles-A Strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for Their EU-Wide Activities, COM (2001) 582 final
(Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Communication on Consolidated Corporate Tax Base]; Tax Analysts EU Summarizes November Meeting ofHarmonized Tax Base Working Group, WORLDWIDE TAx DAILY, Jan. 21, 2005, 2005
VTD 18-16 (LEXIS) Tax Analysts, EU Goals Include Harmonizing Company Tax Base, Reviving Constitution,
WORLDWIDE Tx DAILY, Jan. 16, 2007, 2007 WTD 10-8 (LEXIS).
482. See Tax Analysts, EU Publishes Common Company Tax Base Paper on Group Taxation, WORLDWIDE TAx
DAILY, June 14, 2006, 2006 WTD 114-14 (LEXIS)(In the paper, the EU Commission discusses the definition
of a group and how intragroup transactions would be identified and treated).
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through tax rate harmonization. 4s3 In the meantime, there remains a huge spectrum of
corporate income tax rates in Europe, ranging from a zero percent rate in Estonia for the
year 2005 to rates exceeding 30 percent in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
and Spain. 48 4 The broad disparity in tax rates creates very real incentives to manipulate the
location of capital within the EU. Without rate harmonization, it is fairly disingenuous for
the Commission to contend that harmonizing the tax base will neutralize tax considerations
in decision making.
The ECJ's tax jurisprudence with all of its direct ramifications and indirect effects is bound
to have substantial repercussions in both the Untied States and Japan because of the extensive economic ties and bilateral tax treaties both the countries have with EU Member States.
If formulary apportionment is instituted in the EU, it will undoubtedly affect how Japanese
and U.S. corporations structure their investments and operations in the EU. At a minimum,
some bilateral tax treaties may have to be renegotiated. At worst, a new tax base may generate
even more litigation and opportunities for the ECJ to assert its nondiscrimination doctrine,
which not only might further impair Member States' abilities to employ tax incentives and
avoid double taxation, but also threaten to upset the entire bilateral tax treaty network, creating a high level of uncertainty, and weakening the relatively high level of consensus that has
been reached on many difficult issues such as transfer pricing, the treatment of fiscally transparent entities, and the proper interpretation and breadth of the nondiscrimination principle
now found in OECD-based bilateral tax treaties. At present, it seems that Professors Graetz
and Warren got it exactly right when they characterized the ECJ's jurisprudence as incoherent and unstable from an international tax policy perspective. 415 In short, the EU's method
of attempting to develop international income tax policy on a case-by-case basis through
the ECJ so as to remove barriers to its internal market is not theoretically sound. The ECJ's
nondiscrimination jurisprudence is on a dead-end course, and serves neither as a desirable
or practical substitute to replace the existing OECD bilateral tax treaty network (in fact, it
could impair that network), nor as a viable model for Asian-Pacific international tax policy.
4. Asian Trade Groups and Agreements-APEC,ASEAN, AFTA,
and CAFTA
Although the geographic proximity of countries in East Asia and along the Pacific Rim might
be sufficient to catalyze their economic integration, this region has not had a major binding
regional trade agreement on the order of the NAFTA or the European Union's treaties until
quite recently, when the nascent free trade agreement between China and the Southeast Asian
nations entered into force in 2005. 416 The region encompassing East Asia and the Pacific Rim
483. See Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination, supra note 252, at 1229 (likening the Commission's
push to create a common corporate tax base to a "stalking horse" for a subsequent push for rate harmonization);
cf.McDaniel, NAFTA and FormularyApportionment, supra note 422, at 302 (noting that a general convergence
of tax rates is desirable to institute a system of formulary apportionment, but that such a close convergence
would not be necessary in the three NAFTA countries were to consolidate their tax bases); but cf. Vann, Treaty
for the Asian-Pacific?,supra note 30, at 160 (contending that uniformity of domestic tax systems is likely to grow
out of a system in which the corporate tax bases of various countries are consolidated).
484. See Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination,supra note 252, at 1228-29.
485. See id. at 1188, 1219, 1243.
486. Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China, Nov. 29,
2004, PRC-ASEAN, art. 23(1) (Entry into Force), availableat http://www.aseansec.org/16646.htm. (last visited
Sep. 1, 2006)[hereinafter the acronym CAFTA will be used to refer to this free trade agreement]. CAFTA is
further discussed below at Part XII.C.4.b.ii.
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lacks many of the commonalities that drive such agreements, such as a shared history, religion,
or culture; similar levels of affluence; or equally amenable attitudes towards foreign trade and
investment. The region is extremely diverse economically and politically, and includes highly
industrialized nations like the United States, Japan, Australia, and Canada; newly industrialized
nations like China; and many small developing nations in the South Pacific. But the sheer size
of the region makes it a force to be reckoned with, since it encompasses over one-half of the
world's population and 40 percent of its total gross domestic product.
a. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum-APEC
Despite the Asia-Pacific region's lack of legal, economic, or social cohesion, a number of
regional economic forums emerged in the 1960s, founded on the general belief that some
kind of dialogue between representatives of countries in the region was needed to benefit
their respective private sectors and to facilitate a greater understanding of policymaking. In
1989, amalgamating efforts, spearheaded by Japan and Australia, led to the emergence of
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) as the predominant group for facili4 7
tating economic growth, cooperation, trade, and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. 1
APEC was founded with twelve members, but has since grown to twenty-one countries,
which refer to themselves as Member Economies.4 Every year, one of the Member Economies plays host to the annual APEC conference, which includes various ministerial, academic, and leaders' meetings.

48 9

APEC is distinguishable from other regional economic arrangements in several key
respects. First, unlike the WTO and the EU, APEC is not a supranational body; rather,
it operates as a collective secretariat with its headquarters in Singapore. Second, unlike
the WTO, the EU, and the NAFTA, APEC has no binding multilateral treaty-its operative principle is voluntary action, not binding negotiations. Thus, although APEC produces
Many countries in the Asian-Pacific and East Asia are also members of the WTO. APEC played a significant

role in the success of the GATT's Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. See AsIA-PACIFIC
COOPERATION FORUM, EMINENT PERSONS

GROUP,

IMPLEMENTING THE

APEC

ECONOMIC

VISION, THIRD REPORT OF THE

1 (1995).
487. Other regional groups emerged in the 1960s, which helped pave the way for the creation of APEC in
1989. These other groups include the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Pacific Basin Economic Council
(PBEC), the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), and the Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council (PECC), all of which are still in existence but now have much lower international profiles than APEC.
For an overview of these groups' respective roles in Asian economic cooperation, see EDWARD J. LINCOLN, EAST
ASIAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM 114-27 (2004).
488. According to APEC's website, "[t]he term Member Economies is used because the APEC cooperative
process is predominantly concerned with trade and economic issues, with members engaging with one another
as economic entities" rather than as political entities. See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.apec.org/apec/tools/faqs.htnl#Q3. APEC's Member Economies are: Australia;
Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; The Republic of the Philippines;
The Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States of America; and Viet Nam. AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation, Member Economies, http://www.apec.org/apec/membereconomies.html.
Inclusion of so many new members with diverse economies and thinner links to the Asia-Pacific region
has arguably diluted APEC's sense of direction and focus on economic issues. See LINCOLN, supra note 487, at
312-33 (2004). Thus, in 1997, a 10-year moratorium was placed on adding new APEC members, ostensibly to
give APEC time to strengthen its platform.
489. APEC is funded by annual donations of its Member Economies, which are used to fund a small Secretariat in Singapore. For more information on APEC's bureaucratic structure and operations, see its official
website at: http://www.apec.org/content/apec/about-apec/structure.html.
EMINENT PERSONS GROUP
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recommendations and nonbinding codes, they may or may not be implemented by the
individual Member Economies. Obviously, this non-binding aspect of APEC's reform
agenda is similar to the international tax recommendations of the OECD, 490 except that the
OECD Model Treaty has spawned over 2500 binding multilateral treaties, while APEC's
role has proven to be primarily a forum for dialogue and for the establishment of nonbinding trade goals and recommendations. Moreover, APEC has made almost no progress in
proposing explicit tax coordination rules for the region.
i) The Bogor Declaration
Initially, APEC's meetings were attended only by trade and foreign ministers from the
Member Economies, but the meetings soon assumed a higher profile by adding a leaders'
meeting, which included high ranking government officials. In 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton spoke at the Seattle meeting of APEC, held on Blake Island, an historic Indian village.
Although APEC began its existence with no clear mission other than to meet to discuss topics
of mutual interest, its broad agenda has become more refined. At its 1994 summit meeting
following President Clinton's appearance, APEC adopted a free trade proposal incorporating
two ambitious, long-term goals: (1) the achievement of "free and open trade and investment"
in the Asia-Pacific region by 2010 for developed economies, and (2) the same achievement for
developing economies by 2020. These two goals, agreed to by APEC Economic Leaders in
49
Bogor, Indonesia in 1994, are often dubbed the "Bogor Goals" or the "Bogor Declaration. '
The Bogor Declaration was followed one year later with the establishment of an action
plan, the 1995 Osaka Action Agenda, for achieving the broad Bogor Goals. The agenda
delineated three broad areas of cooperation, known as the "Three Pillars" of APEC:
(1) liberalizing trade by working towards the eventual elimination of tariffs and non-tariff
barriers to trade and investment; (2) facilitating cross-border business by improving access
to trade information, and by better aligning policy goals with modern business strategies;
and (3) enhancing APEC members' economic and technical capacities so that both institutions and individuals can take better advantage of electronic commerce and the new economy.492 However, neither the 1994 Bogor Goals, nor the 1995 Osaka Action Plan explicitly
defined what was meant by "free and open trade and investment. ' ' 49 '
APEC's Eminent Persons Group (EPG)494 recommended that the Bogor Goals be
achieved by a process of open regionalism, the key principle implying regional integration

490. See Seiichi Kondo, OECD Deputy Sec'y-Gen., Remarks concerning the APEC-OECD Cooperative
Initiative on Regulatory Reform (Singapore, Feb. 21, 2001), transcript of speech availableat http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/39/26/2350080.pdf (noting the similarities between OECD and APEC reform agendas and
approaches, but stressing that regulatory reform must "go beyond talking about principles.., by building
domestic capacities for quality regulation.") [hereinafter Kondo, OECD Deputy Sec'y General, 2001Conference Address].
491. See APEC Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve (Bogor, Indonesia, Nov. 15, 1994), available at
http://www.apec.org//content/apec/leaders-declaration/1994.htrnl [hereinafter either Bogor Goals or Bogor
Declaration].
492. A description of APEC's 1995 Osaka Action Agenda is available on the APEC website at http://www.
apec.org/apec/about-apec/how-apec-operates/action-plans-.html.
493. See id.
494. The Eminent Persons Group was established in 1992 to help APEC develop a clearer vision of its role
and objectives. The EPG is comprised of distinguished leaders from academia, business, and the private sector, drawn from each of APECs Member Economies. The EPG issues an annual report, which often contains
analysis and recommendations as to how the Bogor Goals can be achieved.
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without trade discrimination against non-APEC countries. 49 In general, open regional496
ism is analogous to nondiscrimination implemented through the MFN mechanism.
But, in contrast to the approach taken by most regional trade agreements, including the
NAFTA and the EU, open regionalism involves the extension of trade benefits on a unilateral basis, regardless of whether those benefits are reciprocated. As several economists
have observed, APEC is "[c]haracterized by market-driven integration, rather than by
institutional integration; involves economies at different stages of economic development
rather than economies with similar income levels; and [is] outwardly oriented rather than
inward-looking."

497

According to recommendations in the EPG's 1994 report,4 9s open regionalism has four
dimensions to its meaning, the essence of which is to create a free trade area that will
engage with the rest of the world liberally, with "absolutely no contemplation of creating a customs union that would require members to maintain common [external] trade
policies toward nonmembers." 4" Thus, according to the EPG's vision of open regionalism, Member Economies should commit to further reducing their trade and investment barriers toward non-APEC countries; they should be encouraged to lower their
own trade barriers unilaterally to the maximum possible extent; and APEC should, as an
organization, extend APEC benefits to nonmembers on a mutually reciprocal basis. And
yet, APEC should allow individual Member Economies to relate to third-party countries
on a bilateral basis, by sanctioning extension of free trade benefits unconditionally or
reciprocally. 00
This formulation, however, is problematic in that it advocates applying the MFN principle on both a unilateral and reciprocally contingent basis, depending on the stance of the
trading partner. Subregional trading blocks within the APEC region usually apply their benefits to insiders only. For example, NAFTA countries do not unilaterally extend their agreement to non-NAFTA countries (at least until 2010), a restriction that ostensibly conflicts
with the open regionalism policy advocated by APEC. There remains a question as to how
APEC Member Economies are to treat outsiders. The options include: (1) closed regionalism, whereby trade benefits are not extended at all; (2) conditional MFN status, whereby
benefits are extended only if reciprocated; and (3) open regionalism, whereby benefits are
495. The concept of "open regionalism" was mentioned as an APEC goal years earlier, at least as early as
1991. See 3rd APEC Ministerial Meeting-Joint Statement, Seoul, Korea, Nov. 12-14, 1991 (stating that APEC
should set an example of open regionalism), available at http://www.apec.org/apec/ministerial-statements/
annual-ministerial/1991_3thapec_ministerial.html.
496. As mentioned, the MFN principle generally stands for the proposition that the country implementing
such principle must extend to other party-countries, its nationals, or its residents, any benefit, advantage, or
favor that is has granted to any country's nationals or residents in specified matters. The MFN principle can
apply on a unilateral basis (i.e., without the requirement of reciprocal treatment). However, reciprocity is usually made a condition, meaning that countries will extend MFN status to countries on a bilateral or multilateral
basis, but only if and to the extent that such countries extend the same benefit to them. See discussion of MFN
status supra Part XII.C.2.
497. Peter Drysdale, Andrew & Hadi Soesastro, Open Regionalism: The Nature of Asia Pacific Integration in
Europe, EastAsia andAPEC 103, 107 (Peter Drysdale & David Vines ed., 1998).
498. See AIA-PACIFic ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM, EMINENT PERSONS GROUP, ACHIEVING THE APEC
VisioN: FREE AND OPEN TRADE IN THE AsIA PACIFIC, APEC #94-EP-01, ISBN 981-00-5925-6 (1994), available

at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/publications/al-publications/eminent-persons--group.html
APEC Eminent Persons Group, 1994 Report].
499. Id. at 4.
500. Id. at 3-4.
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extended unilaterally. In 1997, an intellectual leader of APEC, C. Fred Bergsten of the
United States, attempted to help APEC refine the meaning of open regionalism by pointing out that if all APEC Member Economies lowered or extended MFN status to all other
nations on a unilateral basis, APEC members would essentially be giving up their leverage
and potential bargaining power in trade negotiations with non-APEC countries. 5' 1
Although clearly APEC leaders originally wanted APEC to be distinguished from preferential regional trade blocks like NAFTA and the EU, which extend their benefits only
an exclusive basis to other in the region,0 2 the meaning of open regionalism with respect
to non-APEC countries has never been clearly delineated and remains nebulous. In recent
years, APEC leaders have expressed their approval of subregional preferential trade agreements, noting that they can help lead to increased economic cooperation, even though such
arrangements probably fall short of open regionalism.5
Further obfuscating APEC's mission is the fact that despite APEC's verbal reaffirmations
of its Bogor free trade objectives, it still has never defined free and open trade and investment,
a key APEC objective that is to be accomplished by the target dates set forth in the Bogor
Declaration. To industrialized countries, free trade may automatically imply the lifting of all
bans, quotas, and tariffs; but to poorer countries, free trade may mean something much less.
To developing countries, free trade may imply the mere removal of bans on imports, but

not the elimination of tariffs. The lingering ambiguities over the practical meaning of these
putatively guiding APEC principles-open regionalism and free trade-combined with the
fact that compliance with APEC's principles is strictly voluntary, have both clouded APEC's
mission and hindered its progress toward achieving free trade in the region by its target dates
of 2010 for advanced countries, and by 2020 for developing countries.
Indeed, as an institution, APEC has trouble getting its members to implement the MFN
principle on either a mutually exclusive or unilateral basis, except within the context of their
WTO commitments.5 °0 Thus, Japan, for example, apparently had no qualms in protecting
its domestic rice market in 2001,1°" despite the Bogor Goals, despite APEC's three so-called
Pillars of Cooperation, despite APEC's support of and self-proclaimed leadership role in
the WTO, 50 6 and despite the EPG's attempts to promote its broad and blurry vision of open
regionalism.
501. See C. FRED BERGSTEN, OPEN REGIONALISM 11-15 (Inst. for Int'l Economics, Working Paper No. 97-3,
1997).
502. See APEC Eminent Persons Group, 1994 Report, supra note 498, at 29-30 (strongly recommending
"that APEC members liberalize their trade and investment barriers unilaterally to the maximum extent possible" and advocating that APEC propose revising Article 24 of the GATT to require that new regional trade
groups do the same).
503. See, e.g., 12th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting Santiago Declaration, One Community, Our Future,
Santiago de Chile, Nov. 20-21, 2004 (renewing commitment to achieving APEC's Bogor Goals through unilateral measures, as well as other "collective market-opening actions," including preferentialfree trade agreements
and regional trade agreements); 13th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting Busan Declaration, Towards One
Community: Meet the Challenge,Make the Change, Busan, Korea, Nov. 18-19, 2005 (reaffirming commitment to
the Bogor Goals through both unilateral actions and preferential trade agreements). The texts of APEC's annual
Economic Leaders' Declarations are available at http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders _declarations.html.
504. See LINCOLN, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM, supra note

487, at 134-35.

505. See id. (citing Hisane Masaki, APECNears Compromise,JAPAN
TiMES ONLINE, Sept. 14, 2001, availableat
www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl 5 ?nb200l10914a2.htm).
506. See, e.g., 17th APEC Ministerial Meeting-Joint Statement, Busan, Korea, Nov. 15-16, 2005 (recommending APEC Leaders provide "strong political leadership and commitment necessary to produce a sound
platform for successfully concluding the [IWTO] negotiations in Hong Kong, China ....
).
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ii) APEC's Effect on Tax Impediments
Not only has APEC's progress in implementing its original vision of trade liberalization
through the MFN mechanism been disappointing, APEC has also not had a discernable
impact on lowering tax barriers to FDI. AlthoughAPEC has co-sponsored non-tax initiatives with the OECD,"°7 APEC has not exercised its guiding MFN principle to induce the
broad removal of tax barriers to foreign investment within the APEC region, as has been
attempted by the EU through litigation in the European Court of Justice. Clearly, the
MFN principle, as annunciated by APEC's EPG, is broad enough, theoretically, to restrict
tax impediments to foreign investment.0 8 But, as contrasted to the situation in the EU,
the nondiscrimination principle, in the form of MFN status, has not been implemented in
the APEC region; there is no regional multilateral treaty that explicitly requires it, and no
supranational tax authority to enforce it.
Japan's well-publicized reluctance to legally authorize share exchanges with foreign inves-

tors provides a striking example of the non-enforcement of APEC's MFN principle, even
when reciprocity is present. Most developed OECD nations, including the United States,
authorize share-for-share exchanges with foreign corporations as a technique enabling corporations to invest abroad by acquiring or merging with foreign corporations. However,
merger-and-acquisition (M&A) activity between Japanese and foreign corporations has long
been hindered by Japan's insular corporate culture and protective laws that prohibit Japanese
corporations from swapping their shares with those of a foreign corporation. To ameliorate
this situation and stimulate more FDI, a controversial provision was adopted in Japan's 2005
Companies Law, which expands the categories of permissible consideration in triangular

mergers to include cash, bonds, and shares of foreign corporations. 0' This new provision
will permit a Japanese target corporation to merge into a Japanese subsidiary of a foreign
corporation with the target's shareholders receiving as consideration the acquiring foreign
parent's stock and a limited percentage of cash or bonds. The amendment will make it easier
and less expensive for foreign corporations to acquire Japanese companies and to buy out
any dissenting shareholders.
But this very possibility has sparked a great deal of alarm in Japan that the provision will
make foreign triangular mergers too easy to execute."' Amid widespread fears of a sudden

507. See APEC-OECD Co-operative Initiative on Regulatory Reform, 2001-2006, available at http://
www.oecd.org/document/2 5/0,2340,en_2649_2011852397017 11-ll ,00.html (aimed at reforming anticompetition laws); OECD-APEC Workshop on Security of Information Systems and Networks-Seoul,
5-6 September 2005, summarized at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/23/3 5808919.pdf (aimed at improving
computer network and database security). In October 1996, APEC and the OECD co-sponsored an international tax conference in Sydney, Australia. However, the conference did not produce any APEC-sponsored
tax initiatives.

508. Indeed, this has been the theoretical basis of the ECJ's decisions invalidating many of its Member
States' tax laws. See discussion supra Part XII.C.2.b.
509. A proposal to authorize stock swaps directly with foreign corporations was eliminated from the Companies Law bill. See 2005 Companies Law, supra note 94 and sources cited therein.
510. But, this fear is unfounded and apparently has its genesis in a general misunderstanding by Japanese
lawmakers of the difference between negotiated mergers and unwanted (i.e., hostile) takeovers. Mergers must
necessarily be negotiated and are not tantamount to hostile takeover bids. Moreover, a triangular merger is an
"extraordinary transaction" under Japanese law, requiring approval of at least two-thirds of the merging companies' shareholders. Although garnering this level of approval is theoretically possible, it is highly unlikely,
even in a U.S. corporation, much less in a Japanese one.
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surge in foreign hostile takeovers ofJapanese companies, Japan's legislature postponed the
effective date of the foreign-merger provision to May 2007 at the earliest, a move disparaged by foreign business interests as too protective and discriminatory. The delay will make
it harder for Japan to achieve former Prime Minister Koizumi's well-publicized goal of
doubling FDI by 2009, an ambitious objective established in 2004.1" Even when foreign
triangular mergers become legal under Japanese law in 2007, they are not likely to become
a popular acquisition technique unless Japan's tax law is also amended to make them tax
deferred to the target's shareholders, which is the tax treatment accorded such transactions
by many of Japan's trading partners, including the United States."1 2 Arguably, Japan's tax
laws constitute a form of discrimination against foreign producers and investors since taxdeferred mergers, involving share-for-share exchanges as a method of acquiring or reorganizing a corporation, are available to domestic but not foreign corporations."1 3
Because many of Japan's trading partners, including the United States and other APEC
members, have long sanctioned tax deferred, share-for-share exchanges between domestic and
foreign companies as a means of effecting FDI, 14 and Japan has meanwhile routinely shunned
the technique, even when its benefits are offered on a reciprocal basis by its trading partners,
the MFN principle has obviously been ineffective in removing a major tax barrier to direct
investment in Japan, an APEC-member economy."'
iii) APEC's Future
Assessments of APEC's impact and accomplishments vary. While APEC's actual record
in inducing its Member Economies to lower their institutional trade barriers has been
weak, especially as compared to the accomplishments of the NAFTA and the EU, APEC
has provided a much needed forum for discussing issues related to international trade and
economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. This regular interaction, combined with
specific agendas and annual progress reports by its Member Economies, has arguably had
the cumulative effect of building a legion of government officials and academics whose
consciousness of technical trade issues, problems, and possible solutions has been raised

511. Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan, General Policy Speech to the 159th Session of the Diet
(Jan. 19, 2004) ("We will make Japan an attractive market for foreign companies in order to achieve the goal
of doubling the amount of investment within the next five years." [provisional translation issued by Prime
Minister's Cabinet]), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2004/01/19sisei e.html.
512. Currently, shareholders of a Japanese target who, pursuant to a merger, exchange their shares for shares
in another Japanese corporation can defer their tax gains until they dispose of the newly acquired shares in a
taxable transaction. However, an exchange of domestic shares for foreign shares is immediately taxable. This
rule is not on a par with the tax rules in many other industrialized countries, including the United States which
allow gains realized in cross-border corporate reorganizations to be deferred indefinitely if certain requirements are satisfied. See, e.g., U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c) and 1.367(a)-3(d)(3), Example 5 (1998).
513. For a discussion of the application of the nondiscrimination principle in the European Union, see
discussion supra in Part XII.C.2.b.
514. Most of the countries that sanction share exchanges between domestic and foreign corporations
are industrialized, OECD member countries. See, e.g., U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c) and 1.367(a)-3(d)(3)
(1998). Developing countries are more reluctant to open their doors to such forms of investment, fearing
expropriation.
515. For a more thorough analysis of Japan's new provision sanctioning foreign triangular mergers, Japan's
2005 Companies Law, and its emerging market for corporate control, see Pamela A. Fuller, Whitber M&A in
Japan? N.Y.LJ. 10, Nov. 7, 2005; Fuller, 2005 Int'l Legal Development, Asia and Pacific Law-Japan supra
note 97, at 515-523; Pamela Ann Fuller, Japan, InternationalLegal Developments in Review: 2005, CorporateInternationalMergers andAcquisitions--Japan,in 40 INT'L LAW. 311, 325-328 (2006).
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and sharpened. Requiring members to present action plans and progress reports has also
created some peer pressure to conform to APEC's principles. This soft law aspect of APEC
has caused some observers to liken APEC to the OECD.51 6 However, APEC has spawned
nothing on the order of the OECD's more than 2,500 bilateral tax treaties, all of which have
similar provisions and allocation rules.
Although voluntary compliance with APEC's MFN principle has been far from impressive,"'7 some economists believe that APEC has nonetheless had a long-term positive effect
on the direction of trade liberalization and levels of gross domestic product (GDP)-not
only within the APEC region, but also in the European/OECD economies that are well
outside the APEC region."' t Although the effect has not been robust, these economists
maintain that APEC's progress in facilitating trade (by expediting and reducing the cost
of customs clearance procedures) and its limited success in reducing trade barriers unilaterally have generated efficiency gains evinced by increases in real GDPs and expanded
exports.

19

On the other hand, many scholars and U.S. government officials clearly regard APEC as
an inefficient institution, a waste of time, and only peripheral to the process of removing
trade and tax barriers to economic integration.52 ° APEC is not likely to produce anything
approximating the EU or NAFTA treaties, a perceived shortcoming contributing to its critics' discontents. There is a widespread belief that APEC is a flawed institution because of
its failure to accomplish its trade liberalization goals. However, these goals were probably
too ambitious ab initio, given that the APEC region has long exhibited far greater economic
and cultural diversity than that of either Western Europe or North America. One result of
the rampant dissatisfaction with APEC has been the emergence of narrower approaches to
economic integration in Asia, including increased calls and negotiations for sub-regional
free trade agreements.521 The following briefly explores this development and explains how
increased East Asian regionalism could have negative implications for international tax
policy and global economic welfare.
b. Emergence of Narrower Asian Economic Alliances
In recent years, a vision of a narrower East Asian region has emerged to compete with
APEC's vision of a broad, transcontinental Asia-Pacific zone where trade benefits are
extended on a non-preferential basis. Although the idea of an East Asian economic sphere

516. See Kondo, OECD Deputy Sec'y General, 200lConference Address, supra note 490 (noting the
similarities on OECD and APEC principles).
517. See LINCOLN, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM, supra note 487 at 133-35 (attributing APEC's lack
of progress toward free trade primarily to its weak, nonbinding process and its failure to explicitly define its
objectives).
518. See Seunghee Han & Inkyo Cheong, APEC Trade Liberalisation: Its Implications 23-31 (O.E.C.D.,
Working Paper, No. 197, May 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/48/1864956.pdf (arguing
that their empirical study shows that APEC's long-term effect has been to boost the levels of gross domestic
product "throughout OECD as well as non-OECD economies").
519. See id.
520. See, e.g., JOHN

RAVENHILL,

APEC AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF PACIFIC RIM

REGIONALISM,

193 (2002)

(characterizing APEC's agenda regarding technical (ECOTECH) issues as "a triumph of process over substance"); LINCOLN, EAST ASI.' ECONOMIC REGIONALISM, supra note 487, at 115 (noting that "mention of APEC
in Washington often brings little more than a yawn").
521. See LINCOLN, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM, supra note 487, at 138-39.
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is not new and has probably long been simmering in the consciousness of government
leaders and intellectuals, there has recently been a noticeable swell in momentum for creating distinctly East Asian institutions and economic deals to manifest and embody this
growing consciousness. In particular, a number of East Asian trade groups have evolved,
including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its larger sister group,
ASEAN + 3 (with China, Japan, and South Korea), raising concerns that their strong rhetoric and exclusionary tendencies could result in Asian protectionism on many fronts, which
could easily alienate Western business and political interests, and impair broader efforts to
achieve higher levels of economic efficiency.
i) Catalysts Sparking EastAsian Regionalism

The reasons underlying the desire of some nations to create and formalize a so-called
East Asian consciousness are deeply rooted and multifaceted. However, Edward Lincoln notes that any efforts to formally bind the region would have to overcome some
formidable impediments-namely, extreme economic, political, and cultural diversity. 22
Lincoln has identified five basic factors that have stimulated the recent calls for forming an East Asian economic block. First, there has been a growing perception that the
region shares social, cultural, and economic attributes that are now often labeled Asian

values. This perception, which many scholars believe is illusory and deeply flawed, was
pushed so vigorously in the late 1980s and 1990s by certain countries in the region that
some began to believe in it. The notion of Asian values is ostensibly founded on Confucian ethics, including an emphasis on the family, hierarchy and order, education, and the
predominance of a group orientation over individualism. However, some nations in the
region do not have a strong Confucian tradition, including Thailand, Indonesia, and the
Philippines. Thus, the notion of the Asian way and the putative, deeply rooted, Asian cultural traditions, have often been invented or exaggerated by government elites wanting
to get a tighter grasp on the nature and direction of reforms and development.523 Lincoln
believes the notion of Asian values was advanced mainly by Singapore and Malaysia as a
means of fleshing out their national identities and aligning themselves with more power24
ful countries in the region, particularly Japan.
A second set of related motives for establishing a more cohesive East Asian economic
sphere was the recognition by Southeast Asian nations in the late 1980s that Japan was
becoming a major source of much needed foreign aid and investment. While these developing nations saw the need to strengthen their political and economic alliances with Japan,
Japan, on the other hand, wanted to cultivate low-cost manufacturing centers in those
countries and to legitimize its distinctive economic model and corporate governance system
by exporting them. Thus, it was in these nations' interests to adopt the rhetoric of Asian
exceptionalism, as distinct from Western ways. The view that East Asia needed institutions
to compete with the EU and NAFTA provides a third motive for creating an East Asian

522. See id.
at 140.
523. See, e.g., Frank K. Upham, Weak Legal Consciousness as Invented Tradition, in MIRROR Or MODERNITYIvETsirro TRADITIONS OFMODERNJAPAN 48, 55-58 (Stephen Viastos ed., 1998) (arguing thatJapan's elites, wanting to channel legal disputes away from the courts where litigators might be able to forge social reforms, instead
created the erroneous notion thatJapanese have traditionally had a "weak legal consciousness'"-an innate cultural
attribute that prevents them from being litigious).
524. See, LINCOLN, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM, supra note 487, at 142.
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economic block. Japanese officials, in particular, have advocated the formation of a free
business zone among Japan, China, and South Korea, which they see as necessary to mitigate the trade diversion losses that it suffers by being excluded from the world's two largest
regional trade blocks-the EU and the NAFTA. s25
Perhaps, the most potent catalyst igniting the recent rally to coalesce East Asia has been the
widespread anger and frustration over the way the United States and the IMF responded to
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The motivating perception was that the United States had been
too financially disinterested in the region, that the IMF's conditions for assistance on bad loans
were too stringent, and that Western powers were too manipulative in pushing for structural
reforms in East Asia, reputedly as a strategy to capitalize on the crisis and gain a more advantageous foothold in East Asia. 26 The fifth and most recent set of factors underlying the desire of
East Asian governments to coalesce, according to Lincoln, stem from anti-American sentiment.
In particular, many East Asian nations are concerned that the United States responded too
unilaterally in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and that the United States
27
has also been overly and increasingly protective of its markets, especially its steel industry1
American protectionism, according to Lincoln, is a principle economic issue prompting East
Asian nations to conclude free trade agreements with their Asian neighbors. 28
ii) Other ManifestationsofAsian Regionalism-FreeTrade Agreements

While the desire to form an East Asian economic block is largely rooted in opposition
to American and Western policies, this visceral frustration has resulted in more talk than
tough action. The ASEAN, which predates the trends discussed above,129 has always been a
very loosely organized, non-legalistic institution. 3 Nine years after its founding, ASEAN
established the ASEAN Secretariat, although it has no supranational decision making
power. The Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN's founding document, speaks in broad terms
about its purpose, which is generally "[t]o promote regional peace and stability through
abiding respect for justice and the rule of law," and "[t]o accelerate the economic growth,
531
social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours."
In 1992, ASEAN announced the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA),532
which obligated ASEAN members to gradually reduce their tariffs on goods traded within
the ASEAN region. Following some back peddling and amendments to the agreement,
525. See id. at 145-47(citing Shinji Fukukawa, East Asia Needs a Free Business Zone, DAILY YOMTURI, July 12,
2001, at 16).
526. See id. at 147-48.
527. In 2002, the Bush administration imposed punitive import duties on certain steel products from several
countries, includingJapan. See id. at 149.
528. Id.
529. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established as a Secretariat in August 1967
in Bangkok by the five original member countries-Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN in 1984; Vietnam joined in 1995; Lao PDR and Myanmar joined in 1997;
and Cambodia joined in 1999. For more information about ASEAN's membership and organizational structure, see its official website at http://www.aseansec.org.
530. ASEAN's founding document, the so-called Bangkok Declaration, was merely a political statement,
requiring no ratification. See ASEAN Declaration [Bangkok Declaration), Aug. 8, 1967, available at http://
www.aseansec.org/1212.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
531. Id.
532. FrameworkAgreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (Jan. 28, 1992), ASEAN, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1l65.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter AFTA]. ASEAN has added
several protocols to the AFTA, which are available on its website at: http://www.aseansec.org/12039.hun.
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the target dates for complete elimination of all tariffs by the original AFTA members is
set to be accomplished by 2010 and by 2015 for the newer members. Although ASEAN
characterizes AFTA has a big success and claims that its goals have now all been virtually
established,"' many economists and scholars are skeptical of these claims, pointing to the
nontransparent means by which these alleged results were computed,53 4 and prompting
some scholars to characterize the advancement towards the achievement of AFTAs target deadlines a struggle."' In 2002, the six original members appeared to have lowered
most of their tariffs to the target level of 5 percent, a deadline originally set for 2008. Yet,
despite this seeming success, the relatively low levels of intra-ASEAN trade have lessened
the efficiency gains that could have been realized had trade been more robust. 36 Moreover,
some members, most prominently Singapore, have become so impatient with the various
loopholes in the AFTA and its later protocols, their many exceptions, and AFTAs deference to the foot-dragging ASEAN members, they have gone outside AFTA to set up their
own bilateral trade agreements."3 Notwithstanding AFTAs tendency to generate other free
trade agreements, some scholars have praised it as being the most rationally sound trade
agreement in East Asia, given the members' geographic proximity, similar sizes, and other
commonalities. 5 '
In 1990, Malaysia proposed forming another group, the East Asian Economic Caucus
(EEAC), whose membership was narrower than APEC's, but broader than ASEAN's. Like
ASEAN, EEAC's organization was non-legalistic, but its purpose seemed more centered
on the promotion of Asian values and shared opposition to Western policies. Both the
United States and Australia opposed the group's formation for fear that it would diminish
APEC's role in the region, leaving them out of the dialogue. 3 9 The EEAC initiative eventually morphed into a successor group known as ASEAN+3, which initially included all the
ASEAN members, with Japan, China, and South Korea joining the association in 1995.1 40
Although, like APEC and ASEAN, ASEAN+3 is not formalized by any binding, multilateral treaty and has an extremely loose organizational structure, it has nonetheless played an
important role in promoting the interests of East Asia and encouraging the region's economic integration. Since the Asian debt crisis of 1997-98, the ten ASEAN countries have
initiated a regular series of meetings at the cabinet and ministerial levels with their counterparts from Japan, China, and Korea, respectively.54' These annual, high profile conferences

533. For a detailed ASEAN description of AFTXs alleged effects, see ASEAN's website at http://www.aseansec.org/12021.htm.
534. See LINCOLN, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM, supra note 487, at 172.
535. Teofilo C. Daquila & Le Huu Huy, Singapore andASEAN in the GlobalEconomy: The Case of Free Trade
Agreements, 43 ASIAN Sonr. 908, 912 (2003) [hereinafter Daquila & Huy, Singapore and ASEAN].
536. Low levels of intra-ASEAN trade may be attributable to the fact that ASEAN's members' economies
and industries were more competitive than complementary of each other. See LINCOLN, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC
REGIONALISM, supra note 487, at 152.

537. See Daquila & Huy, Singapore and ASEAN, supra note 535.
538. See, e.g., LINCOLN, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM, supra note 487, at 168"69, 174.
539. See id. at 155-56.

540. The ASEAN+3 group has no formal secretariat, as all of its meetings are held in the host country. For a
detailed description of the ASEAN+ 3 group and its initiatives, see the ASEAN official website at http://www.

aseansec.org/16580.hnn.
541. Sometimes these meetings are held on an ASEAN-plus-three basis and sometimes on an ASEAN-plusone basis, the latter arrangement allowing the ASEAN consortium to focus more closely on the details of its
relationships with each of the other three larger countries-China, Japan, and South Korea, respectively.
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include meetings of the countries' ministers of foreign
affairs, trade and investment, and
5 42
finance, in addition to meetings by heads of state.
The importance of ASEAN and its spin-off ASEAN+3 derives primarily from several key
initiatives they have facilitated aimed at enhancing the trade relationships between ASEAN
and the larger economic players in the region, namely China and Japan.143 In what could
become ASEAN's crowning and most significant achievement, a new free trade agreement
between the Peoples Republic of China and the ten ASEAN countries (CAFTA) entered
into force onJanuary 1,2005,"44 obligating China and the original ASEAN members, including Singapore, to establish free trade in goods by the year 2010, with the newer ASEAN
countries being required to establish free trade by 2015.54s The CAFTA employs the MFN
principle on a reciprocal basis to eliminate discrimination in goods, and Japan and South
546
Korea, the other two members of ASEAN+ 3, are presently not part of the agreement.
47
block.1
Not surprisingly, CAFTA has the potential to become the world's largest trading
If it is successful, CAFTA will surpass the EU and the NAFTA in terms of the size of the
economic region it encompasses (i.e., 1.7 billion consumers), and the total estimated trade
it could help generate (i.e., $1.23 trillion [U.S.]).148 It is not clear, however, that CAFTA
will live up to its expectations. Scholars have pointed to the fact that the trading patterns
of Southeast Asia and China are in more of a competitive posture than a complimentary
one.549 The parties to the trade agreement are all primarily oriented toward exporting their
manufactured products to the same industrialized countries, including the United States
and Japan, not to each other.5 0 Thus, while the signing of the China-ASEAN free-trade
agreement is a remarkable development in itself, and certainly evinces China's growing
economic power and influence in East Asia, there remains a big question as to whether it
can be carried out. There is no guarantee that CAFTA will generate the estimated levels of
trade in East Asia, and the hoped-for efficiency gains.
Although Japan is not a party to CAFTA, its diplomatic and economic policies have
clearly played an important role in strengthening the informal regional network that is

542. In 1999, representatives of the ASEAN+3 countries hammered out a joint declaration dedicating
themselves to achieving the objectives of continuing structural reforms, strengthening economic and political
ties, enhancing monetary and financial cooperation within the region, and intensifying their cooperative efforts
with the U.N. and the WTO. See ASEAN+3 Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, ASEAN+3 Summit
Meeting, Manila, Philippines, Nov., 28, 1999, availableat http://www.aseansec.org/5301.htm.
543. The Chiang Mai Initiative, undertaken in Chiang Mai, Thailand in 2000, is one of the major achievements of the ASEAN+3 group. It advocated a series of agreements among the central banks in the region to
swap their foreign exchange reserves with one another, thereby spreading and attenuating their inherent volatility risk in an effort to stabilize their currencies on the foreign exchange markets. For an overview of other
ASEAN+3 initiatives, see ASEAN's official web site, http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm.
544. See CAFTA, supra note 486, art. 23(1) (Entry into Force).
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. See Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, The Logic of Cbina-ASEAN FTA: Economic Statecraft of"Peacefiul Ascen-

dancy," in CHINA

AND SOUTHEsST ASIA:GLOBAL CtANES AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES

17, 26 (Ho Khai Leong &

Samuel C.Y. Ku eds., 2005) [hereinafter Wei-Cheng Wang, China-ASEAN FTA].
548. See ASEAN-CHINA EXPERT GROUP ON EcoNoMic COOPERATION, FORGING CLOSER ASEAN-CHNA
EcoNoMic RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2, 30 (2001), available at http://www.aseansec.org/newdata/aseanchi.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
549. SeeJohn Wong & Sarah Chan, China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Shaping Future Economic Relations,
43 AsiAN SuRv. 507, 517 (2003).
550. See id.
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emerging in East Asia. The Asian debt crisis of 1997-98 gave Japan new opportunities to
strengthen its somewhat paternalistic role in the region. Desiring to establish itself as the
de facto leader of East Asia, but not wanting to alarm its neighbors or the United States by
advocating formal institutions, Japan has sought to bind the region by unilaterally increasing its own level of foreign aid and investments in nearby developing countries; finessing
its historically troubled relationship with China by making diplomatic overtures (especially

following China's Tiananmen Square Massacre), and attempting to speak for Asia at international meetings."5 ' All of these actions demonstrate Japan's aspiration to build an informal
East Asian economic block, with Japan at its hub, which would enable Japan to more rigorously pursue its own economic agenda.
At the 2003 ASEAN+ 1 summit meeting in Tokyo, Japan and ASEAN leaders executed
the Tokyo Declaration," 2 pledging the countries to form a closer East Asian community,
and to consider implementing various trade liberalizations by the year 2012. The Tokyo
Declaration, however, is broadly drafted, covers many areas, and does not begin to approximate a regional free trade agreement on the order of CAFTA. In fact, the provisions mentioning trade barriers are rather vague, reflecting Japan's historical reluctance to open its
borders to free trade and unbridled foreign investment.
Thus, despite Japan's recent commitments and its continual reminders to the ASEAN
countries of its long and mature relationship to Southeast Asia, China has seized much
of the momentum for economic integration in East Asia. Compared to China's commitment to form an explicit free-trade zone, Japan's recent proposals for lowering barriers
to cross-border trade and investment appear hesitant and vague, its commitment seems
comparatively weak, and its leadership role rather faltering. Thus, while China's star is
rising, Japan's presumed role as East Asia's putative leader and spokes-nation appears to
be fading.
XIII. Whither the Direction of International Tax Regulation?
The foregoing discussion has delineated the major deficiencies in the OECD bilateral
tax treaty network553 and evaluated some major alternatives to bilateralism, including the
advantages and drawbacks of forming an explicit multilateral tax treaty; a supranational
body similar to the WTO; and cooperative tax agreements under the umbrellas of existing
regional free-trade areas.554 This Part XIII is devoted to my claim that, despite its flaws and
weaknesses, the OECD bilateral tax treaty network, which operates within the informal,
multilateral, consensus seeking framework provided by the OECD and its Model Treaty,
is still the best institutional approach for allocating international tax authority, given the
broad spectrum of economies, domestic tax rules, and diverse political regimes. Not only
does the informal OECD network appear to be the most promising alternative in terms of
its dedication to preserving the traditional tax policy objectives of "neutrality, efficiency,

551. See LINCOLN, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM, stupra note 487, at 153-55.
552. Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and EnduringJapan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium,
Dec. 12, 2003, availableat http://www.aseansec.org/15500.htm [hereinafter Tokyo Declaration].
553. See discussion supra Part XII.A.
554. See supra Part XII.B (discussing a binding multilateral treaty based on the OECD Model Treaty), Part
XII.C (evaluating the possibility of using a supranational institution like the WTO to enhance international
tax cooperation), and Part XII.D (exploring the viability of using regional free trade agreements as models for
harmonizing national tax systems, especially in the diverse Asian-Pacific and East Asian regions).
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certainty and simplicity, effectiveness and fairness, and flexibility, '... it also appears to be
the most pragmatic and economically efficient option available."5 6 An informal network,
like that provided by the OECD, is better than the institutional alternatives at preserving
nations' fiscal sovereignty; maintaining flexibility by providing alternative standards and
soft law enforcement mechanisms; and proceeding organically towards the goal of global
tax cooperation through transgovernmental channels of communication and less restrictive,
bilateral links. But, to adapt to the challenges posed by the digital commerce revolution,
and the increased integration and mobility of multinational firms, the OECD network will
have to change. If the network fails to flexibly evolve in a way that incorporates the interests
of more diverse economies, the risks that international tax cooperation will be weakened by
regionalism will rise.
This Part is divided into four sections. The first describes how the bilateral tax treaty
network is exhibiting certain synergistic attributes, known in economics as network effects,
which serve to increase the value and utility of the network to participating Contracting
States, especially as it expands. In particular, so-called transgovernmentalnetworks, comprised
of Contracting States' national tax administrators, competent authorities, and contributing academics, appear to be serving a key cooperative function by dialoguing, increasing
information flows, establishing informal standards and expectations to bolster compliance
with explicit treaty rules and principles, resolving taxpayer disputes, and also addressing
systemic problems within the broad parameters of the bilateral network, thereby lowering
transactions costs. The second section seeks to defend the bilateral tax treaty network from
the sharp criticisms it has received, and argues that rather than it being time to completely
replace the network and substitute a different institutional approach, it is time to recognize
the OECD's growing status and value as the world's informal international tax organization. The third section focuses again on the newJapan-U.S. Tax Treaty, and considers the
extent to which it is signaling new norms and inspiring reforms-particularly in Asia, where
many developing countries are only now negotiating modern tax treaties. In this context,
the continued viability of the alleged anachronistic principles, income source and taxpayer
residency, as a means to delineate nations' tax sovereignty is finally evaluated.
A. NETWORK

EFFECTS OF

OECD

BILATERAL

TAx TREATIES

In the economics literature, "network effects" has generally referred to a group of theories
focused on the question of whether and to what extent "the utility that a user derives from
consumption of a good [or service] increases with the number of other agents consuming
the good [or service].""' In other words, a network effect exists where a consumer of a good
or service, or a user of the network, finds that the good, service, or network, has greater
utility and value as more consumers buy the good, subscribe to the service, or plug-in to the

555. See OECD Ottawa Taxation Framework, supranote 310 (reiterating "a set of broad taxation principles
that should apply to e-commerce" that were part of the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions adopted at the
Ottawa OECD Ministerial Conference in 1998).
556. These claims are offered hypothetically since more empirical analyses are needed to fully substantiate
them. The economic network effects of the OECD's bilateral tax treaty consortium would likely be an interesting and fruitful area for further study.
557. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON.
REv. 424, 424 (1985) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities]; See also
Philip H. Dybvig & Chester
S. Spat, Adoption Erternalitiesas Public Goods, 20 J. PUB. EcoN. 231, 231-32 (1983).
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network. The term network effects has been applied not only to situations where the thing
being acquired is identical to the things being acquired by others, but also to circumstances
where the value of the thing being acquired increases because another person or entity has
something that is compatible with it."' The analysis of the network effects of various organizations and business cultures has become increasingly popular in the law-and-economics
literature.5 9 However, the phenomenon of network effects is not new or novel; rather, it is
ancient and pervasive. For example, any language exhibits network effects because the benefits of being able to speak and understand the language increase as the language becomes
more common. The Internet provides an obvious example of network effects since the
benefits of being connected to it increase as more websites, people, and organizations are
accessible on-line. Likewise, the value of Microsoft Windows increases, and the value of
other incompatible operating systems generally decrease, as Windows becomes more dominant in the marketplace. Moreover, software and systems that are merely compatible with
Windows become more valuable. Linux is Window's competitor, but even it may indirectly
benefit from the network effects of Window's dominance to the extent that it generates new
software developers for Linux.
One way of analyzing the effects of networks is to view them along a spectrum where
networks employing tangible, physical links (e.g., telephone or Internet connections) are
situated at one end, networks employing less tangible links are situated at the other end
(e.g., informal discussion groups), and networks employing virtual links are in between
(e.g., software users).160 Physical, virtual, and intangible networks can generate positive,
value-adding effects, characterized by extensive information sharing, brainstorming, collaborating, and joint problem solving, among others benefits. Conversely, all networks can
exhibit negative effects, which can be triggered by various causes, including overuse and
congestion on the network. To take a simple example, if the network of freeways leading
into New York City is overused, gridlock can result, lowering the value of that particular
network. When the costs of using the network of highways exceed the benefits, users will
search for and choose another network, like subways or water taxis.
Networks can result in a phenomenon known in the economics literature as lock-in,
when an emerging standard quickly spreads throughout the network to the point of displacing competing standards-even ones that may be inherently superior in the long run.
Thus, the lock-in effect or tipping as it is sometimes called, can lead to inefficiencies when
a particular standard is popularized and becomes dominant in a network, not because it
is necessarily superior to other standards, but rather due to the jump-on-the-bandwagon
effect. Because network users need to communicate with each other, a particular language
or standard can be so promoted among the users that at some point, the network itself

558. See Lemley & McGowan, Legal Implications ofNetworks, supra note 334, at 483 (citingJoseph Farrell &
Garth Saloner, Standardization,Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. EcoN. 70, 70 (1985)).
559. See, e.g., Katz & Shapiro, Network Euternalities,supra note 557; Lemley & McGowan, Legal Implications
ofNetworks, supra note 334; Robert B Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation
of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CALIF. L. REv. 277 (2003); Michael Klausner, Corporations,CorporateLaw, and
Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 764 n.16 (1995); Dennis W Carlton &J. Mark Kiamer, The Need for
CoordinationAmong Firms,with SpecialReference to Network Industries, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 446, 450 n.15 (1983);
DoUGLAsS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 7-8 (1990) (very
broad application of both path dependence and network effects).
560. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture ofInternationalCooperation:TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future
ofInternationalLaw,43 VA. INT'L L. 1, 63 (2002) [hereinafter Raustiala, International Cooperation].
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seems to generate the momentum for the resulting dominance of the language or standard.
The well known contest between VHS and Betamax to dominate the videotape world is
often used to illustrate the lock-in effect. VHS became the dominant standard, not because
it necessarily had superior technology, but rather because VHS was able to acquire more
users to the point that it had a tipping effect. This lock-in tendency of networks is the
motive underlying the common practice of software companies like Microsoft, as well as
Internet providers like MSN, to distribute copies of their software packages or even web
browsers for free. They recognize that one of the economic effects of networks is that they
tend to create standards as the network expands, and as it expands, both the users and the
proprietor of the standard usually benefit.
1. Directand Indirect Effects of OECD-basedBilateralTax Treaties
Obviously, the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, standing alone (i.e., without regard to the OECD
tax treaty network) benefits the taxpayers of both countries by immediately lowering crossborder transaction costs and mitigating risks associated with uncertainty and lack of information. To the extent that tax barriers to trade between Japan and the United States are
lowered, CEN is served,56' ostensibly increasing global welfare (assuming that the econom5 62
ic distortions caused by any trade diversion do not exceed the levels of trade creation).
These benefits are generally derived from the bilateral treaty itself, not from the larger,
informal OECD network of bilateral treaties, of which the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is a part.
Technically, these inherent benefits are not network effects.
Network effects can be direct or indirect. The fact that the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is part
of the OECD network generates benefits to the taxpayers, to Japan and the United States
as sovereign countries, and to third-party countries that have similar bilateral tax treaties.
Direct network effects result from the immediate increase in value that other countries
belonging to the tax treaty network experience as a result of an additional treaty being
added to the network. However, compared to a multilateral treaty, the direct effects of
negotiating a new bilateral tax treaty are more limited because third-party countries cannot
take advantage of the latter. Whereas a user of the Internet is able to connect directly to all
other Internet users, a resident of Japan, for example, can normally only claim reduced tax
rates on cross-border income pursuant to the bilateral tax treaties that Japan has entered
63
into because residency is one of the prerequisites for that treaty benefit. Ajapanese resident cannot claim a reduced withholding rate on a Chilean-sourced royalty since Japan has
no tax treaty with Chile, even though both Japan and Chile have bilateral tax treaties based
on the OECD Model with other countries, and are thus members of the informal OECD
Tax Treaty network.
However, as more bilateral tax treaties are added to the informal OECD network, an
indirect effect is the increased value and utility of the network to numerous countries
around the world, not only to those that are formal members of the OECD, but also to
non-member countries that have treaties based on the OECD Model, to developing countries that have treaties based on the U.N. Model (which is similar to the OECD Model),
and to countries that seek to form cooperative tax agreements in the future. The indirect
561. See Part II supra discussion providing a discussion of a possible explanation for capital export neutrality CEN.
562. SeeJAcoB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNIoN, Issue 44(1950).
563. See Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 1,at art. 1(1).
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benefits of an expanding, robust, bilateral treaty network are extremely diverse and not
always easy to identify, let alone quantify. They are defined, in part, by the beneficiary's
identity and posture. In this context, indirect network effects can include, inter alia, access
to a common set of tax treaty articles, well-known principles, and recurrent issues arising out of the network's overwhelming reliance on the OECD Model Tax Treaty; broader
access to OECD enforcement efforts and to information about taxpayer activities in other
countries; 516 the opportunity to discuss and ideate beliefs concerning the proper interpretation and application of tax treaty provisions,5 65 as well as the best methods for handling
recurrent issues like transfer pricing techniques, financial instruments, hybrid transactions,
electronic commerce, treaty shopping, and harmful tax subsidy competition; increased
opportunities to promote certain regulatory standards within the network;566 harmonization of treaty policies; and the cost savings associated with the ability to obtain off-the-shelf
tax regulation, which is effectively provided by the OECD Model Tax Treaty.
According to the economic theory, the addition of the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty to
the OECD network will generate many, if not most, of these network effects. As further
discussed below, the network makes it more likely that certain provisions in the new Treaty, such as its complete elimination of withholding tax on certain categories of portfolio
income," 7 will set a new global standard and become an objective in treaty negotiation.
Moreover, the mere fact that the world's two largest industrial giants have negotiated a
new OECD-based bilateral tax treaty, incorporating what ostensibly is the latest thinking
on some difficult issues, has the effect of affirming for other countries in the network, that
this bilateral method of obtaining international tax cooperation is not being degraded or
in serious danger of being replaced by another institution in the near future. This strong
affirmation enhances the reputational value of other bilateral tax treaties (especially those
with similar, updated provisions), as well as the prestige of belonging to the network.
a. Standardizationin OECDNetwork-Risk of Lock-In
As mentioned, networks have a tendency to standardize rules and regulations. This effect
is evinced by the rapid and widespread adoption of bilateral treaties based on the OECD
Model, which now number over 2500 treaties. Networks increase the incentives for regulatory convergence because the more similar a particular nation's laws, tax rules, and treaties
are to other jurisdictions' laws, rules, and treaties, the easier it is to transact business, access
markets, and create political alliances. As the OECD network has expanded, so too have
the incentives for countries to adopt the Model's standard treaty provisions. Frequently,
the policies that have become the Model's standards were borrowed (or exported) from the
more influential nations belonging to the network. For example, Articles 10, 11, and 12,
allocating to the Residence State most of the authority to tax portfolio income, became the
part of the 1920s' Compromise reflected in the OECD Model because that allocation rule
564. See supra Part XI.B. (discussing Exchange-of-Information article (Article 26) in the Japan-U.S. Tax
Treaty).
565. See supra
Part XI.A. (discussing Mutual Agreement Procedure (Article 25) of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty).
566. See supraPart VI (discussing the likely impact of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty's treatment of fiscally
transparent and hybrid entities in Article 4(6) and noting that "because it is the world's two largest economic
powers that have agreed to this complex but useful provision... their inclusion of it may signal ... a growing
consensus that the OECD's approach to fiscally transparent entities is pragmatic and the best solution... ").
567. See supra Part WA. (discussing the elimination of withholding tax on royalties, certain dividends, and
certain categories of interest).
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6
served the interests of the influential, industrialized countries. The U.N. Model, which
is more closely aligned with the interests of developing countries, allows the Source State
to tax portfolio income at higher rates, which serves the interests of developing countries.
Of course, one of the most salient examples of regulatory convergence within the OECD
tax treaty network is the OECD's adoption of the arm's length standard for pricing transactions between associated enterprises.57 Again, because the industrialized countries are the
ones that have most frequently been faced with transfer pricing issues, their standard was
the one adopted by the network.571
Once a regulatory standard becomes dominant in a network, there is often little incentive
for states to change course, even if a more efficient standard exists, because the costs of making
the switch seem too high. As earlier discussed, many tax scholars have argued vociferously that
the arm's length standard for pricing inter-company transactions has reached the tipping point
within the OECD network, causing it to be locked-in even though a formulary apportionment
method would, according to them, be a better alternative in a world where firms are increas57
ingly integrated and mobile, and transactions increasingly digital and invisible. Clearly there
are reasons to be concerned that the 1920s' Compromise of allocating tax authority between
countries on the basis of income source and taxpayer residence has become an inadequate
and outdated allocation method. These principles were adopted in another era when business enterprises were usually identifiable by the bricks and mortar that housed them. Value
creation in the new, electronic, global marketplace strains many other key treaty concepts like
permanent establishment and arm's length price, making income allocation more difficult. The
ambiguous site of firms exacerbates the dual threats of noncompliance and double taxation.
Proponents of formulary apportionment believe that the existing system of bilateral tax treaties
is just not up to the task of handling the challenges posed by globalization and electronic commerce. Some contend that the Information Age necessitates a whole new supranational institu573
tion to replace the bilateral network, so that new allocation rules can be administered.
However, this contention is paradoxical because the risk that an inefficient standard will
get locked into an explicit network (e.g., a network circumscribed by a binding multilateral
treaty), is theoretically greater than the risk existing in a nonbinding, virtual network like
the informal OECD consortium. Indeed, it could be argued the EU's network of Member
States is presently being infected by an inefficient standard for allocating income: the
74
European Court ofJustice's unbridled nondiscrimination doctrine, which some well-versed

568. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing how nonindustrialized countries, wanting their
own model tax treaty, signed treaties based on the United Nations Model Tax Treaty, which more strongly
reflects the Mexico Model (i.e., source based taxation) than the London Model (i.e., residence based taxation).
(However, because the U.N. Model has relied on the 1977 OECD Model as its starting point, the framework
and much of the textual language of the two models is similar.)
569. See discussion supra note 35.
570. See supra Part V (discussing how the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty imposes the arm's length standard) and
Part XII.C.2 (evaluating the advantages and weaknesses of the formula apportionment method, as opposed to
the arm's length standard).
571. See infra Part XIU.B.3 (setting forth a brief overview in the footnotes of the development of transfer
pricing rules in the OECD, the U.S., Japan, and China).
572. See supra Part XI.C.2, notes 389-91 and 394-404 (citing scholars who favor some kind of formula
apportionment method, and evaluating such method).
573. See id.
574. See supra Part XII.D.3.b (discussing recent decisions of the ECJ invalidating EU Member States' tax
laws on grounds they infringed one of more of the four freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty).
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international tax scholars believe leads to an incoherent result. 7 Network theorists have
observed that open and informal networks, as opposed to closed and explicit ones, usually
provide an environment where network members have opportunities to choose among a
multiplicity of alternate standards, thus mitigating the risk that an inefficient standard will
become dominant, displacing more efficient ones. Indeed, one of the principle tenets of
antitrust jurisprudence is that fair competition in a marketplace serves the policy objective of economic efficiency. 76 Although proponents of formulary apportionment contend
that a supranational tax institution like the WTO would be better equipped than the loose
OECD consortium of bilateral treaty partners at selecting the most efficient international
tax rules, that contention contravenes market principles and rational choice theory, which
argues that rational, self-interested actors (e.g., Nation States or market participants) are
extremely good at making efficient choices if they have adequate information and opportunities to act.577
2. TransgovernmentalNetworks
A fundamental question now facing the OECD countries is whether electronic commerce
is so dissimilar from traditional forms of commerce as to merit a paradigm shift in the existing
international tax order. The answer to this question will depend on whether the OECD's transgovernmental network can dissuade competing tax policy architectures by garnering sufficient
resources in time to help governments create regulatory and fiscal environments that strike a
balance between the need to promote electronic commerce "and the need to secure a revenue
base on which so much government expenditure is based.1117 1 An ongoing debate is whether the
OECD's Model Treaty, and the architecture of bilateral agreements it has spawned, is designed
to handle this challenge. Fifteen years ago, Professor Richard Vann of Australia noted that as
the OECD bilateral tax treaty network expands, the more difficult it is for the entire network
to accept a major change in the OECD Model or to take a novel approach:
Although it is possible to refine the actual terms of the OECD Model and to elaborate the commentary so as to cover new cases as they arise, the time has passed for radical revision within
the current bilateral framework. In a sense the opportunity to go in another direction was lost
before the 1963 draft appeared. The failure to adopt any new approach to international tax after
575. See Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination,supra note 252, at 1219 (arguing that regulating the
division of the tax base between source and residence countries in the EU, from a principle of nondiscrimination as articulated by the ECJ "ultimately produces an incoherent result.").
576. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of
a ProprietaryStandard(Feb. 1998), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=57515 (arguing that open standards
may be achieved in the open market. Where they are not, the law may intervene, but it must be cautious not
to overreach and to avoid disturbing the incentives provided by intellectual property protection.); Franklin M.
Fisher & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, United States v. Microsoft: An Economic Analysis, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (2001)
(commentary on the economic issues presented in the Microsoft antitrust case by two economists who testified
in the case); Nicholas Economides, The Microsoft Antitrust Case, (N.Y.U.Center for L. & Bus., Working Paper
No. 01-003, 2001), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=253083 (analyzing the legal and economic issues in
the landmark antitrust case, U.S. v. Microsoft, involving the propriety of antitrust intervention in network
industries). The roots of the neoclassical economic theory of general equilibrium stretch back to the Lausanne School of Economics, founded by Leon WValras and Vilfredo Pareto around the turn of the nineteenth
century.
577. See Marc-Andreas Muendler, The Evistence of Informationally Eficient Markets when Individuals are
Rational (Center for Econ. Stud. & Info. Inst. For Econ. Res. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1295, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=612142.
578. OECD Ottawa Taxation Framework, supra note 310, at 11.
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the Second World War (compared to trade law and the international monetary system) meant
that effectively the solution adopted after the First World War continued by default. In other
words, the OECD Model is the culmination of 50 years of development, rather than a new
departure." 9
Skeptical of the OECD network's flexibility, Professor Vann has been one of the more
vocal proponents of adopting a whole new GATT-like approach to tax cooperation, which
5 s0
However, as mentioned, a
he says would be an optimal model for the Asian Pacific region.
of a large internationdoubtful
not
as
are
scholars
and
legal
of
economists
growing number
al network's ability to evolve, and seem confident of a network's ability to support the sover8
eignty of Nation States and to supplement the States' existing treaty relationships." ' This
theory, known as transgovernmentalism, has emerged in the international relations literatures as economies have become increasingly integrated. Transgovernmentalists believe:
that, despite many claims to the contrary, the [nation] state is not disappearing as the major
force in the international system. The state is instead disaggregatingfor purposes of cooperation: domestic officials are reaching out to their foreign counterparts regularly and directly
through networks, rather than through state-to-state negotiation of the kind that dominated
82
20th century cooperation."
To deal with the regulatory problems presented by the globalization process, transgovernmental networks are expanding rapidly and organically in many areas of international
law, including antitrust, environmental, securities, and tax law. These loosely structured
networks are typified by 'direct interaction between domestic officials, agency regulators,
and academics; peer-to-peer meetings and conferences formed to study specified problems; and joint policy-making activities, including the establishment of special task forces
and goals aimed at achieving higher levels of international cooperation. The networks are
transgovernmental (rather than international) because they typically function with minimal
8 3
interference by high level, national bureaucrats."
The OECD is an example of a transgovernmental network even though it has an established secretariat structure. Even its name-the Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and
Development-seems to subscribe to the whole theory of transgovernmentalism. On closer
examination, the progress that the OECD has made on its recent initiatives addressing major
problems presented by globalization demonstrate that the OECD's strategy of relying heavily on soft law without binding commitments, monitoring, and peer-to-peer policy making

579. Vann, Treatyfor the Asian-Pacific?,supra note 30, at 103 (citation omitted).
580. See id. at 160-63.
581. Raustiala, International Cooperation, supra note 560, at 6 ("Under some conditions networks should
make treaties work better. Under other conditions networks perform a gap-filling role."); cf, David Zaring,
Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in InternationalAdministration, 5 Cm. J. INT'L L. 547 (2005) (The internationalization of regulation "has occurred quiedy--not through laws passed by legislatures, treaties agreed to
by executives, or mandates lain down by international organizations such as the United Nations. Instead, the
internationalization of regulation has happened informally, and the primary impetus for its development has
been domestic bureaucracies themselves."). See also Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrustPossible?, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501, 1504 (1998) ("The incentives facing individual countries make it extremely difficultperhaps impossible-to negotiate substantive international antitrust agreements.").
582. Raustiala, International Cooperation, supra note 560, at 10-11 (citing Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of InternationalPolitics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513 (1997)); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
InternationalLaw in a World ofLiberalStates, 6 EuR.J. INT'L L. 503 (1995) (footnote omitted).
583. See Raustiala, International Cooperation, supra note 560, at 9-11, 63-64.
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through its Technical Advisory Groups, is increasingly effective at getting governments to take
coordinated steps to adapt their tax regimes to the Information Age. Specific OECD initiatives
include the OECD's Transfer Pricing Guidelines; the 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition; the E-Commerce Tax Report and Recommendations; the Bank Secrecy Report; the
Financial Task Force Money Laundering Report; and amendments to the Model Tax Treaty
itself184 The impact of these OECD initiatives extends far beyond the countries that are formal
members of the OECD club."'5 Indeed, some international legal scholars might go so far as
to predict that the OECD, which typifies a transgovernmental network, will prove to be "the
optimal form of organization for the Information Age."" 6 While this characterization seems
overstated given the glaring deficiencies in the present level of international tax cooperation,
many scholars seem too eager to go back to the tax policy drawing board and start from scratch,
not recognizing the relative success of the OECD's recent initiatives." 7
B. OECD TAx TREATY

NETWORK: EVOLVING AND ADDING VALUE

Despite the rapid proliferation of bilateral tax treaties since World War II, both bilateralism and the OECD's informal approach to obtaining international tax cooperation have
come under heavy attack from critics, especially since the digital revolution of the 1990s
transformed the way business was conducted. Part XII of this article explored several major

alternatives to the present system, including the possibilities of forming a binding multilateral
tax treaty based on the OECD Model's text, creating a supranational tax institution similar to
the WTO, and expanding the purview of regional trade agreements to include international
tax issues. None of these alternatives seem convincingly viable. This section seeks to defend
the OECD Model Tax Treaty and the OECD as an institution, using examples provided by
the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty. My main claim is that despite its weaknesses, the OECD's system
of bilateral tax treaties, which operates within an informal, transgovernmental network, still
provides the most optimal approach for achieving effective tax cooperation between diverse
national economies and tax regimes in the Information Age. In addition, methods to improve
the present system to surmount its current challenges are suggested at the end.
1. Does the Nonbinding Nature of the OECD Network Hurt or Help
Tax Cooperation?

a. Criticism
Those calling for a new supranational institution to oversee the development of international tax policy have long contended that a major weakness of the present international
tax system is that the OECD has no explicit power to bind its members, enforce the tax
584. See Cockfield, OECD as Informal World Tax Organization, supra note 393, at 184; Ault, International
Cooperationin ForgingTax Policy, supra note 353, at 1696 (noting the OECD's accomplishments in achieving
international tax cooperation without binding commitments).
585. Some scholars, who are skeptical of the OECD's impact and have called for a paradigm shift in international tax cooperation, have observed that developing countries tend to identify the OECD "as the rich
countries' club." Revven S. Avi-Yonah, Treating Tax Issues Through Trade Regimes, supra note 315, at 1689.
586. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (Michael
Byers ed., 2000) (arguing that transgovernmental networks, in general, will prove to be the "optimal form of
organization in the Information Age.").
587. See supra Part XII.C.2, notes 389-91 and 394-404 (citing scholars who favor some kind of formula
apportionment method, and evaluating such method).
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treaties based on its Model, or sanction countries that breach tax treaty norms. They argue
that international tax cooperation suffers from the fact that the OECD Model Tax Treaty
is merely a recommended draft, open to different interpretations by various Contracting
States, creating conflicts in the application of identical treaty provisions. A binding multilateral treaty, according to critics, would obviate the need to renegotiate numerous tax
agreements each time the OECD alters its consensus.
b. Defense
The fact that the OECD Model Tax Treaty is not explicitly binding lies at the heart of its
astonishingly high level of acceptance. Sovereign nations find it easier to enter bilateral agreements than multilateral agreements, which require a greater sacrifice of their tax sovereignty.
The Model's success is evinced by the fact that there are now over 2500 bilateral tax treaties,
8
the vast majority of them with structural features similar to the OECD Model Tax Treaty."'
Apart from sovereignty concerns, a second reason why the OECD has been so successful in
advancing its Model, as well as its many proposals concerning complex and sensitive tax issues,
is that countries can incorporate as many or as few of the propounded rules and principles as
they wish in their tax treaties and related practices. The OECD's lists of best practices, like
the OECD Model Tax Treaty itself, are not put forth as binding multilateral agreements or
even strict templates, but rather as recommendations and suggested blueprints. This soft law
method is effective. More often than not, new treaties, like that between Japan and the United
States, incorporate the OECD's latest thinking on various problems.8 9
Given all the hype over the potential benefits of strong-form convergence, it is somewhat
ironic that the OECD has steadily built a multilateral consensus on so many thorny tax
issues. Although the OECD's power is not explicit, its influence is obvious. One can read
virtually any bilateral tax treaty and find one's way around the document; the numbers of
the articles are usually identical, the texts are strikingly similar, and virtually all Contracting States look to the OECD's official Commentaries for guidance on the articles' proper
interpretation and application."' 0 Indeed, the American Law Institute has observed that
"[t]he OECD Model [Tax Treaty] has almost acquired the status of a multilateral agreement."5 91 Although not legally binding, the OECD Model is a rules-based instrument that
has been forged through a multilateral, consensus-seeking process. Would this document
have achieved the present level of international tax cooperation if it had, instead, been
advanced as a legally binding, multilateral agreement, restricting the signatory countries' powers to design and impose taxes on the vast majority of cross-border transactions

588. See supra note 296 and sources1 cited therein.
589. See supra Parts IV-XH.
590. The text of the United Nations Model Convention is based on the text of the OECD Model Tax
Treaty. Not surprisingly, the Commentaries to the OECD Model are often used to aid in the interpretation of
similar articles of non-OECD bilateral treaties, such as those based on the U.N. Model. See BAKER, DOUBLE
TAx CowvENTrroNs, supra note 30, at 31. Because the U.N. Model allocates more tax from investment income
to the Source State, more developing countries rely on the U.N. Model when drafting bilateral tax treaties,
while industrialized countries use the OECD Model Treaty. The Introduction to the OECD Model Treaty
notes that its impact "has extended far beyond the OECD area." OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29,

1 14-15 (2005).
591. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT - INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED
STATES INCOME T4ATION II, PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAx TREATIES 3 (1992).
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affecting them in the future? It is doubtful, given that the power to tax is the very "lifeblood
'
of government,"'592
and not lightly yielded.'
Despite its weaknesses, the present system of bilateral tax treaties has the singular advantage that each treaty can be tailored to account for the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of
each Contracting State's tax system and legal culture. Given the limited state of global
economic and legal convergence, the bilateral tax treaty is a relatively expedient way of
knitting together the nitty-gritty details of each Contracting State's tax system within a general framework of international consensus respecting tax rules and treaty interpretation as
expressed in the OECD Model Treaty and the official Commentaries thereto. Although the
Commentaries to the Model are not legally binding, they have gained widespread acceptance as an important tool of treaty interpretation.194
Accordingly, while the OECD Model Tax Treaty is not a binding multilateral agreement,
it has been broadly influential, providing a multilateral platform extending well beyond the
small circle of approximately thirty official OECD member countries. The Model has been
used as a basic document of reference in treaty negotiations between non-Member States,
between states participating in regional tax agreements, including the European Community, and most notably, in the revision of the United Nations Model Double Taxation
Convention between Developed and Developing Countries.5 95 Given the present direction
and recent accomplishments of the OECD, the influence of the OECD Model Tax Treaty
will likely become more widespread, and the OECD, as an institution, will likely earn its
96
increasing status as the informal world tax organization.1
2. Anachronisticand Rigid, or Realistic and Flexible?
a. Criticism
As mentioned, many scholars contend that treaties based on the OECD Model are too
vulnerable to exploitation because of their schedular layout of discrete income categories,
592. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935) (The U.S. Supreme Court observing that "taxes are the
lifeblood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need.").
593. Of course, a bilateral treaty is a negotiated limit on the Contracting States' power to tax. Unilateral
decisions to reduce tax rates can be viewed as market-induced limits on tax sovereignty. See McClure, Globalization, Tax Rules, supra note 393, at 328, 329-30, 339 (observing that U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill
expressed strong reservations in 2001 about U.S. participation in the OECD's efforts to fight so-called harmful
tax competition, ostensibly on efficiency and sovereignty grounds) (citing Press Release, U.S. Treas. Dept.
(May 10, 2001), availableat http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po366.htm).
594. ProfessorJohn E AveryJones of the United Kingdom has observed that "There is surely a case for saying
in the treaty itself that it is intended to be interpreted in accordance with the Commentary in force at the time of
[the treaty's] conclusion."John E AveryJones, Visiting Professor of Taxation at the London School of Economics,
and Sr. Partner at Speechly, Bircham, London, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture delivered at New York
University School of Law: Are Tax Treaties Necessary? (Sept. 25, 1997) in 53 Tax L. Rev. 1, 19 (1999) [hereinafter
J. E Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?]. See infra Part XI.B.4 (discussing how elevating the status
of the
OECD Commentaries would strengthen the present multilateral framework for international tax cooperation).
595. See United Nations Double Tax Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N.
Publications (New York, 1980, 2001) (reproducing many provisions and Commentaries of the OECD Model
Convention); Introduction to OECD Model Tax Treaty, 1 14 (2005).
596. See Cockfield, OECD as Informal World Tax Organization, supra note 393, at 136 (arguing that a
formal World Tax Organization, which could impose binding rules
on participating countries, is not truly necessary as evinced by the success of OECD in developing guiding principles and tax rules to confront challenges
posed by e-commerce); Ault, InternationalCooperationin ForgingTax Policy, supra note 353, at 1696 (questioning
the wisdom of making the OECD Model Tax Treaty more explicitly multilateral when international cooperation, without binding commitments, has accomplished so much to date).
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and their allocation of tax authority based the income's source, the taxpayer's residence, and
the so-called arm's length price. According to these critics, these concepts are anachronistic
and ambiguous, inviting manipulation. They argue that a supranational tax institution with
powers to issue binding tax rules would be preferable to the current system because the
supranational institution could introduce an entirely new method for allocating tax authority based on a uniform, global formula, thereby eliminating reliance on the anachronistic
principles of income source, taxpayer residence, and arm's length price.5 97
b. Defense
The concepts of taxpayer residence and income source derive from, and serve to support,
the territorial jurisdiction of the Nation State. The power of the Nation State is compromised to the extent these concepts are compromised as a method of dividing up international jurisdiction to tax cross-border transactions. Presently, there is not much to indicate
"that countries will soon engage in a massive surrender of national sovereignty over [their]
tax [policies]."5' 98 As the fifty-year European experiment has shown, even in regions where
there is a relatively high level of social and economic integration, harmonizing sovereign
states' direct taxes in a top-down fashion is extremely difficult, if not impossible.5 99 So far,
the EU has failed in that endeavor. The political obstacles in getting a sufficient number of
countries to cede sufficient levels of their taxing powers to a new supranational institution
in order to hammer out a whole new deal weakening their territorial jurisdiction appear
overwhelming, unrealistic, and utopian. Sovereign states are sovereign, and extremely
reluctant to relinquish their inherent powers of taxation, which they use to stimulate their
economies, fund public works, and institute social and economic reforms.
Although critics contend that the arm's length method of apportioning income in intercompany transactions has become increasingly arbitrary, their alternative is a simply a bad
idea. A worldwide system of formulary apportionment is fraught with procedural and technical problems, some of which have probably not surfaced. There is no guarantee that
worldwide formulary apportionment would be easier to administer than the present system,
or less vulnerable to manipulation. To the contrary, apportionment would depend heavily
on the identification of a unitary enterprise, an ambiguous concept that is bound to be
manipulated and to trigger continual disputes over the interpretation of applicable local
laws as any given enterprise expands or contracts over time.
Although electronic commerce and economic globalization have challenged the concepts of income source, residence, and arm's length transactions, there are many reasons
to believe that the present system is becoming more flexible and organic through the synergistic efforts of transgovernmental networks within the informal multilateral framework
spearheaded by the OECD. Increasingly, treaties based on the OECD Model Treaty are
replacing bright-line rules with more flexible principles. There are examples of this new
approach in the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty. For example, in Article 9, the arm's length
pricing methods set forth in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are explicitly incorporated as a source of authority under the Treaty on an ambulatory basis, meaning that references to the OECD Guidelines are to that document as it evolves over time. This flexible,

597. See supra Part XII.C.2, notes 389-91 and 394--404 (citing scholars who favor some kind of formula
apportionment method, and evaluating such method).
598. McClure, Globalization, Tax Rules, supra note 393, at 341.
599. See supra Part XII.D.3 (analyzing the EU's attempts to harmonize direct taxes).
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principles-based approach means that the Contracting States' obligations under the Treaty
may continue to evolve as the OECD Guidelines are updated to better reflect modern business practices.6
The treatment of partnerships and other fiscally transparent entities is another area in
which the OECD has encouraged Contracting States to replace rigid, bright-line tests with
flexible rules. As earlier explained, 65° Article 4(6) of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty essentially
codifies the basic approach of the OECD Report on Partnerships by establishing the general rule that one must look to the internal tax laws of the Residence State to determine
whether or not an entity is fiscally transparent and who is actually liable to tax. Thus, even
though the relevant Residence State or the relevant foreign laws of the Residence State
may change, Article 4(6)--requiring the State applying the Treaty to look to foreign law
to determine whether or not treaty benefits should be granted-will now operate to properly assign tax jurisdiction. This new, more flexible approach represents a radical departure
from the earlier promulgated treaty, which did not take into account the other State's tax
treatment. 602
The fact that the OECD is now encouraging more reliance on the decisions of the Contracting States' competent authorities through the Mutual Agreement Procedure is another
way flexibility is being infused into the system. Competent authorities are a major component of the OECD's transgovernmental network, because they allow bilateral treaty partners to work out solutions to their disputes without having to cede their sovereignty to a
supranational court or institution. 6°3 This flexibility is clearly evident in the text of the new
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty,6 4 which makes the countries' competent authorities the final arbiter
of many disputes arising under the Treaty. 6 Admittedly, without adequate guidelines, this

process can take on the spirit of a political compromise, which has prompted allegations
that the authorities are engaging in horse-trading and that the taxpayer is being denied the
6 6
benefit of a transparent process and well reasoned judicial decision . 0
3. Can CurrentNetwork Produce a Convergence of Tax Systems?

a. Criticism
Critics of the present bilateral tax treaty network contend that it is not likely to produce
much rule convergence-neither in nations' tax treaty practices, nor with respect to their
domestic tax regimes. One of Britain's leading tax scholars, John Avery Jones, maintains
that because bilateral tax treaties carry with them the incentive to maintain a bargaining
60 7
position, bilateral treaties discourage meaningful harmonization of domestic tax laws.
For example, if country X imposes exceedingly high withholding taxes on a foreign persons' X-source investment income, country X can use the prospect of lowering its high
withholding taxes as a bargaining chip in treaty negotiations to extract concessions from
600. See Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 9, 165; see supra Part V (discussing
transfer pricing rules in the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty).
601. See discussion supra Part VI.
602. OECD Report on Partnerships, supra Part VI.C.
603. See discussion supra note 301 (noting that critics argue that mandatory binding arbitration clauses
should be introduced so that taxpayers are assured of having their tax disputes resolved).
604. See discussion of Mutual Agreement Procedure supra Part XI.
605. See, e.g., discussion of LOB article supra Part VII.
606. See discussion of Mutual Agreement Procedure supra Part XI.
607. See Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, supra note 594, at 3.
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another Contracting State. Country X will not be motivated to lower its withholding rates
through amendments to its domestic law, according to Jones, because to do so would mean
60
relinquishing a valuable bargaining position in bilateral tax treaty negotiations. 1

b. Defense
The informal network of bilateral tax treaties has proved capable not only of forging
an international consensus on the proper allocation of tax authority through its Model
Treaty and interpretive Commentaries, it has also shown a strong tendency to stimulate tax

reforms at the domestic level through peer pressure, conciliatory dialogue, so-called soft
law recommendations and, just as importantly, the desire of Contracting States to create a
wider pool of countries with which they can more meaningfully communicate and conduct

business. Although Contracting States are bound to think about their optimal bargaining positions in any treaty negotiation, this factor does not justify replacing the informal
network of bilateral treaties with a more explicitly binding multilateral arrangement. To

the contrary, this type of pre-negotiation posturing could become more pronounced if the
stakes were raised in a binding multilateral treaty. The higher the stakes in the multilateral
negotiation, the more of an incentive a country will have to bargain and posture.
Moreover, recent economic studies on international cooperation have concluded that socalled transgovernmental networks-the type that has evolved through the OECD's bilateral network of tax treaties---create powerful incentives for regulatory convergence, with
weaker jurisdictions tending to import foreign models that comport with legal standards
employed by the more powerful nations. 60 9 Although multiple standards and rule options
may continue to exist in an informal network, studies show that the incentives to cooperate are strong and largely self executing due to jurisdictions' desire to cultivate deeper and
larger markets, and advantageous political relationships. 61°
This convergence phenomenon is evident in the OECD bilateral network. With increasing regularity, nonbinding OECD proposals, reflecting the consensus of the OECD member countries and the positions of non-member countries, 611 are incorporated in both the
OECD Model's text and the official Commentaries to the Model,6 2 and end up shaping the
development of both real tax treaties as well as domestic law. One of the salient examples

608. See id.
609. See Raustiala, InternationalCooperation,supra note 560, at 68 ("[IThe existence of a network strengthens incentives for jurisdictions to seek convergence because convergence allows for deeper and broader
cooperation.").
610. See id. at 62-69.
611. Recognizing the growing influence of the OECD Model Tax Treaty in non-OECD-member countries,
the OECD decided in 1997 to reflect their positions in the Model Treaty and its Commentaries. See OECD
Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, T 14.
612. The Introduction to the sixth edition of the condensed version of the OECD Model Tax Treaty states that
the revision of both the Model Treaty and the Commentaries "had become an ongoing process." Thus, in 1991:
...the Committee on Fiscal Affairs adopted the concept of an ambulatory Model Convention provid-

ing periodic and more timely updates and amendments without waiting for a complete revision. It
was therefore decided to publish a revised updated version of the Model Convention which would
take into account the work done since 1977 by integrating many of the recommendations made in the
above-mentioned reports.
OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, 9.
Between 1992 and 2005, the OECD has issued six revisions of its Model Tax Treaty and Commentaries.
See id. T 3.
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of the OECD's influence in forging a worldwide consensus is the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines," 3 which now are: (1) expressly incorporated in the official Commentary to
Article 9 (Associated Enterprises) of the OECD Model Tax Treaty; 614 (2) expressly incorporated as a binding commitment in the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty;65 and (3) the inspiration
and foundation for many countries' domestic transfer pricing regulations, 616 including that
ofJapan and the United States. 617 As further evidence of convergence in this area, in 2004,
Japan announced its decision to conform its transfer pricing enforcement policy to that of
the OECD and to crack down on tax shelters, tax haven companies,Japanese silent partnerships, and non-performing loan schemes. 15

613. See Revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (as amended 2000), discussed in relation tojapan-U.S.
Tax Treaty supra Part V
614. See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Commentary on Article 9 ConcerningAssociated Enterprises, I I
and n.1 (noting that OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines constitute "internationally agreed principles" and
provide guidance for applying the arm's length standard of which article 9 is the "authoritative statement").
Although the Commentaries are not binding, they can "be of great assistance in the application and interpretation of the conventions and, in particular, in the settlement of any disputes." Introduction to OECD Model
Tax Treaty, supra note 29, 1 29.
615. The Revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are binding authority in applying the arm's length
standard under Article 9 (Associated Enterprises) of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, which provides that references
to the Guidelines include any future revisions of them. See supra Part V
616. Most countries, including China, have developed transfer pricing rules that rely heavily on the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a general framework for their pricing methods. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note
289, at 420-24.
617. In 1979, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs produced an authoritative (but non-binding) report
intended to describe methods and practices that were acceptable in determining transfer prices. See OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Transfer Pricingand MultinationalEnterprises(1979). Another updated report was
issued in 1984, followed by the 1992 Transfer Pricing Guidelines. See OECD GUIDELINES FORMULTINATIONAL

ENTERPRISES (as amended June 27, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
Japan introduced transfer pricing regulations in 1986, effective for taxable years beginning in 1987. Japan's
transfer pricing rules closely correspond to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as they evolve. See Japan
Nat'l Tax Agency, APA Program Report 2005 1 (Sept. 2005).
Transfer pricing under U.S. tax law has also been influenced by the OECD's reports and guidelines although,
historically, the U.S. has been a leader in the area. The U.S. rules are more developed than the OECD's Revised
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and contain a hierarchy of methods that must be used. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1
to -8 (as amended). The predecessor to § 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code was § 45, enacted in 1928.
The provision allows the IRS to allocate income, deductions, credits, and other allowances among commonly controlled corporations "in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect [their] income." I.R.C.
§ 482(RIA 2006). Detailed regulations were promulgated under § 482 in 1986, see Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1 to -8
(as amended)--(the same year that § 482 was amended by the addition of a very controversial sentence allowing income from the transfer of intangibles to be priced "commensurate with the [future] income attributable
to the intangible."). I.R.C. § 482. This so-called super royalty provision allows the IRS to adjust the income
generated by an intangible for tax purposes if the profits of the transferee are higher than expected at the time
the transaction was entered into. See id. Because the super royalty provision allows tax authorities to adjust allocations of the income generated by an intangible years after the deal was entered into, the provision has been
heavily criticized by the OECD and other countries, on the grounds that it contravenes fundamental principles
of contract law-specifically, that the buyer should be able to benefit from an unforeseeable bargain.
618. See, e.g., Gary M. Thomas, Opportunitiesand Challenges in New InternationalTax Era in Japan, 34 Tx
NOTES INT'L 1161 (June 14, 2004) (reporting on Japan's decision to more closely conform its transfer pricing
enforcement policy to that of the OECD and to crack down on tax shelters, tax haven companies, Japanese
silent partnerships, and non-performing loan schemes); Cockfield, OECD as Informal World Tax Organization, supra note 393 (detailing how the OECD was able to persuade over forty countries with so-called harmful
tax regimes to dismantle certain aspects of their tax regimes, reforming their laws, and enhancing transparency
and information exchange).

WINTER 2006

896

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

The OECD's influence is also evident in the development of special treaty rules and
domestic legislation to deal with the taxation of fiscally transparent entities, 6 9 thin
capitalization, 620 and abusive conduit structures. 62 As mentioned, the method of dealing
with fiscally transparent entities in Article 4(6) of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is derived
from an OECD Report. This same innovative approach is being incorporated into more
bilateral tax treaties, as well as national tax laws.622 The OECD reports on thinly capitalized companies and conduit structures have been equally influential in shaping normative
rules-both national and international-to address exploitive tax practices. 623 Indeed, the
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty reflects the conclusions reached in these OECD-sponsored studies
62 4

throughout its text.

The OECD's program to study the effects of electronic commerce

has resulted in a set of broad tax principles applicable to electronic commerce, which have
audit, and administrative
been well received, as well as detailed guidance on recordkeeping,
625
procedures that countries can use to avoid the evasion of taxes.
Perhaps the most stunning recent demonstration of the OECD's power to effect real
changes in domestic tax policies is its recent success in persuading over forty countries with
so-called harmful tax regimes 626 to dismantle certain aspects of their regimes by reforming
627
their laws, enhancing their transparency, and cooperating in better information exchanges.
influence in the domestic tax law sphere. With
Accordingly, the OECD has demonstrated its

619. See OECD Report on Partnerships, supra Part VI.C., 1 1.
620. See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Report on Thin Capitalisation(Paris: OECD, Nov. 26, 1986),
reproduced in volume II of the loose-leaf version of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital,
atp.R(4)-1.
Double Tax Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies, in
621. See OECD Committee on Fiscal
Affairs,
INTERNATIONAL TAx AVOIDANCE AND EVASION: FOUR RELATED STUDIES (1987), reproduced inVol. IIof the
loose-leaf version of the OECD Model Tax Convention, at PP R(5)-l and R(6)-1.
622. U.S. tax regulations targeting abusive, cross-border, financing schemes involving hybrid entities and
treaties employ a mechanism similar to that reflected in the OECD Partnership Report and Article 4(6) of the
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty. See Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d) (as amended in 2002) (disallowing tax treaty benefits for
certain payments made to or by a "domestic reverse hybrid entity").
623. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1630) ("Limitation of deduction for interest on certain indebtedness.") (RIA 2006);
I.R.C. § 7701(1) (authorizing regulations "recharacterizing any multiple-party financing transaction as... appropriate to prevent avoidance of any tax imposed by this tide.") Regulations under I.R.C. § 7701() were
issued in 1995, and allow the IRS to "disregard ...the participation of one or more intermediate entities in a
financing arrangement" for purposes of §§ 871, 881, 1441, and 1442 (i.e., the withholding tax). See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.881-3(a)(1) (1995); Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d) (as amended in 2002) (disallowing tax treaty benefits for certain payments made to and by a "domestic reverse hybrid entity").
624. See, e.g., supra
Part W.A. 1-3 (discussing withholding limits on royalties, dividends, and interest), Part V
(discussing transfer pricing), Part VI (discussing new approach to tax arbitrage involving hybrid entities), Part
VII (discussing the prevention of treaty shopping in Article 22 of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty), Part XI (discussing recent OECD initiatives reflected in the Mutual Agreement Procedure (Article 25) and the Exchange-ofInformation article (Article 26) of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty).
625. For an overview of the issues raised by electronic commerce, see OECD Conference Report, Finland,
Nov. 19-21, 1997, Dismantling the Barriers to Global Electronic Commerce, available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecdl37/55/2751237.pdf, and OECD Ottawa Taxation Framework, supra note 310.
626. For an overview of the initiative on harmful tax competition, see OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs,
note 310; OECD Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, OECD Committee on FisHarmfil Tax Competition, supra
cal Affairs, OECD'sProjecton HarmfulTax Practices:The 2004 Progress Report (progress report to the Ministerial Council meeting) (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf.
627. See Cockfield, OECD as Informal World Tax Organization, supra note 393, at 165 (detailing how the
OECD was able to disentangle "fair tax competition from harmful tax competition," thus forging a consensus
and extracting offending countries' promises to reform, with possible retaliatory measures for noncompliance).
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its clout apparently growing, the OECD has become increasingly empowered to obtain
consensuses on issues at the international level, and also to catalyze regulatory convergence
through tax reforms at the national level. Although the pace of reform may seem rather
sluggish, there is no guarantee that a supranational tax organization like the WTO could
do any better.
4. How to Improve the OECD's Effectiveness in Obtaining Tax Cooperation
The evolving international tax system is now at a critical juncture. If the bilateral tax
treaty network cannot be adapted to meet its current challenges, countries will start turning to inferior institutional structures to lower tax barriers to trade. Now is the time for
the OECD consortium to focus on improving the effectiveness of the Model Tax Treaty,
strengthening its dispute resolution mechanisms, and expanding the network to incorporate developing countries, such as those in Asia. The following explains why these suggested
reforms are needed immediately.
a. Elevate Status of Commentaries
The official Commentaries to the OECD Model Tax Treaty constitute one of the most
important tools for achieving the consistent application of treaties based on the OECD
Model. However, the Commentaries are not explicitly binding, which leads to inevitable
disputes between Contracting States as to the weight that should properly be accorded to
them. Clearly, national courts are increasingly relying on the Commentaries: "[Tihe Commentaries have been cited in the published decisions of the courts of the great majority
of [OECD] member countries." 628 Moreover, in these decisions, the Commentaries "have
frequently played a key role in the judge's deliberations. '' 62 9 Nonetheless, the status of the
Commentaries is blurred because they seek to interpret double tax conventions that have
a dual nature: on one hand, a tax convention is an international agreement between two
countries to regulate the exercise of their fiscal jurisdiction. Its status as an international
agreement puts the convention squarely within the domain of public international law. On
the other hand, a tax convention becomes part of a Contracting State's domestic law when it
is ratified, and thus becomes subject to the Contracting State's domestic rules for interpret60
ing binding agreements.
Professor Philip Baker has noted that the status of the OECD Commentaries does not fit
precisely within any of the recognized categories of the Vienna Convention 631 that describe
what can be properly used to interpret an international treaty.632 However, there appear to
be three plausible categories that would properly describe the OECD Commentaries:
(a) Article 31(2): an agreement of all parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty, or an instrument made by one party and accepted by the other;
(b) Article 3 1(3): any subsequent agreement or practice of the parties;
3
(c) Article 32: supplementary means of interpretation, including travauxpreparatoires.1
628. Introduction to OECD Model Tax Treaty, sutpra note 29, 29.3 (2005).
629. Id.
630. See supra Part M (discussing the status of treaties under U.S. and Japanese domestic law).
631. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, art. 31 (a)(b) (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The text of the Vienna Convention is available athttp://untreaty.
un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1 1 1969.pdf.

632.

BAKER, DOUBLETAx CoNvETrrloNS,

supra note 30, at 29-30.

633. Vienna Convention, supra note 631, art. 31(3), art. 32 (as paraphrased by Baker).
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These categorical distinctions are not merely academic. As Professor Baker points out:
Article 3 l(2)(b) could bring in the non-OECD states who accept the Commentaries, Article
31(3) would only apply to subsequent Commentaries, and Article 32 refers to travaux prepara-

toires (i.e., prior Commentaries) only if the materials in Article 31 leave the meaning unclear
or
634
to confirm the meaning. Material in Article 31(2) may also have a more binding nature.
The practical answer is that the OECD Commentaries fit within all three categories of
the Vienna Convention as aids to proper tax treaty interpretation. However, the inherent
uncertainty as to the proper weight leads to many disputes and inconsistent applications of
tax treaties negotiated under the OECD Model.
One way to avoid these uncertainties is to elevate the legal status of the Commentaries
themselves. Professor Avery Jones, a leading expert on tax treaty interpretation, believes
that the best way of doing this is to have the Contracting States adopt a formal Memorandum of Understanding explicitly stating their intention that their tax treaty is to be interpreted in accordance with the OECD Commentaries. 635 Although Japan and the United
States have not made the Commentaries explicitly binding, both Contracting States and
their taxpayers could probably avoid future disputes by doing so. The U.S. and Austria
36
6

included such a Memorandum in their 1996 tax treaty.

A related issue regarding the status of the Commentaries is whether subsequent revisions
to them should be given weight in interpreting tax treaties that were negotiated before the
revisions. 637 The Committee on Fiscal Affairs believes that bilateral tax treaties should be
interpreted in accordance not only with the Commentaries that were in force at the time
of the treaty's conclusion, but also, as far as possible, any Commentaries that are added or
revised after a particular treaty was concluded. 66 Some scholars have characterized this
view as wishful thinking on the part of the Committee and have questioned whether any
court would give much legal weight to subsequently revised Commentaries in light of the
69
fact that tax treaties are part of a nation's internal law that directly affects taxpayers.
The Committee's argument would have more force if the Commentaries themselves were
explicitly binding. The mere prospect of making the existing Commentaries explicitly
binding should give one pause. The Commentaries reflect the consensus of the OECD-a
group of countries that are not formally parties to the bilateral treaty in question. Thus,
making the Commentaries explicitly binding seems to be a step away from bilateralism and
towards multilateralism. The higher the status of the Commentaries, the more the informal
network of bilateral agreements begins to function like a multilateral treaty.
634.

BAKER, DOUBLE TAx CONVENTIONS, supra note 30, at 30.
635. Jones, Are Tax TreatiesNecessary?, supra note 594, at 19.
636. See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Interpretation of the Convention, May 31, 1996, U.S.Aus., I Tax Treaties (CCH) P703A.
637. Cf.Vienna Convention, supra note 63 1, art. 31(3) (providing that any subsequent agreement or practice
of the treaty parties may be used as an aid to treaty interpretation).
638. OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, 11 33-36 (2005) (noting that normally, revised Commentaries should be used to clarify the proper interpretation of a previously existing treaty since such Commentaries
represent the consensus of the OECD Countries on a given article's proper application. However, any Comment that has been amended as a direct result of an amendment to the text of the Model Treaty should not be
used to interpret a previously concluded treaty where the provision in question differs in substance from the
amended model article).
639. See Jones, Are Tax TreatiesNecessary?, supra note 594, at 22-23 (1999) ("[1] am doubtful any legal weight
should be given to the Committee's retrospective views about proper interpretation. Tax treaties are different
from normal international treaties under which the contracting states can agree to any interpretation.").
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b. Strengthen Dispute Resolution System
One of the major weaknesses of the present bilateral tax treaty system is that its dispute
resolution mechanism is too weak. As previously discussed, this weakness is no doubt a
product of its past.640 The Mutual Agreement Procedure was originally envisioned to serve
not as process of litigation but rather as a kind of on-going channel of negotiation to iron
out the Contracting States' differences as to how their tax jurisdiction should be divided up
and regulated. 6"' While the use of competent authorities to resolve disputes infuses a great
deal of flexibility into the system, the process is hampered by the fact that the authorities
are under no legal obligation to resolve a dispute-they need only to endeavor to resolve it.
Moreover, without set time frames and legal precedents, the process can take on the character of political compromise-or worse, a horse-trading show where all kinds of extraneous
factors enter into the deal.
One way to eliminate many of the vagaries of the Mutual Agreement Procedure is to
institute binding arbitration. As mentioned, although the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty does not
provide for the binding arbitration of disputes, the United States is one of the countries that
has begun to incorporate such clauses into its treaties and protocols. The OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs has convened a working group to study supplementary methods
of dispute resolution, including binding arbitration. 642 The working group's findings and
proposals are due to be released in 2007, but it will probably take much longer before an
optional or mandatory arbitration clause finds its way into Article 25 of the Model Treaty.
In the meantime, more countries should attempt to negotiate protocols and Memoranda
of Understanding to institute some method of binding arbitration. 64 This modification to
bilateral tax treaties would greatly improve the existing international tax system, perhaps
allaying calls to make more dramatic institutional changes. Although binding arbitration
raises sovereignty concerns, 644 this concern seems to be greatly outweighed by other tax
policy concerns-namely, efficiency, simplicity, fairness, and certainty.
c. Reach Out Globally-Shed "Rich Countries' Club" Image
The OECD's ability to attain consensus on international tax issues is aided by the fact
that its formal voting membership presently consists of only thirty countries. This elite
group of nations includes all of the world's most advanced economies that together control the vast majority of the world's funds, technology, and capital-producing industries.64s
As mature economies, most of these countries share similar national interests and, as a
Japanese ambassador to the OECD put it, a like-mindedness concerning the normative

640. The advantages and disadvantages of the Mutual Agreement Procedure, within the context of the
Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, are discussed in Part XI.A., supra and will not be recapitulated here.
641. See LINDENCRONA & MATTSON, ARBITRATION IN TAXATION, supra note 258, at 24.
642. See discussion supra note 302. The working group convened by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs has
already issued a list of best practices, including one that advocates that competent authorities take a more
principled approach to their decision making. See id.
643. As noted, the U.S. and Germany signed a protocol to their existing treaty which will, when it becomes
effective, provide for the mandatory arbitrationof disputes when the competent authorities fail to reach an
agreement. In addition, non-mandatory arbitration clauses have been included in other recently negotiated
U.S. tax treaties. See discussion supra note 268.
644. See discussion supra notes 268-69 (noting that the new U.S. Model Tax Treaty, released in November
2006, does not contain any provision providing for mandatory arbitration).
645. Both the United States and Japan are longtime members of the OECD.

WINTER 2006

900

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

646
objective of promoting market-based economies, democracy, and human rights. While
its small, heterogeneous membership helps the OECD to expedite reforms, it also tends
to alienate smaller, developing countries that have different economic interests, creating
an obstacle to achieving the OECD's goals of international tax cooperation, inter-nation
equity, efficiency, fairness, and increased global welfare.
Although the OECD is considering various global outreach strategies, including offers of
6
there are legitimate reasons why it has not
formal membership to a number of countries, ""
been anxious to throw open its doors to all countries. First, as mentioned, there is a critical need to achieve consensus in order to make progress on major projects and initiatives,
and limiting voting membership helps. Secondly, there are normative criteria for OECD
membership: prospective members must demonstrate a commitment to being like minded
and must have sufficiently reformed their fiscal and domestic policies to reflect the OECD
mandate of promoting democracy, protecting individual human rights, and establishing
and upholding the rule of law. Some criteria involve expensive tax measures such as the
requirement that all tax holidays be extended to all resident companies-not just domestic
ones.64s Paradoxically, meeting the OECD criteria would serve these developing countries
well, since transparent corporate governance and fiscal systems, open markets, and governance by a rule of law, all work to create a more stable business environment, thereby
attracting more inward FDI, which would help their struggling economies to grow. However, many developing countries fall short of meeting these prerequisites for membership.
Moreover, many developing and newly industrialized countries are extremely suspicious of
the OECD's reform initiatives-viewing them as self-serving measures designed to protect
rich, industrialized countries at the expense of the less affluent, underdeveloped ones. 649
From the OECD's perspective, it is imperative that it expand its global outreach. The
stakes are high. If the network fails to engage the developing countries in its initiatives and
take them into the OECD fold, the OECD's cooperative tax initiatives will fail, and the entire
international tax order will likely splinter into something less than a global approach-perhaps

into competing and conflicting architectures aimed only at regional cooperation.

60
1

Just

646. OECD, Chair of OECD Working Groups, Seiichiro Norboru (Ambassador of Japan), A Strategy for
Enlargement and Outreacb at 16-17 (May 13, 2004) (inferring that OECD Member States share a "like-mindedness" for democratic principles, market economies, free trade and competition, and human rights), available at http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2649_201185_37301337- ll11,00.htnl [hereinafter
OECD Outreach Strategy].
647. See id. (detailing OECD mandate to consider membership expansion and outreach). Mexico was granted OECD membership in 1994, after entering into its first OECD-based tax treaty with Canada only two years
earlier in 1992.
648. This criterion is consistent with the Nondiscrimination article found in the OECD Model Tax Treaty.
See OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 29, art. 24(1).
649. For example, many developing countries object to the 0% withholding rates set forth in the OECD's
Model Tax Treaty, which clearly favor net exporters of technology. See Positions of Non-Member Countries
on Article 12 (Royalties) and Commentary, OECD Model Tax Treaty, (Condensed Version, 2005) (listing all
the non-member countries that have reservations about, or objections to, this article).

650. The VTO is becoming increasingly alarmed that the proliferation of regional trade agreements
is substantially impeding the international trade system by creating a web of incoherent rules. See Pascal
Lamy, Director-General of WTO, Address to Confederation of Indian Industries in Banglagore, India:
Regional Agreements: the 'Pepper in the Multilateral 'Curry' (Jan. 17, 2007). available at http://www.wto.
org/english/news-e/sppl-e/sppl 53_e.htm.
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like regional trade agreements can pose a threat to bilateral tax treaties, so too can explicit
regional tax agreements.6"'
Recently, the OECD has taken steps to recognize and informally incorporate the views of
non-Member States into its informal network. In 1997, the OECD began publishing nonMember States' official positions and reservations to the Model Treaty and its Commentaries
as an addendum. This step alone is likely to have a big impact because it brings these countries
into the OECD's bilateral treaty dialogue. In 2002, the OECD, World Bank, and IMF created a special forum called the International Tax Dialogue to consider developing countries'
perspectives on various tax measures and OECD initiatives, to share best practices, and to
discuss ways to coordinate the tax objectives of developing and advanced economies. 5 2 In
addition, the OECD sponsors numerous annual conferences around the world, including its
Global Forum and a number of multilateral tax centers to reach out to nonmember countries,
653
to find common ground, and to cultivate opportunities for coordinated tax policy making.
Recognizing that the OECD is at a critical juncture and desperately needs to engage developing countries in order to achieve its objectives, a two-tier membership structure is now
being studied. 6 4 The advantage of a two-tier membership structure is that it would allow the
existing thirty members to preserve their exclusive voting rights, while also legitimizing the
role played by non-voting members in the network. As one scholar envisions it:
The first tier would include all OECD member countries-consensus among these members
would continue to be needed to enact major policy changes, such as amendments to the OECD
Model Tax Treaty. The second tier would include non-member countries who wished to be
granted permanent membership within this tier. Countries from both tiers would be invited
to deliberate policy changes through the Committee on Fiscal Affairs and its committees, but
only tier-one countries could ultimately make these changes (this approach is similar to the
OECD's e-commerce tax reform efforts). 5
Although nonmember countries may balk at being given only second-class status with
this structure, they would be gaining a permanent voice in the international tax network
and increased opportunities to access OECD resources. Creating a two-tier OECD membership structure seems to have few drawbacks and great potential for transforming the
bilateral tax treaty network so that it can continue to coordinate nations' tax policies in an
economically diverse and dynamic global environment.
Herein lies an opportunity for Japan. Japan is by far the most prominent member of the
OECD in Asia, and the network's critical need to expand its global outreach puts Japan
651. Although regional agreements to lower tax barriers to investment are better than no agreements, they
are a second-best alternative, and can threaten the development of more consistent, worldwide approaches to
tax policy. As two international tax experts have observed, the EU's efforts to harmonize its Member States'
corporate tax regimes through the ECJ's "incoherent" nondiscrimination jurisprudence "render the future of
bilateral treaties between the United States and EU member countries uncertain." Graetz & Warren, Income
Tax Discrimination,supra note 252, at 1254.
652. See Duncan Bentley, InternationalConstraintson National Tax Policy, 30 Tx NOTES INT'L 1127 (June 16,
2003) (describing OECD efforts to dialogue with developing countries on such issues as harmful tax competition, anti-corruption, and information exchange); Cockfield, OECD as Informal World Tax Organization,
supra note 393, at 178.
653. See Charles Gnaedinger, OECD Tax CentersSpark Dialoguefor Non-OECDStates' Benefit, 2004 WORLDWIDE TAx DAILY, May 4, 2004, available in LEXIS, Intlaw library, TNI file, 2004 WTD 86-7.
654. See Cockfield, OECD as Informal World Tax Organization, supra note 393, at 185 (fleshing out his idea
of what a two-tier membership structure should look like).
655. Id. at 183.
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in the perfect position to provide leadership and increase its own sphere of influence
among developing countries in East Asia and along the Pacific Rim.656 It is no accident
that a Japanese ambassador is heading up the OECD's global outreach initiative. The fiscal
policies Japan adopts, the standards Japan sets for itself, and the trade and investment ties
Japan is able to secure with countries in Asia are bound to affect the development of those
nations' fiscal infrastructures and tax policies. And, what happens in those dynamic Asian
economies will undoubtedly impact the formulation of international tax policies within the
OECD and around the world.
C. FutrtRE IMPACT OF JAPAN-U.S. TAx TREATY
There is little wonder why U.S. Treasury officials have characterized the new Japan-U.S.
657
Tax Treaty as "one of the most important tax treaties in the world." Not only does the
Treaty remove trade barriers between the world's two most powerful economies, it is bound
to be highly influential outside the explicit bilateral relationship on a number of levels: by signaling new norms and standards in international tax policy; by stimulating reforms in domestic tax laws, as well as future bilateral tax treaties and protocols; and by evincing the continued
dominance of the Nation State in the continuing development of international tax policy.
1. Signaling New Norms?
Clearly, the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty does not represent a radical departure from the
foundational norms that have evolved within the informal OECD bilateral tax treaty network since the 1920s' Compromise was first reached-most fundamentally, the construct of
assigning income on the basis of its source and the taxpayer's residence, under an economic
entitlements theory.65s However, within this normative framework, the Treaty does incorporate what ostensibly is the latest thinking on some difficult issues, thereby signaling new

norms and emerging best practices.
Of course, the reciprocal reductions in gross-basis withholding taxes imposed by the
59
Source State are among the most striking revisions reflected in the new Treaty. The complete elimination of withholding tax on broad categories of investment income-including
royalties, qualifying dividends, and certain kinds of interest--constitutes an "unprecedented
departure from historic Japanese tax treaty policy,"6" signaling Japan's newfound willingness to open its markets more liberally to free trade and foreign investment. For the United
States, the zero percent withholding rate on all royalties and inter-company dividends also
sets a new standard; in its other recently negotiated treaties reflecting that rate-for example, those with the United Kingdom, Australia, and Mexico-the tax-exempt categories
of investment income are more narrowly defined. Although the complete elimination of
Source-State withholding taxes on dividends from controlled subsidiaries is not the current U.S. Model Treaty position, 1 it is clear that the exemption will routinely be used as a
656. In trade theory terms, Japan is an Asian economic hub, with spokes extending out to surrounding
developing economies that seek to sell products into the large Japanese consumer market. See infra note 674
and sources cited therein.
657. Tax Analysts, Japan-U.S.Tax Treaty of CrucialImportance, U.S. Treasury'sAngus Says, supra note 12.
658. See supra Part II.D (discussing economic entitlements theory).
659. See supra Part IV.A (discussing Treaty's maximum withholding rates on investment income).
660. See 2003 Tax Treaty Hearing, supra note 5.
661. See Bell, supra note 147 (article quotes Patricia A. Brown, U.S. Treasury Deputy International Tax
Counsel).
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bargaining chip by the U.S. to exact treaty provisions designed to prevent treaty abuse and
to better verify whether the requisite equity ownership levels for qualifying for the withholding tax exemption have been met: sophisticated LOB articles and verifiable information
exchange procedures, as well as domestic laws requiring a sufficient level of banking and
accounting transparency. As the criteria for qualifying for the withholding tax exemptions
become easier to verify, it is conceivable that the complete elimination of Source-State withholding tax will gradually evolve into a normal treaty practice or, at the very least, become a
widespread objective for tax treaty negotiations. The Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty's broad exemptions of Source-State withholding tax thus serve as powerful compliance incentives to other
countries seeking to negotiate tax treaties with major economic powers like the United States
662
and Japan, and suggest the emergence of a new standard in this regard.
Article 9 (Associated Enterprises) of the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty makes no attempt
to depart from the well-established practice of employing the arm's length method and the
commensurate-with-income standard to price transactions between commonly controlled
enterprises. 66' And while proponents of the formulary apportionment method will argue
that the addition of a new Treaty to the OECD network further entrenches an inefficient
and anachronistic pricing method 66 neitherJapan nor the United States have made serious
attempts to embrace the use of formulary apportionment in the international context. 66 '
Nonetheless, Article 9 of the new Treaty does include some features that introduce more
flexibility into the existing transfer pricing system-for example, the Treaty's incorporation of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines on an ambulatory basis as those Guidelines
evolve over time. This feature, along with Article 9's expanded coverage of various transactions, and the competent authorities' augmented powers to devise creative solutions to
transfer pricing disputes pursuant to the Mutual Agreement Procedure (Article 25), are
features that are expected to mitigate the problems inherent in the arm's length standard.
These features will likely be reproduced in other bilateral tax treaties.
The new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is also signaling an emerging tax treaty norm in its treatment of fiscally transparent entities in Article 4(6). 66" That provision essentially codifies the
basic approach of the OECD Report on Partnerships by establishing the general rule that
one must look to the internal tax laws of the Residence State-not the State from which
the income is sourced-to determine whether or not an entity is fiscally transparent and
who is actually liable to tax. 667 Critics of the 192 0s' Compromise will undoubtedly contend
that the need to include such an elaborate provision to more efficiently allocate income
between the Source State and the Residence State in transactions involving hybrid entities
gives credence to their argument that the Source and Residence concepts no longer work
well and are anachronisms in a world where transactions are increasingly borderless and
companies are increasingly transnational. But Article 4(6) ingeniously infuses flexibility and

662. U.S. treaty negotiators have staunchly maintained that each tax treaty stands on its own, and that treaty
benefits are negotiated with other countries on a case-by-case basis. See id. However, this unofficial bargaining
position seems to contradict the fact that the U.S. requires that a Limitation-on-Benefits clause and a Savings
clause be included in all of its new treaties and protocols.
663. See supra Part V
664. Seediscussion of the "lock-in" phenomenon in the context of network effects supra Part XIII.A. .a.
665. For a discussion of the problems with instituting formulary apportionment in the international context,
see supra Part XII.C.2.b.
666. See discussion of Article 4(6) and fiscally transparent entities supra Part VI.
667. But see art. 1(4) (Savings Clause), discussed supra Part VI.E.
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fairness into the Residence concept, looking beyond mere labels to the Residence State's
actual tax treatment of the entity in question. Article 4(6) clearly sets a new standard in that
its purview is much broader than similar provisions found either in earlier negotiated tax
treaties 661 or in domestic law.669 And because it is the world's two largest economic powers
that have agreed to this complex but useful treaty provision, their inclusion of it strongly
suggests what some have termed a growing consensus that the OECD's approach to fiscally transparent entities is the most pragmatic solution to the problems posed by attempts
to fairly tax fiscally transparent entities, or payments made through those entities, in the
cross-border context.
Perhaps the aspects in which the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is most likely to have a profound and normative effect on international tax policy are found in the Treaty's provisions
that mandate a high level of information sharing by the competent authorities and augment their powers to interpret the Treaty to more efficiently resolve tax disputes. This
is because increased reliance on these mechanisms-specifically, the Mutual Agreement
and Exchange-of-Information Procedures and Article 3(2)--will enhance the growth and
impact of the transgovernmental networks within broader parameters of the OECD network. As previously explained, 670 transgovernmental networks serve a key cooperative function within the informal OECD network by dialoguing, by setting informal standards and
expectations to bolster compliance, and by resolving systemic problems within the network
itself. If the informal OECD network of bilateral tax treaties is to deter competing architectures for international tax cooperation, it will have to surmount the challenges posed
by electronic commerce and the increased integration and mobility of multinational firms.
The ability of transgovernmental networks to infuse flexibility into the system and to lower
transaction costs is thus critical to the network's evolution and survival.
Certainly, the new Treaty's Mutual Agreement Procedure (Article 2 5) and the Exchangeof-Information Article (Article 26) will play important roles in establishing transgovernmental networks. Moreover, the expansive language the Treaty employs in Article 3(2) is
critical to the impact of informal negotiations in that it expressly augments the capacity of
the U.S. and Japanese competent authorities to establish the meaning of treaty terms that
are left undefined in the Treaty's text. 67' This special grant of authority represents a departure from the OECD Model Tax Treaty's text 672 and may end up establishing an important
673
new method of treaty interpretation if the provision is picked up in other treaties.
2. InspiringReforms?
If a scorecard were being kept in the debate between those in favor of replacing the informal bilateral tax treaty network with an explicitly multilateral institution and those in favor
668. Unlike older treaties, Article 4(6) of the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty covers more than just the treaty
benefits accorded to dividends, interest, and royalties. For example, it can also be applied to identify the person
who is liable to tax on an item of business profit (Article 7) paid through a fiscally transparent entity.
669. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d) (as amended in 2002) (denying treaty benefits on certain payments
to domestic reverse hybrid entities).
670. See discussion of transgovernmental networks supra Part XIn.A.2.
671. See discussion of Article 3(2) of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty supra Part XI.A.
672. Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Treaty neither includes the reference to the States' competent authorities, nor infers that their agreement will be determinative of the meaning of an undefined term. See OECD
Model Treaty, supra note 29, art. 3(2).
673. The disadvantages of relying on the competent authorities to resolve tax disputes has been previously
discussed. See upra Part XI.A (Mutual Agreement Procedure).
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of forging further international tax cooperation within the parameters of the present system, the successful conclusion of the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty would definitely score big
points for the team rooting for the status quo with progressive modifications. The mere fact
that a new OECD-based bilateral tax treaty was concluded between the world's two largest
economies cannot be very encouraging to the proponents of more radical international tax
reforms that call for a return to the international tax policy drawing board. This is not to
say, however, that the new Treaty will fail to inspire changes within the existing framework.
The Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty is already inspiring reforms, both in domestic tax laws and in
treaty negotiations due to the seemingly unavoidable phenomena of "competitive liberalization" and the "indirect network effects" of adding the Treaty's newly revised provisions and
standards to the network.
According to the well-established free trade doctrine of competitive liberalization propounded by C. Fred Bergsten and others,674 when trade barriers are reduced by a major
new preferential treaty, particularly a treaty with or between economic superpowers like the
United States and Japan, that new treaty immediately creates strong incentives for other
countries to negotiate similar tax treaties of their own so as to avoid the costs of having
trade diverted from their markets to the markets of the Contracting States that negotiated
the new preferential treaty. This phenomenon has already been noted above in the discus6
sion of national welfare concerns, game theory, and harmful tax competition. 1
In another variant of this domino effect, smaller economies tend to react to the success of their competitors in securing a new bilateral tax treaty with a major economy like
the United States by attempting to secure their own bilateral treaty with the same major
economy. Hub-and-spoke patterns of cooperative agreements tend to result from this type
of competitive liberalization; the Contracting States with major markets wield more bargaining power as hub economies and so can dominate the treaty negotiations by extracting more concessions such as the inclusion of sophisticated anti-treaty-abuse mechanisms
from Contracting States that are merely spoke economies. 6 6 Thus, the overall effect of
competitive liberalization is not limited to a race to lower withholding rates. Rather, it also
encourages the smaller spoke economies to modernize their tax, securities, and accounting
laws to remain competitive, and to replicate or emulate the provisions contained in the
hub economy's tax treaty. This convergence effect becomes super charged when the new
preferential treaty happens to be between two major economic hubs like the United States
and Japan.677
The phenomenon of competitive liberalization can already be identified in the wake of
the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty's conclusion, particularly in Asia. For example, Japan is now
engaged in a major effort to modernize and expand its network of bilateral tax treaties,

674. See C. Fred Bergsten, Competitive Liberalizationand Global Free Trade:A Vision for the Early 21st Century
(Peter G. Peterson Instit. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper No. 96-15, 1996), available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/wp/wp.cfm? Research ID=171; Richard E. Baldwin, A Domino Theory of Regionalism, in TRADING

BLOCKS: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES To ANALYZING PREFERENTIAL TRADoE AGREEMENTS

479-501

(Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Pravin Krishna, and Arvind Panagariya eds., MIT press, 1999) [hereinafter Baldwin,
Domino Theoryl.
675. The classic prisoner's dilemma in game theory is created when countries are compelled to maintain
revenue losing rates in order to stay competitive. For a discussion of this dilemma and the OECD's promising
initiative to prevent harmful tax competition see supra Part XII.A and Part XIII.B.1, respectively.
676. See generally supra note 673, see also Baldwin, supra note 674.
677. See generally supra note 674 and sources cited therein.
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and has indicated that it is using its new agreement with the United States as its model in
negotiating further tax treaty reforms with other countries.678 In 2006, for example, Japan
signed a new tax treaty with India, incorporating a modem LOB clause and other sophisticated anti-abuse provisions, as well as reductions in the maximum withholding rates on
intercompany dividends (reduced from 15 to 10 percent) and royalties (reduced from 20 to
10 percent). 679 Japan has also recently signed protocols amending its bilateral tax treaties
with the Philippines and the Netherlands, and is presently engaged in negotiations to modernize its tax treaties with Indonesia, Australia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Not
surprisingly, after the successful conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, other economic
hubs like the United Kingdom and France have been eager to renegotiate their tax treaties
with Japan. In 2006, Japan and the UK signed a new tax treaty that includes a modem LOB
clause and substantial reductions in the maximum withholding rates. 6s0 And in January
2 007, Japan and France agreed to further reduce tax barriers to trade by signing a new tax
treaty expected to enter into force in 2008.611
The indirect network effects 682 of augmenting the OECD bilateral network with a major,
new tax treaty are also sure to trigger tax policy reforms. The various provisions in the new
Treaty have now become part of the large body of off-the-shelf regulatory standards, treaty
articles, and viable income allocation mechanisms-all now available for perusal and possible replication by formal members of the OECD, by non-members with treaties based on
the OECD or U.N. Models, and by developing countries that seek better methods of han68 3
dling the recurrent tax allocation problems. The evolving transgovernmental networks,
which the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty encourages, will create increasingly powerful incentives
to cooperate, causing weaker jurisdictions to import the legal standards and treaty provisions of more powerful nations like Japan and the United States. Within the context of the
informal OECD tax treaty network, this phenomenon of rule convergence is largely self
executing.
3. Just Tweaking Anacbronisms? Or Evincing the Continued Dominance
of the Nation State in a Globalizing World?
Undoubtedly, some international tax scholars will contend that the new Japan-U.S. Tax
Treaty, far from signaling new norms or inspiring meaningful reforms, merely tweaks fundamental anachronisms in international tax policy-in particular, the construct of allocating
income between countries on the basis of the income's source and the taxpayer's residence.
This allocation scheme, inherent in the 1920s' Compromise, 6' 4 was designed in another
era when business enterprises were more easily identifiable by the physical buildings that

678. See Thomas, supra note 3 (reporting that a high rankingJapanese tax official clearly indicated, without
actually using the term model tax treaty, that Japan views its new tax treaty with the U.S. as its new model for
future tax treaty negotiations).
679. See Tax Analysts, India,JapanSign Tax Treaty, 2006 WonLDWIE Tx DAILY, Feb. 27, 2006, at 38-3.
680. See Tax Analysts, Japan-U.K Tax Treaty Enters Into Force, 2006 WORLDWIDE TAx DAILY, Oct. 13, 2006,
at 198-1.
681. See Tax Analysts, Japan,France Sign Revised Tax Treaty, 2007 WoRLoWDE TAx DAILY, Jan. 16, 2007, at
10-4.
682. See supra Part XIII.A.1.
683. See supra Part XIII.B.3.b. (explaining how transgovernmental networks can help forge cooperation and
rule convergence).
684. See supra Part ilD.
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housed them. In a sense, these critics are right; the new Treaty ostensibly applies only
patchwork solutions to the gaping loopholes and absurdities created by attempts to make
the economic entitlements theory, upon which both in rem and in personam jurisdiction
are founded, fit the new realities created by the advent of integrated economies, multinational enterprises, digital commerce, and financial engineering. To the extent the JapanU.S. Tax Treaty manages to plug the resulting holes in the international tax policy dike, it
will nonetheless take years, perhaps decades, before these arguably superficial solutions are
incorporated into other bilateral tax treaties, perhaps slowing tax policy reforms to a glacial pace. Moreover, the addition of the new Treaty to the OECD bilateral network, these
inefficient rules through the lock-in effect,
skeptics will argue, tends to further standardize
65
even though superior rules may exist.

Clearly, these are credible contentions. There are obvious reasons to be concerned that
the 1920s' Compromise has become an inadequate and inefficient allocation method. As
the foregoing Parts of this article have shown, 68 6 some scholars now maintain that the Information Age necessitates a whole new supranational institution to replace the present bilateral tax treaty network so that new allocation rules can be administered without reference
to income's source and taxpayer's residence. 6s7 However, the common solution propounded
by these scholars-replacement of the network of bilateral tax treaties with a legally binding
multilateral or supranational institution-is illogical because the likelihood that inefficient
rules and standards will get locked in is greater in an explicit network (e.g., a binding multilateral treaty or supranational institution like the WTO or the EU) than the risk existing in
a nonbinding, virtual network created by the informal OECD consortium where new rules
and standards can be tested in one bilateral treaty at a time. Open and informal networks,
as opposed to closed and explicit ones, are more likely to provide environments where
members have the opportunity to choose among a multiplicity of standards, thus mitigating
8
the risk that an inefficient standard will become dominant, displacing more efficient ones. 6
Several ingenious provisions of the new Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty-for example, Article 4(6)
concerning the treatment of fiscally transparent entities; Article 9 referencing the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines; the newly delineated Royalties Article (Article 12); and Article
3(2) granting more interpretive authority to the Contracting States' competent authorities
pursuant to the Mutual Agreement Procedure-evince the capacity of the informal OECD
tax treaty network to adapt to radically changed circumstances.
Those scholars calling for a paradigm shift in the way tax jurisdiction is allocated also
tend to disregard the continued dominance of the Nation State on the international stage,
and further discount the extreme reluctance of Nation States to surrender their fiscal sovereignty. As emphasized throughout this article, the concepts of taxpayer residence and
income source derive from, and serve to support, the territorial jurisdiction and economic
entitlements of the Nation State. 6 9 To the extent these concepts are compromised, so too is
685. See supra Part XIII.A. .a (discussing the "lock-in" effect).
686. See supra Part XII.B-D.
687. See, e.g., the discussion of formulary apportionment, supra Parts XI.B.3, C.2, and D.2-3, and XIII.
B.2.b.
688. As earlier described in Part XII.D.3.b., the European Union is arguably being infected by an inefficient
standard for allocating income: the ECJ's unbridled application of its nondiscrimination doctrine, which some
scholars maintain is causing incoherent results. See Graetz & Warren, Income Tax Discrimination,supra note
252, at 1219. See discussion supra Part XII.D.3.b.
689. See supra Part IID (discussing the economic entitlements theory underlying the 1920s' Compromise).
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the power of the Nation State to govern and survive. Not surprisingly, as the experiment in
the European Union has shown, there is little evidence to support the theory that Nation
States will soon be ready to "engage in a massive surrender of national sovereignty over
[their] tax policies. ' 690 Given the continued dominance of the Nation State on the international stage, and the great diversity of political systems, economies, and domestic tax rules
among these States, the present system of bilateral income tax treaties, which operate within
the informal, multilateral framework provided by the OECD and its Model Treaty, remains
the most viable institution for allocating international tax authority. The network's soft-law,
consensus seeking approach is more substantively desirable, procedurally pragmatic, and
demonstrably effective than the alternative institutions considered in this article-namely,
an explicitly binding multilateral tax treaty, a supranational body similar to the W"TO, and
regional tax agreements existing within regional trade blocks. 69 1 The new Japan-U.S. Tax
Treaty evinces both the continued dominance of the Nation State on the world stage, as
well as the ability of the OECD's informal tax treaty network to meet the tremendous challenges posed by a rapidly changing economic and technological environment.
XIV. Conclusion
The trade and investment relationship between Japan and the United States-unquestionably one of the global economy's most critical bilateral economic relationships-will be
substantially strengthened by the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, which became fully effective on
January 1, 2005. Although the future economic effect of the Treaty is incapable of being
accurately tallied in dollars or yen, the Treaty's precedent setting reductions of withholding
taxes on investment income, its improved allocation of income derived through partnerships and hybrid entities, and its provisions policing transfer pricing and treaty misuse,
will undoubtedly promote more flexible and efficient business structures, and foster higher
levels of investment in both countries.
Although the Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty does not break the foundational mold for international tax policy, it does represent a major policy breakthrough on several levels. First,
the Treaty signals a fimdamental shift in the international trade and tax policies of Japan
(historically an isolated country with strong, protectionist tendencies), which comport with
Japan's new open attitude and recent sweeping revision of its company and securities laws
aimed at attracting more foreign investment. Second, given Japan's leadership role in Asia,
the Treaty will likely catalyze tax policy reforms in other Asian countries looking to remove
unnecessary tax barriers to trade and investment flows. Moreover, the Treaty also reflects
and fortifies what appears to be an evolving international consensus on how to most practically resolve, at least for now, some longstanding problems in allocating cross-border
income between sovereign states. The Treaty, which sets new standards both for the negotiation and administration of bilateral tax treaties, will cause significant changes in behavior.
The triggered changes in investing behavior, both those anticipated and those unforeseen,
will undoubtedly impact the development of international tax relationships between sovereign nations for many years to come.

690. McClure, Globalization,Tax Rules, supra note 393, at 341.
691. See the discussion of these alternatives supra Part XII.A-D.
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